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Prediction Markets: Theory and Applications
Abstract
In this thesis I oer new results on how we can acquire, reward, and use accurate
predictions of future events. Some of these results are entirely theoretical, improving
our understanding of strictly proper scoring rules (Chapter 3), and expanding strict
properness to include cost functions (Chapter 4). Others are more practical, like
developing a practical cost function for the [0, 1] interval (Chapter 5), exploring
how to design simple and informative prediction markets (Chapter 6), and using
predictions to make decisions (Chapter 7).
Strict properness is the essential property of interest when acquiring and rewarding
predictions. It ensures more accurate predictions are assigned higher scores than less
accurate ones, and incentivizes self-interested experts to be as accurate as possible.
It is a property of associations between predictions and the scoring functions used to
score them, and Chapters 3 and 4 are developed using convex analysis and a focus
on these associations; the relevant mathematical background appears in Chapter 2,
which oers a relevant synthesis of measure theory, functional analysis, and convex
analysis.
Chapters 5{7 discuss prediction markets that are more than strictly proper. Chap-
ter 5 develops a market for the [0, 1] interval that provides a natural interface, is
computable, and has bounded worst-case loss. Chapter 6 oers a framework to un-
derstand how we can design markets that are as simple as possible while still providing
iiiAbstract
an accurate prediction. Chapter 7 extends the classical prediction elicitation setting
to describe decision markets, where predictions are used to advise a decision maker
on the best course of action.
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Introduction
11: Introduction
All appearances being the same, the higher the barometer is, the greater the
probability of fair weather.
{ John Dalton, 17931
...there has been vague demand for [probabilistic weather] forecasts for sev-
eral years, as the usual inquiry made by the farmers of this district has
always been, \What are the chances of rain?"
{ Cleve Hallenbeck, 19202
Verication of weather forecasts has been a controversial subject for more
than half a century. There are a number of reasons why this problem has
been so perplexing to meteorologists and others but one of the most impor-
tant diculties seems to be in reaching an agreement on the specication of
a scale of goodness for weather forecasts. Numerous systems have been pro-
posed but one of the greatest arguments raised against forecast verication
is that forecasts which may be the \best" according to the accepted system of
arbitrary scores may not be the most useful forecasts.
{ Glenn W. Brier, 19503
One major purpose of statistical analysis is to make forecasts for the future
and provide suitable measures for the uncertainty associated with them.
{ Gneiting & Raftery, 20074
1From [27], see also [61] for a discussion of the history of probabilistic weather forecasts.
2From [46].
3All of Brier's quotes are from [16].
4From [43].
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This thesis studies the now classical problem of how we elicit and score predictions
about the future and some of its practical extensions. This problem is motivated
by a natural desire to acquire an accurate prediction about the likelihood of future
events from one or more self-interested (risk-neutral and expected score maximizing)
experts, or { equivalently { a desire to devise a system for scoring experts that rewards
accurate predictions. The formal study of this problem rst came from meteorology,
with its interest in predicting tomorrow's weather, and is now often studied indepen-
dently. Systems designed to elicit accurate predictions of the future have been used
to predict everything from presidential elections to technology trends, and it appears
they produce better predictions than some common alternatives.[17, 22]
After about sixty years of study there are still signicant challenges to our un-
derstanding of how we score predictions. Some of these challenges are theoretical {
we lack a complete understanding of how to relate our problem to various mathe-
matical objects { and many others are practical|some systems for eliciting accurate
predictions are too complicated to be used in practice, and actually making use of a
prediction can be surprisingly dicult. This thesis addresses some of these challenges,
oering a new theoretical perspective on how we score predictions and examining sev-
eral practical problems: (1) the creation of a practical securities market for events
occurring in the [0,1] interval, (2) the construction of simple and informative markets,
and (3) the use of predictions for decision making. Chapters 2{4 are more theoreti-
cal, presenting some mathematical background and then characterizing strictly proper
scoring rules and cost functions, and Chapters 5{7 present the three more practical
investigations. The rest of this introduction provides an overview of these chapters.
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1.1 Convex Functions and Relations
Chapter 2 synthesizes concepts from measure theory, functional analysis, and con-
vex analysis, to provide the mathematical tools and perspective needed in Chapters
3{5. It formalizes our discussion of predictions and scores, and shows how we can
study associations between them using convex analysis. These associations describe
how we score predictions, and will be the fundamental objects of study in Chapters
3 and 4.
Chapter 2 also develops some specialized new tools that let us succinctly describe
strictly proper associations between predictions and scoring functions, associations
that are the subject of Chapter 3.
1.2 Scoring Rules
Chapter 3 describes strictly proper scoring rules. Scoring rules are a popular
method for acquiring predictions about the future, and strict properness is the es-
sential property that guarantees they elicit and reward accurate predictions. These
rules dene an association between predictions and a means of scoring them, known
as scoring functions, and strict properness is a property of the structure of these
relations. Using the tools developed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 identies this strictly
proper structure as always being a subset of a relation described by convex functions.
When using a scoring rule ask an \expert," like a meteorologist, to oer a predic-
tion of the likelihood of future events, like whether or not it will rain tomorrow. A
scoring rule assigns this prediction a scoring function that maps each possible out-
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comes to a score. When a meteorologist is predicting the likelihood of rain there are
two outcomes, RAIN and NO RAIN, and a prediction is a probability distribution
over these possible outcomes. A scoring rule assigns the meteorologist's prediction
a scoring function b, and if it RAINS the expert is scored b(RAIN) and otherwise
b(NO RAIN).
If a scoring rule is strictly proper, then an expert expects to maximize its score only
when it oers the most accurate prediction possible. Alternatively, a strictly proper
scoring rule rewards accurate predictions more in expectation. If our meteorologist
thinks the likelihood of rain is 70% then a strictly proper scoring rule provides a strict
incentive for it to also predict a 70% likelihood. If a scoring rule is not strictly proper
then our meteorologist may expect to maximize its score by predicting 50% instead,
and this less accurate prediction might be rewarded just as much as or more than
the more accurate one! Simply put, scoring rules that are not strictly proper fail our
goal of eliciting and rewarding accurate predictions. This is why strict properness is
the essential property we need when eliciting and scoring predictions, and this point
cannot be emphasized enough.5
Strictly proper scoring rules have been studied heavily, ever since Brier proposed
a scoring system for weather predictions he thought would encourage and reward ac-
curate predictions [16]. Savage later characterized strictly proper scoring rules that
could handle countable outcome spaces [83], and Gneiting and Raftery described
them for arbitrary measurable spaces [43]. Both Savage's and Gneiting and Raftery's
characterizations identify strictly proper scoring rules with strictly convex functions,
5I think methods of acquiring a prediction that are not strictly proper have some serious explain-
ing to do.
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essentially showing that a strictly proper scoring rule's association between predic-
tions and scoring functions is described by a strictly convex function's association
between points and their \subtangents."6 This characterization is not as elegantly
stated as I have paraphrased it, and, from my perspective, it has real decits:
1. It provides little insight into why strictly proper scoring rules and strictly convex
functions are related.
2. It uses subtangents, atypical mathematical objects that are not part of convex
analysis
3. It requires the class of predictions considered is convex. Equivalently, it only
allows strictly proper scoring rules with convex instead of arbitrary domains.
4. It allows scoring rules to assign scores of negative innity to some experts, and
these scores cannot be assigned in a prediction market.7
5. It does not suggest a way of expanding strict properness to cost functions,
another popular method of scoring predictions. (Discussed in the next chapter.)
Gneiting and Raftery were not attempting to address these perceived decits; they
were certainly not trying to create a perspective on strict properness that would also
cover cost functions! My point here is that there is room to improve our fundamental
characterization of strictly proper scoring rules.
6See Chapter 3 for a more detailed analysis of Gneiting and Raftery's characterization.
7In a prediction market it is necessary to take the dierence of two scores. The dierence of
negative innity and negative innity is undened, and so scoring functions that assign negative
innity would result in an ill-dened market.
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By approaching strict properness from the perspective provided in Chapter 2,
Chapter 3 quickly arrives at a distinct characterization that shows a strictly proper
scoring rule's mapping from predictions to scoring functions is always a subset of
a convex function's mapping from its points to their unique supporting subgradients.
This is very similar to Gneiting and Raftery's characterization, and it has the following
advantages:
1. It claries the relationship between scoring rules, a type of relation, and convex
functions, which are a useful tool for understanding the structure of relations.
2. It uses the idea of \supporting subgradients" instead of \subtangents," and the
former is part of convex analysis.
3. It lets strict properness apply to any class of predictions, not just convex ones.
4. It restricts scores to be real-valued, letting these scores always usable by a
prediction market.
5. It oers a framework for extending strict properness to cost functions.
This second-to-last point may also be seen as a negative, since Gneiting and Raftery's
characterization is more general by allowing more scores. Written negatively, the
last item might read: scoring functions can no longer assign a value of negative
innity. This is a consequence of using supporting subgradients and the tools of
convex analysis instead of subtangents. Not being a complete generalization, I think
both characterizations are still of interest, and I hope my own oers the reader some
new insights for their own work.
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1.3 Cost Functions
Cost functions are another popular means of acquiring a prediction. These func-
tions are especially interesting since they can emulate futures markets where (one
or more) traders buy and sell securities whose values anticipate future events. While
scoring rules can also be used to run markets with many experts \trading" predictions,
trading securities using a cost function has two signicant advantages over using a
scoring rule: (1) it presents a familiar interface to traders, and (2) it lets traders focus
exclusively on their areas of expertise.8 Instead of having to predict the likelihood of
every future event, a cost function lets traders focus on determining whether a few
securities are priced correctly. The cost function, acting as a market maker, assumes
the role of translating trading behavior into a complete prediction of future events.
Futures markets have been implicitly acquiring and rewarding predictions of the
future since they were rst opened. The better a trader can predict the price of corn
the more it expects to make trading corn futures. These markets naturally provide the
same incentives a strictly proper scoring rule does for traders to acquire information
and produce predictions that are as accurate as possible. Well-designed cost functions
can let us act as market makers who emulate these futures markets.
Prior work on cost functions has usually developed them to have desirable eco-
nomic properties, to be eciently computable,9 or to make theoretical connections
8Generalizations of the scoring rules considered in Chapter 3, like those discussed in Chapter 6,
can also allow traders to focus in this way. Classically, however, we think of scoring rules request an
entire probability measure.
9When running a market with billions (or more) possibilities, accounting for the eects of one
trade on the system can be very dicult. For instance, if running a market to determine the next
U.S. president, it can be hard to understand how to increase the likelihood of a Democratic win if
traders begin purchasing the security that says they will win in Iowa. Some excellent work on this
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with other elds, especially machine learning [1]. This work has also often revealed
connections between cost functions and scoring rules [1, 3], yet the idea of a strictly
proper cost function was never formally developed.10 It has also proven dicult to
adapt cost functions to measurable spaces, and most work on them considers discrete
spaces.
Chapter 4 characterizes strictly proper cost functions on arbitrary measurable
spaces for the rst time. This characterization puts our understanding of cost func-
tions in parity with our understanding of scoring rules, and completely reveals the
relationship between the two. It does this by developing the perspective on scoring
rules in Chapter 3 into a more general object that I call a \scoring relation." These
scoring relations are the root object in the study of strict properness, and both scoring
rules and cost functions are derived from them.
Perhaps surprisingly, given our discussion so far, a cost function must be more
than strictly proper to emulate a futures market. Chapter 5 discusses the additional
structure required while developing a new cost function for continuous random vari-
ables.
problem is [53].
10The authors of [1] eectively show the cost functions they consider are strictly proper when they
demonstrate the mathematical connections these cost functions have to strictly proper scoring rules.
The concept of strict properness has been so alien to cost functions, though, that the authors do
not elaborate on the incentive implications of this result.
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1.4 A Cost Function for Continuous Random Vari-
ables
Chapter 5 continuous our discussion of cost functions. In Chapter 4 strictly proper
cost functions were described, and Chapter 5 begins by characterizing when these
functions actually emulate a futures market. In addition to being strictly proper,
emulating a futures market requires cost functions reliably oer traders a consistent
set of securities to buy and sell, and that they can quote meaningful prices for any
bundle of securities. These are natural properties we expect any market to have.
The second part of Chapter 5 uses the techniques developed to produce a prac-
tical cost function for continuous random variables. Cost functions for non-discrete
spaces have, historically, proven elusive. In [38] a set of economic properties was pro-
posed, as we expect from work on cost functions, and it was shown that cost functions
satisfying these properties must experience unbounded worst-case loss when working
with continuous random variables. Unbounded worst-case loss means that our market
maker can lose any amount of money, and this is an undesirable property to have in
practice. In [67] a cost function for continuous random variables with bounded loss
was incorrectly claimed, a claim withdrawn in the author's thesis [66]. These di-
culties have caused prior work to discretize the outcome space of continuous random
variables, or oer alternative interfaces other than a traditional cost function [68, 37].
Chapter 5 uses my characterization of strictly proper cost functions for arbitrary
measurable spaces to create a market for the outcome of a (bounded) continuous
random variable that (1) is strictly proper, (2) acts like a futures market, (3) has
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bounded worst-case loss, and (4) can be computed using a convex program. This cost
function is not perfect. It does not let traders buy and sell any security, and it is
incapable of representing every possible prediction. Still, it is an interesting rst step
in our development of cost functions for continuous random variables, and may even
be considered suitable for real use.
Chapter 5 concludes my discussion of strict properness in measurable spaces.
Chapters 6 and 7 continue, like Chapter 5, to discuss markets that are more than
strictly proper. The rst of these chapters, Chapter 6, asks how we can design predic-
tion markets that are simple and informative, and the second, Chapter 7, investigates
how we can use expert advice to make decisions.
1.5 Simple and Informative Markets
Chapter 6, like Chapter 5, focuses on a prediction market that is more than strictly
proper. In this chapter I assume a nite outcome space and Bayesian traders, with a
common prior and known information structure. Our prediction market oers a set
of securities, and Chapter 6 is interested in designing markets that are both simple
and informative.
A market is informative if (1) traders are able to converge on security prices that
reect all their private information, and (2) we are able to uniquely infer from these
prices the likelihood of some events of interest. This rst property has been studied
by [65], which showed a separability condition was necessary. In brief, this condition
related the available securities to the structure of traders' information. Securities
are the medium through which traders exchange ideas and debate in markets, and if
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they are cleverly structured then traders are able to accurate deduce the likelihood
of future events. Sometimes, however, this is not possible.
Consider, for example attempting to determine the future price of corn. Corn
prices are determined by a variety of factors, like the weather and future demand,
and if we understood these variables we could oer securities to determine how much
it would rain, and how much demand there would be. The prices of these securities
would then let traders better determine future corn prices. If we just oer a security
for the future price of corn, traders would be unable to express their information
about the weather, future demand for corn, etc., and the result is a less accurate
prediction of future corn prices.
The second property of informativeness is straightforward: the security prices
must actually be usable. This prevents us from mistakes like running a trivial market
with, for instance, a constant-valued security. Traders are always able to price this
security perfectly and it always tells us nothing. Thus informativeness is composed
of two properties.
Returning to our future corn price example, we might think one solution to best
determining the future price of corn is oering as many securities as possible, one for
every possible event. This would allow traders to express a great deal of information,
and the market would be very dicult, in practice, to run. Broadly speaking, the more
securities a market oers the more computationally complex it becomes to run, and
too many securities is computationally prohibitive. Some excellent work on making
tractable markets that can handle large outcome spaces is [31, 53].
Because too many securities is computationally prohibitive, then, when designing
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a market we think of both informativeness and simplicity. These are markets that
informative and that use as few natural securities as possible, securities that either
pay $0 or $1. This prevents us from oering superuous securities, as well as especially
strange securities real traders are unlikely to want to work with.
How we consider designing a market that is both simple and informative depends
on our knowledge of traders' signal structure, and Chapter 6 has two signicant re-
sults. The rst shows that without any knowledge of how traders' information is
structured a potentially huge number of securities is necessary to best identify the
likelihood of a future event, as many securities as outcomes that comprise the event
or its complement. The second shows that when we know traders' signal structure,
designing a simple and informative market is NP-hard. Thus, designing a simple
and informative market is either trivial and does not help us reduce the computa-
tional complexity of a market, or we actually have the chance of reducing a market's
complexity but doing so perfectly is NP-hard.
In the end, these results that simple prediction markets likely work because in-
formation is being exchanged outside the market, or traders' information is already
very simple. In our corn example traders might be receiving weather reports in-
stead of relying on weather securities. Given the hardness of usefully designing a
market that is both simple and informative, and how unlikely it is that we perfectly
know traders' information structure, this chapter likely raises more questions about
designing prediction markets than it answers.
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1.6 Making Decisions with Expert Advice
Chapter 7 concludes my new results with an investigation of how we can use expert
advice to help make decisions. Acquiring predictions of the future is, after all, only
useful if it might change how we act today|if it can inuence some decision we are
making. The idea of a \decision market" where prediction markets would inuence
policy decisions was rst proposed in [47], and formally studied for the rst time
in [69]. This latter paper revealed a tension between acting on decisions and ensuring
their accuracy, and they discussed a solution for a special case of the problem.
In the rst part of Chapter 7 I will fully characterize strictly proper decision
markets, which incentivize accurate predictions just like strictly proper prediction
markets. These markets consider a decision maker trying to choose between several
available actions. Experts are then asked to predict what would happen if each action
were taken. For example, a prediction of the likelihood of future events conditional
on action A being taken, and another prediction of the likelihood of future events
conditional on action B being taken. The decision maker can then review these
predictions to assist in picking what it thinks is the best possible action it can take.
Chapter 7 shows that strictly proper decision markets exist, and can be readily
built from traditional strictly proper scoring rules. Unfortunately, they also require
the decision maker risk taking any action with some (arbitrary small) probability.
Since this probability can be made as small as desired, this limitation still means a
decision maker can use a decision market to improve the chances it makes a good
decision.
The second part of Chapter 7 talks about decision making using the advice of
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a single expert. Here it is possible to simply take a recommended option, and rec-
ommendation rules can be constructed to incentivize the expert to reveal the option
the decision maker would most prefer. These recommendation rules are an interest-
ing departure from scoring rules since they are not necessarily designed to reward
more accurate predictions. Instead, they might give the expert a share of the de-
cision maker's utility for the actual outcome, aligning the expert's incentives with
the decision maker's. Recommendation rules are mathematically similar to scoring
rules, even if conceptually dierent, and they suggest there may be other uses for the
techniques developed in Chapters 2{4.
152
Mathematical Background
This chapter oers a relevant synthesis of some concepts from measure theory,
functional analysis, and convex analysis needed in Chapters 3{5. An excellent intro-
ductory measure theory book is [7], an excellent introductory functional analysis text
is [52], and a very interesting book on convex analysis is [9].
This chapter begins in Section 2.1 by showing how measure theory is an appro-
priate language for scoring predictions. The events we would like to predict are
represented by a measurable space, predictions are probability measures, and scor-
ing functions are bounded measurable functions. Section 2.2 shows how predictions
(probability measures) and scoring functions (bounded measurable functions) can be
placed in duality, and how each is actually a continuous linear function of the other.
Section 2.3 shows how convex functions can be used to study relations between ob-
jects in duality, like predictions and scoring functions, and develops some renements
particular to our work. In particular, it concludes with a description of a the rela-
tion between a convex function's points and their unique supporting subgradients, a
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relation that we will see describes all of strict properness.
2.1 Measures, Measurable Spaces, Sets and Func-
tions
When using a scoring rule we start with something we would like to predict, then
we acquire a prediction and assign it a scoring function that describes how it will
be scored. Afterwards we observe the actual outcome and use the scoring function
to assign the prediction a score. In this section I will formalize each of these steps
using concepts from measure theory, assisted by two running examples. The rst
will be of a meteorologist predicting the likelihood of rain tomorrow, and this will
allow us to use and compare our intuition from discrete probability theory with the
measure theory; the second example will be of a statistician predicting the outcome
of a continuous random variable on the [0, 1] interval, a more abstract instance that
requires measure theory understand.
2.1.1 Measurable Spaces and Sets
We will represent the possible outcomes of what we would like to predict as an
arbitrary measurable space, a tuple (
;F). This tuple consists of an outcome space

, a set that describes what may happen, and a  algebra F, a set that describes
the measurable sets of 
. These measurable sets are the sets we can use a measure to
assign a value (\size," \length," \mass") to, and are referred to as measurable. In our
context a measurable set is also described as an event. A measurable space always
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has at least one event, ensures the complement of any event is also an event, and
requires that a countable union of events is also an event (and thus so are countable
intersections of events).
Discrete probability theory does not explicitly dene a  algebra. When 
 is a
countable set, like fRAIN, NO RAINg, it is natural to think of every subset being
an event. Explicitly, such an outcome space 
 can be interpreted as belonging to the
measurable space (
;2
), and these spaces are the purview of discrete probability
theory.
Measure theory was developed to work with countable and uncountable outcome
spaces, like the [0, 1] interval, where assuming every subset is an event is mathemati-
cally problematic. The details of why this assumption is problematic is not important
for our purposes, and we need only accept that  algebras are a mathematical neces-
sity and that much of our intuition from discrete probability theory no longer applies
in this setting. We will not encounter any subsets of interest that are not also events
in this thesis, and we will never be interested directly in the structure of a  algebra;
they are mostly carried around as notation.
A common way of quickly dening and forgetting a  algebra for familiar sets 

is to generate one from a familiar or usual topology on 
. A topology is a collection
of open sets, just like a  algebra is a collection of measurable sets, that satises
some similar properties we will not be concerned with. We are intuitively familiar
with the \usual" Euclidean topology on the reals, where a basis of open sets are the
open intervals, the empty set, and R itself, and the uncountable unions of these sets
dene the open sets that compose the topology. A Borel  algebra generated from
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this topology is the smallest  algebra that contains every open set.
On the [0, 1] interval a more common  algebra is the Lebesgue measurable sets,
which also contains every open set and so is a super set of the Borel  algebra. These
sets are described in the next subsection along with Lebesgue measure.
2.1.2 Measures
In the previous subsection we represented the outcome space of what we would
like to predict as a measurable space. This measurable space provided a structure
of measurable sets or events that will let us describe how likely an event is, and a
prediction will be a complete description of how likely each event is. More formally,
a prediction will be a probability measure, a special type of measure.
Given a measurable space (
;F), a measure is any function that maps from the
 algebra to the reals,  : F ! R. The probability measures are a special closed
and convex subset of all measures that are non-negative, countably additive, and that
assign a likelihood of one to 
 itself.1 Countable additivity means that the sum of the
likelihoods of countably many disjoint events is equal to the likelihood of the union
of the disjoint events,
P
i (Fi) = ([iFi); 8i;j;Fi \Fj = ;. The set of probability
measures is denoted P.
With a discrete space, like 
 = fRAIN, NO RAINg, probability measures are
also called probability distributions, and handling them is well understood. With
an arbitrary measurable space it is not so clear what a probability measure looks
1Sometimes probability measures are allowed to be nitely additive, too. This may be an inter-
esting extension for future work to consider. We are usually economically interested in the countably
additive probability measures.
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like. Luckily, in the case of the [0, 1] interval the probability measures have a very
special and familiar structure. Understanding this rst requires knowing a little about
Lebesgue measure.
Lebesgue measure is a measure dened on the reals that acts as one might expect,
assigning intervals a measure equal to their length. In fact, Lebesgue measure is
\strictly positive," which means it assigns every open set of the interval a positive
value. Lebesgue measure is usually denoted , and the Lebesgue measurable sets are
denoted L. We will not go into detail about this measure, suce to say that they are
a superset of the Borel measurable sets, and so contain all points, subintervals, and
all their countable unions and nite intersections|every subset of interest on the [0,
1] interval. Thus we have statements like ([0;:5]) = (0;:5) = :5, and (:7) = 0.
Lebesgue measure and the Lebesgue measurable sets are so important that we will
always think of [0, 1] as part of the measurable space ([0;1];L). One nice thing about
probability measures whose domain is the Lebesgue measurable sets is that these
probability measures are identied with cumulative distribution functions (CDFs).2
Every cumulative distribution function is such a probability measure, and every such
probability measure is a cumulative distribution function. Lebesgue measure itself is
the uniform \straight-line" 45 degree angle CDF.
Returning to our context of acquiring a prediction, we start with a measurable
space (
;F) that represents the possible outcomes of what we would like to predict.
We normally think of an expert have some beliefs p 2 P of what they think most
likely to occur, and they make a prediction p0 2 P. If 
 = fRAIN, NO RAINg
2Right-continuous functions of the [0, 1] interval that begin at zero and go to one.
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then this prediction is a probability distribution, and if 
 = [0;1] this prediction is a
CDF. Strict properness is the property that attempts to make p0 = p. That is, strict
properness is about getting experts to tell us what they actually believe, or about
scoring them higher (in expectation) when the expert is most accurate and does so
(we take the expert's belief as the pinnacle of accuracy).
That beliefs and predictions over the [0, 1] interval are equivalently CDFs will oer
a great deal of useful structure that we will exploit in Chapter 5. Describing more
of this structure will require understanding measurable functions, and conveniently
these functions are also what we will use as scoring functions that determine what
score to assign a prediction.
2.1.3 Measurable Functions
So far we have discussed measurable spaces, sets, and measures, especially proba-
bility measures. When acquiring a prediction, we think of a measurable space (
;F)
describing the possible outcomes, and providing the structure necessary to dene
measures, like the probability measures, that represent an expert's beliefs and the
predictions they can make. In this subsection we describe measurable functions, a
subset of which we will use as our scoring functions that describe how we assign
predictions a score.
Let (
0;F0) and (
1;F1) be two measurable spaces. A function f : 
0 ! 
1 is
F0=F1 measurable when the inverse image of every measurable set is also a mea-
surable set. When the measurable spaces are understood, such functions will be
described simply as \measurable." This is analogous to the topological notion of
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continuity, where a function is continuous when the inverse of each open set is open.
If a function is continuous then it is measurable, and if a function is measurable it is
\almost continuous," having at most a countable number of discontinuities.
Our scoring functions will be bounded and measurable functions from (
;F) to
the reals with their Borel  algebra. The set of such functions is denoted B, and
(again) a member of this set is a function b : 
 ! R that is measurable and bounded.
Boundedness will be important in the next section, where we will need the supremum
norm of our scoring functions sup!2
 jb(!)j to be well-dened. Note that, while any
function b 2 B is bounded above and below by some real k, the set itself is unbounded.
It is important our scoring functions be measurable, because this will allow us to
take their expectation. If an expert has beliefs p 2 P, the expectation of a bounded
measurable function b 2 B is dened by the Lebesgue integral
p(b) =
Z


b dp (Expectation / Lebesgue integral)
This integral is a means of turning a countably additive measure, like p, into a function
of measurable functions. The precise denition of the integral is too detailed for this
overview; in the discrete setting we have a natural intuition about expectations, and
the integral is best understood as such. In the continuous setting the integral is like
the limit of a discrete expectation, and can be thought of as the values of the function
b times the measure that p assigns to them.
When predicting the likelihood of rain, 
 = fRAIN, NO RAINg and we interpret
this outcome space as part of a discrete space. Our meteorologist has some belief
about how likely rain is, and this is simply a probability distribution. Let's assume
the meteorologist believes there is a 70% chance of rain, and let this measure be p.
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We ask the meteorologist for a prediction p0 2 P, also a probability distribution, and
assign it a scoring function b 2 B. The expert expects to score p(b), its expectation
for the scoring function. If b(RAIN) = 1 and b(NO RAIN) = 0, then this would be
p(b) = :7(1) + :3(0) = :7. If RAIN occurs then the expert is scored b(RAIN) = 1.
When an expert is predicting the outcome of a continuous random variable its
beliefs are a probability measure or CDF p, and it oers as a prediction another CDF
p0. It receives a scoring function b : [0;1] ! R, and it expects to score p(b). If b is one
on [0, .5] and zero on (.5, 1], then p(b) = p([0;5])(1) + p((:5;1])(0). If the outcome .2
occurs then the expert is scored b(:2) = 1.
This concludes most of the measure theory we will need in the following chapters.
We have a way to represent what may happen, an understanding of beliefs and pre-
dictions as probability measures, and a knowledge of scoring functions as bounded
and measurable functions. This is a formal representation of how using a scoring
rule works, and in the next chapter I will focus on how we determine what scoring
function b to pair with each prediction p. Before moving on to discuss Banach spaces
and duality, however, it is convenient to now return to Lebesgue measure and how it
relates to probability measures on the [0, 1] interval. This structure will be needed
in Chapter 5.
2.1.4 Lebesgue Measure as a Perspective
The measurable space ([0;1];L) is so often of interest that we have a great deal
of specialized tools available for analyzing it, and we will need these tools in Chapter
5 when we focus on acquiring predictions over the interval. As described earlier
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in this section, probability measures on this interval are identied with cumulative
distributions functions CDFs). Lebesgue measure is the CDF corresponding to the
uniform distribution, and is a natural reference point for mathematical investigations.
In this subsection we will discuss how other probability measures on relate to it.
A probability density function (PDF) is another way of describing some proba-
bility measures on the [0, 1] interval. In the language of classical (not discrete) or
calculus-based probability theory, a PDF is usually dened as a function f : [0;1] ! R
that is Riemann integral. The likelihood of an event is then the Riemann integral of
this function over that event. For instance, the likelihood of the event [.2, 4] would
be
Z :4
:2
f dx (specifying likelihoods with a PDF)
Probability measures that can be described with a PDF are called \absolutely con-
tinuous" in classical probability theory.
From a measure theory perspective, one measure  is absolutely continuous with
respect to another measure   when there exists a measurable function, usually written
d
d  : [0;1] ! [0;1), such that
(L) =
Z
L
d
d 
d  (Radon-Nikodym derivative)
and this function is known as the Radon-Nikodym derivative of  with respect to  .3
If a probability measure p is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure,
then its Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to Lebesgue measure is then called
3I am misrepresenting the math a little here in a simplication that avoids notions like
 niteness. It would be more accurate here to say \any measure we might consider is absolutely
continuous with respect to another one we might ever consider when...."
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its PDF. To avoid a proliferation of \with respect to Lebesgue measure"s from appear-
ing, I will adopt the classical probability theory perspective that assumes Lebesgue
measure as a reference point. That is, I will also start referring to measures simply
as \absolutely continuous," and we will understand it is with respect to Lebesgue
measure.
Note that the change of integral from the Riemann to the Lebesgue here is a minor
issue, since while more functions are Lebesgue-integrable than Riemann-integrable,
the Riemann integral is equivalent to Lebesgue integration with respect to Lebesgue
measure wherever the former is dened.
Measures that are absolutely continuous do not have unique PDFs, and as men-
tioned not every probability measure has a PDF. In particular, probability measures
with point masses do not have PDFs. (These are measures that assign positive mass
to a single real number.4 There are also singular continuous measures, which do not
have point masses and are still not absolutely continuous. These measures are dicult
to work with (an example of a singular continuous measure is the probability mea-
sure that has uniform support on the Cantor set5) and we will, in fact, exclude them
from our consideration in Chapter 5 when designing a practical system for acquiring
predictions on the [0, 1] interval.
While not every measure has a PDF, every measure on the interval can be par-
titioned from the perspective of Lebesgue measure in what is known as a Lebesgue
decomposition. This partition results in three measures, one consisting only of point
4This is why probability measures are countably additive, and not simply additive. Many prob-
ability measures on [0, 1], like Lebesgue measure, assign a likelihood of zero to every point.
5Good luck trying to draw that CDF.
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masses known as a pure point part, an absolutely continuous part, and a singular con-
tinuous part. Further, the pure point part has a countable number of point masses,
and this fact and this decomposition will be used in Chapter 5. In fact, we can im-
mediately derive the fact that the pure point part has a countable number of point
masses because every point mass is a discontinuity in a CDF, and since CDFs are
right-continuous they have at most a countable number of discontinuities. Results
like this demonstrate the utility of working with probability measures on the interval,
where we can leverage the structure of CDFs.
Before concluding our discussion of measure theory and moving on to functional
analysis, I will prove that we can create a strictly convex function of the absolutely
continuous probability measures over the interval by using a strictly convex function
of the reals f : R ! R. Formally:
Lemma 1 (Strictly Convex Functions of Absolutely Continuous Measures). Letting
f : R ! R be a strictly convex function, the function
 () =
Z
[0;1]
f(
d
d
) d
is a strictly convex function of measures  over ([0;1];L) that are absolutely continu-
ous, where
d
d is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of  with respect to Lebesgue measure.
To prove this I will use the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (CDF Distinguishability). Any two CDFs F and G on [0;1] such that
9x 2 [0;1] such that F(x) 6= G(x) must dier on a non-empty open set.
Proof. We begin by showing distinct right-continuous functions dier on a non-empty
open set, then applying this results to CDFs.
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Let f and g be two right-continuous functions dened on [a;b) 2 R. Assume there
exists x 2 [a;b) such that f(x) 6= g(x). Let c = f(x)   g(x), then by right-continuity
there exists f;g > 0 such that f(x)   f(x0) < c=2 for all x0 2 (x;x + f), and
symmetrically for g. Let  = min(f;g), then on the interval [x;x + ) f and g are
nowhere equal since f is always within c=2 of f(x) on that interval and g is always
within c=2 of g(x), and f(x) and g(x) dier by c, so no number is within c=2 of both
of them.
Since any two right-continuous functions dier on a non-empty open subset and
CDFs are right-continuous if two CDFs F and G dier on [0;1) the result is imme-
diate. If the functions do not dier on [0;1) they do not dier anywhere since the
extension of a CDF to [0;1] is unique.
Which we now apply.
Proof. Let F and G be the CDFs of two probability measures absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure. A Radon-Nikodym derivative (density func-
tion) of the measure F +(1 )G is then dF
d +(1 )dF
d. Using the strict convexity
of f, we have the inequality
f


dF
d
+ (1   )
dF
d

<  (
dF
d
) + (1   )f(
dF
d
)
And the same inequality holds for the integrals
Z 1
0
f


dF
d
+ (1   )
dF
d

dx <
Z 1
0
f

dF
d

+ (1   )f

dF
d

dx
since it holds pointwise and applying Lemma 2 we have that the CDFs dier on an
open set and this implies their densities do, too, so the inequality is strict.
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Finally, we note that any other Radon-Nikodym derivative diers from the one
we constructed only on a Lebesgue-negligible set so the value of any such integral is
equivalent and the choice of density function is immaterial to the inequality.
This result will be used in Chapter 5. It is interesting because it lets us take an
easy to understand strictly convex function from the reals, and create a strictly convex
function of the absolutely continuous probability measures, a much more dicult class
of objects to work with.
2.2 Banach Spaces and Duality
Strict properness is a property of a relation, the association between predictions
and scoring functions or, as we saw in the last section, the association between prob-
ability measures and bounded measurable functions. Convex analysis will allow us to
study the structure of these associations because it lets us understand relationships
between the elements of a Banach space and its dual. This brief section describes
what those are, and how they apply to our interests.
2.2.1 Banach Spaces
A Banach space is a complete metric space. That is, it is a set X coupled with
a metric d where every Cauchy sequence converges to a limit in X. Elements of
a Banach space are vectors, and like all vector spaces these vectors may be added
together or multiplied by a scalar, and there always exists a zero vector.
Letting (
;F) be a measurable space, there are two Banach spaces we will be
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interested in. The rst is the ca space of (bounded, signed and) countably additive
measures, since this space contains the probability measures P as a closed convex
subset, and these represent beliefs and predictions. The metric we will use on the
probability measures is the total variation distance, dened as
jjp0   p1jj = sup
F2F
jp0(F)   p1(F)j (total variation distance)
Intuitively, the total variation distance of two probability measures is the greatest
dierence in likelihood they assign any event.6
It is important to realize that the probability measures are not, themselves, nat-
urally a Banach space: multiplying by any scalar other than one does not give us a
probability measure, nor does adding two probability measures together; plus, there
is no zero vector. Hence why we situate the probability measures in the ca space.
While we will not explicitly reference the ca space after this section, it will continue
to be important to think of the probability measures as a thin slice of a larger space,
as this geometric thinking oers valuable intuition in the next section.
The second Banach space we will be interested in is the bounded measurable
functions B, which will become our scoring functions. These are part of the dual
space of the probability measures (described below), and convex analysis will let us
study pairings between them. A norm on B is the supremum norm
jjbjj = sup
!2

jb(!)j (supremum norm)
and we use this to dene a metric that is simply the greatest dierence two functions
assign any point. Our need for Banach spaces is why we must restrict attention to
6This metric is derived from the total variation norm on the ca space: jjjj = +(
) + j (
)j,
where + is the positive part of the measure , and   is the negative part.
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the bounded measurable functions. Boundedness lets us dene our norm (and thus
our metric), and if the functions were allowed to have innite values we could not
add them together and would not have a vector space.
Gneiting and Raftery did not require their scoring functions to be bounded (they
did require them to be measurable), and this distinction is complicated because it
is, on the one hand, less general, and yet it lets us apply the powerful tools convex
analysis has to study strict properness. I think the key to understanding this trade-o
is that allowing unbounded scoring functions is, quite simply, uninteresting, and well
worth trading o for the rich theoretical framework we gain. First, innite scores are
impractical, and scoring functions that actually attain innite values cannot be used
in prediction markets where the dierence of two scoring functions must be taken.
Second, in the discrete setting and on the [0, 1] interval the only unbounded functions
must actually attain innite values, and the interest of functions that are real-valued
and unbounded is then, at best, specic to domains not yet considered. Finally, in
addition to being impractical it is theoretically limiting, a special case that requires
ad hoc tools and regularity conditions. I am happy to leave unboundedness behind,
at least for now, to leverage the standard tools of convex analysis.7
As mentioned, these sets P and B, are of interest because they can be placed in
duality and studied using convex analysis. This section concludes with a discussion
of this duality.
7For those familiar with strictly proper scoring rules, the logarithmic scoring rule is commonly
used as an example strictly proper scoring rule. This rule is unsuitable to use in a prediction market,
for the reasons mentioned, even though it often appears in that context. Further, my framework still
includes the logarithmic scoring rule, it just does not allow its domain to be any possible prediction.
When its domain is restricted the logarithmic scoring rule can associate every prediction with a
bounded scoring function, and this is the only version suitable for use in a prediction market.
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2.2.2 Duality
Two compatible Banach spaces can be paired, or placed in duality, and relations
between them studied using convex analysis. In particular, we can pair the ca space,
which includes the probability measures P, with the bounded measurable functions
B. We will be interested in this pairing because it associated beliefs and predictions
with scoring functions, and these associations will be fundamental to our study of
strict properness.
The continuous dual space of a Banach space X is the set of continuous linear
functions from X to the reals. The continuous linear functions from X to the reals,
denoted X, is also a Banach space, and its continuous dual space contains X. Two
Banach spaces that are part of the others' continuous dual spaces are considered
paired or placed in duality, and they have a natural bilinear form between them, a
function from X  X to the reals that is linear in both arguments.
The ca space and the bounded measurable functions can be placed in duality, and
the bilinear form between them is simply the Lebesgue integral. This is conventionally
written:
h;bi = (b) =
Z


b d (bilinear form)
for a countably additive measure  and bounded measurable function b.
As mentioned, convex analysis lets us study relations between spaces in dual-
ity. Since the probability measures are not the entire continuous dual space of the
bounded measurable functions, and the bounded measurable functions are not the
entire continuous dual space of the probability measures, we will exercise caution in
the next section to be sure we are only dealing with these objects of interest. This
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will become more apparent shortly.
2.3 Convex Functions and their Subdierentials
In the previous two sections we represented the possible outcomes we are trying to
predict as a measurable space (
;F). The probability measures P on this measurable
space are an expert's beliefs and the possible predictions, and the bounded measurable
functions B are the the possible scoring functions. We discussed how P and B were
part of each others' dual spaces, and I said this meant we could study relations
between them using convex analysis. In this section we will see what convex analysis
oers us. This section, unlike the other two in this chapter, actually contains some
specialized results of my own motivated by our focus on P and B, and we will need
these results in Chapters 3 and 4.
2.3.1 Functions and Relations
In this section we will be discussing many functions and relations, and we will
need some general notation for them.
A relation between two sets X and Y is a non-empty set of ordered pairs consisting
of an element from X and an element from Y . The domain of a relation is the elements
of X in it, and its range is the elements of Y in it. A relation between X and Y
is usually introduced as R  X  Y , and I write RT for the transpose of R, where
(y;x) 2 RT when (x;y) 2 R. The notation RjC is the restriction of R to C  X, the
set of pairs from R such that (x;y) 2 R and x 2 C. Then notation R(C) is the image
of C under R, or all y such that (x;y) 2 R for some x 2 C.
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A function f : X ! Y also denes a special type of many-to-one relation, and
we equivalently write f(x) = y and (x;y) 2 f. Functions, unlike relations, can be
described as lower semicontinuous (l.s.c.), an extremely useful property when study-
ing convex analysis, and continuous. Whenever we discuss the continuity or lower
semicontinuity of a function it will be a function between two normed spaces, and
continuity will be with respect to the norm topologies on X and Y .
2.3.2 Convex Functions
A convex functions maps a Banach space X to the extended reals  R such that8
f : X !  R (convex function)
f(x0) + (1   )f(x1)  f(x0 + (1   )x1); 8x0;x1 2 X; 2 [0;1]
if the inequality is strict for all x0;x1 2 X and  2 (0;1) then we say f is strictly
convex. If the inequality is strict whenever tested on a subset W  X then I will
describe f as strictly convex on W. That is, a function is strictly convex on a set
W if the inequality is strict whenever x0;x1 and x0 + (1   )x1 are in W. This is
my own generalization of strict convexity, and we will use it when characterizing the
structure of strictly proper scoring rules.
Convex functions have some special notation. The eective domain of a convex
function f is where it is real-valued and is denoted domf  X. If W  X and I
write f : W !  R then I mean the eective domain of f is a subset of W and it is
+1 elsewhere. If a function is real-valued somewhere and nowhere negative innity
8The mapping is also often described as from a convex subset of X. This distinction is uninter-
esting since the domain of such a function can be extended to all of X by dening it as +1 outside
its original domain. This extension preserves convexity, properness and lower semicontinuity.
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then it is called proper. If a function is both l.s.c. and proper I will call it closed.
This language will be especially useful as it will avoid a profusion of \propers" in
our discussion. This language is also appropriate since a proper convex function is
l.s.c. if and only if its epigraph9 is closed, which is the case when the eective domain
of the function is a closed convex set. One incredibly useful fact is that a function
is closed and convex if and only if it is the supremum of a family of continuous
ane functions.[9, p. 80] I will actually use a family of continuous linear functions in
Chapter 3, a special case of this result.
Two useful facts about l.s.c. convex functions that I will use later are that (1)
l.s.c. convex functions are bounded below on bounded sets [13, p. 144] and (2) l.s.c.
and real-valued convex functions of Banach spaces are, in fact, continuous [9, p. 74].
2.3.3 The Subdierential
Convex functions admit a generalization of the classical derivative known as the
subdierential. Subgradients, elements of the subdierential, are points from the dual
space of the convex function's domain, and a convex function's association between
points and subgradients describes a class of relations between two spaces placed in
duality. In our case, a convex function f : P ! R will have subgradients that are
elements of B, and a convex function f : B ! R will have subgradients that are
elements of P. Of course, as mentioned previously P and B are not each others'
entire dual space, and so the subdierential of these functions may contain elements
9We will not need to know what the epigraph is. Very roughly, we can get some intuition into
what the epigraph is by saying that for a convex function f : R !  R the epigraph is the set in R2
dened as the space above the function.
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from outside our sets of interest. I will create a renement of the subdierential that
lets us restrict attention to just these sets of interest. To reiterate our goal, we are
interested in relations between predictions from P and scoring functions from B, and
these relations will be encoded or embodied or identied with an association between
points and subgradients of a convex function.
Let X be the continuous dual space of X. The subdierential of a (proper)10
convex function f is the function @f dened as11
@f : domf ! 2
X
(subdierential)
@f(x0) = fx

0jx

0 2 X
; f(x)   f(x0)  hx   x0;x

0i; 8x 2 Xg
Following convention I let dom@f be the subset of X where the subdierential of f
is non-empty. An element of @f(x) is referred to as a subgradient of f at x, and if
dom @f = domf I will simply describe the function as subdierentiable. A useful
fact is that the subgradients of a convex function always form a closed convex set in
the continuous dual space.
It is important to remember that a subgradient is a continuous linear function
of the domain of a convex function. When studying convex functions in Euclidean
space, f : Rn ! R, these functions can be identied with vectors from Rn. This
is because n dimensional Euclidean space is its own continuous dual space. Every
linear function on Rn can be represented as a vector from Rn, and the bilinear form
between these two spaces is the dot product. When working in a discrete setting,
like our meteorologist predicting rain tomorrow, we have a nite number of outcomes
10For the subdierential of a convex function to be nonempty it must be proper.
11Following convention that 2X is the collection of all subsets of X.
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and a probability measure is also a vector in Rn. In that example it is actually an
element of R2. We also saw that its scoring functions had two values, and so could
be identied with elements of R2 as well. This is to be expected because a scoring
function comes from the continuous dual space of the probability measures. Note
that it is easy to become confused, and think of this dual space as always having the
same structure, and this example reveals how this is not the case. The continuous
dual space of the probability measures depends greatly on the measurable space we
are considering. When we consider a convex function f : R2 ! R, its subgradients
will also be members of R2, and we will use the association between points on the
function and its subgradients to associate predictions with scoring functions.
On the [0, 1] interval a probability measure is a CDF, and so our convex function
will map CDFs to the extended reals, f : P !  R. On its eective domain it may
be subdierentiable, and where subdierentiable it creates an association between
CDFs and elements of their continuous dual space. Unlike R2, this may or may not
be a bounded measurable function. Assuming it is, the convex function will describe
an association between CDFs and bounded measurable functions of the interval b :
[0;1] ! R. I will next introduce a renement of the subdierential that ensures we
do not accidentally describe an association between probability measures and other
mathematical objects.12
12There does not seem to be a good description of what, exactly, the continuous dual space of the
probability measures on an arbitrary measurable space is. Although we do know that the continuous
dual space of the bounded measurable functions is the ba space of all bounded and nitely additive
signed measures, which includes the ca space as a closed subspace.
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2.3.4 Rening the Subdierential
As mentioned, we will need to rene the subdierential so that we can restrict it
only to the objects we are interested in, like the probability measures and bounded
measurable functions, so we can focus on relations only between them.13
Letting Y  X, the Y  subdierential of a convex function is
@Yf : domf ! 2
Y (Y  subdierential)
@Yf(x0) = @f(x0) \ Y
In particular, the B subdierential of a convex function will only include the bounded
measurable functions, and the P subdierential will only include probability mea-
sures.
Another, further renement will be to focus on a convex function's association
between points and their unique subgradients. This is because it will be useful later
to be sure that only one probability measure p is associated with each bounded
measurable function b, and this association can be identied with a convex function
f : P !  R where b is a subgradient of f at p and only at p. In fact, it is this unique
subdierential relation that is necessary and sucient for there to be a strictly proper
relationship between the probability measures and bounded measurable functions,
although elaborating on this will have to wait until Chapter 3.
13Previously I mentioned that Gneiting and Raftery did not require boundedness. Maybe future
work will not even require measurability, and allow any element of the continuous dual space to
somehow be used as a scoring function. How, exactly, this would work is beyond my understanding,
as the continuous dual space of the ca space is an unknown menagerie with objects so exotic they
are unlikely to be both functions from the ca space and from our state space 
. Our ability to
interpret the bounded measurable functions as both is essential, since as functions from the ca space
they dene an expectation, and as functions from the state space they dene a score.
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Formally, the unique (Y  )subdierential of a convex function f is
@Yf : domf  2
domf ! 2
Y (unique subdierential)
@Yf(x0;W) = fx

0 j x

0 2 @Yf(x0);x

0 62 @Yf(x); 8x 2 W;x 6= x0g
This says that the unique Y  subdierential at a point x0 with respect to a set W is
the set of Y  subgradients of x0 that are not also subgradients at other points in W.
So if f : P !  R and b 2 @Bf(p;P) then the bounded measurable function b is in the
B subdierential of f at p, and nowhere else.
These renements are my own, and maybe in the future they will be standardized
better. They are needed for the particular analysis we will be doing, as will the follow-
ing little lemma that connects unique subgradients with the subgradient inequality
holding strictly. This lemma will be used in my characterization of scoring rules, and
appears to be known (used in [43] without proof) but not formalized elsewhere.
Lemma 3 (Uniqueness and Strict Subgradient Inequality). Let X be a Banach space
and X its continuous dual space; let f : X !  R be a (proper) convex function with
x
0 2 @f(x0). If W  X, then x
0 2 @f(x0;W) if and only if f(x)   f(x0) > hx  
x0;x
0i for all x 2 W;x 6= x0.
Proof. The subgradient inequality implies
f(x)   f(x0)  hx   x0;x

0i; 8x 2 X (subgradient inequality)
f(x)   hx;x

0i  f(x0)   hx0;x

0i
So if there exists x0 2 W such that
f(x
0)   f(x0) = hx
0   x0;x

0i (Case 1)
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then
f(x)   hx;x

0i  f(x
0)   hx
0;x

0i; 8x 2 X
and so Case 1 implies x
0 is also a subgradient of f at x0, and so not in the unique
subdierential of f at x0 with respect to W.
Alternatively
f(x)   f(x0) > hx   x0;x

0i; 8x 2 W;x 6= x0 (Case 2)
f(x0)   f(x) < hx0   x;x

0i
yet if x
0 2 @f(x) then
f(x0)   f(x)  hx0   x;x

0i (subgradient inequality)
a contradiction, and so this case implies x
0 62 @f(x); 8x 2 W;x 6= x0. Thus, since
we assumed x
0 2 @f(x0), it is in the unique subdierential of f at x0 with respect to
W.
Before moving on, the subdierential, being a function, is naturally a relation
between a set X and 2X. It is incredibly convenient and conventional to pretend it
is instead a relation between X and X itself, with (x;x) 2 @f when x 2 @f(x). I
will use the same convention for similar functions through this chapter and Chapters
3{5.
2.3.5 G^ ateaux dierential
There are many notions of dierentiability suitable for working in Banach spaces,
one closely related with the notion of subdierentiability is the G^ ateaux dierential.
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Understanding this particular dierential and how it relates to strict properness is
useful because it is a familiar mathematical property, and in Chapter 5 it will oer
us a natural notion of prices for securities as well as a means of associating many
probability measures with a bounded measurable function. The details of these last
two advantages must, of course, be left for Chapter 5 since they require a great deal
of new context to be understood.
Let X be a Banach space, and f : X !  R a function. Assume the limit
lim
!0
f(x + h)   f(x)

exists for all h 2 X at a point x 2 X, the G^ ateaux variation of f at x is the function
rf(x;) : X !  R (G^ ateaux variation)
rf(x;h) = lim
!0
f(x + h)   f(x)

And f is G^ ateaux dierentiable at x if the variation is a continuous linear function
of h, in which case we refer to it as the G^ ateaux dierential. That is, f is G^ ateaux
dierentiable at x if the G^ ateaux variation exists and is an element of the continuous
dual space of X. For a function f : R ! R this means the dierential is simply a real
number and is, in fact, the derivative, and for a function f : Rn ! R the G^ ateaux
dierential is the gradient.
The subdierential and G^ ateaux dierential are sometimes related. If a convex
function has a single subgradient at a point where it is nite and continuous then
the function is G^ ateaux dierentiable there and its subgradient is the dierential.
Conversely, if a convex function is G^ ateaux dierentiable at a point it has a single
subgradient at that point equal to the dierential, and if a convex function is l.s.c.
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and G^ ateaux dierentiable at a point it is continuous there, too [9, p. 87][13, p. 159].
2.3.6 Cyclic Monotonicity and the Subdierential
So far we have dened the subdierential and a few renements, and mentioned
that the relationship between points and subgradients of a convex function can let
us study relations between spaces in duality. This subsection describes how convex
functions lets us study cyclically monotonic relations, and importantly how any such
relation is always part of the subdierential of some closed convex function. This
last fact will let us focus exclusively on this class of convex functions without loss,
letting us use the great additional structure we get with closed functions to study our
relation of interest, that between the probability measures and bounded measurable
functions.
I just mentioned how we interpret @f as a relation between a Banach space X
and its continuous dual X, and it turns out these relations are exactly the cyclically
monotone ones between these spaces [82]. A relation R  X  X is cyclically
monotone when
X
i2I
hxi;x

ii 
X
i2I
hx(i);x

ii (cyclic monotonicity)
for every nite set of points I, (xi;x
i) 2 R and where  is any permutation of I. A
relation is a subset of the subdierential relation of a convex function if and only if the
relation is cyclically monotone.14, and is the subdierential of a closed convex function
14As a concrete example, the Rockafellar function of a relation R always encodes the relation. It
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if and only if it is maximal cyclically monotone.15 Every cyclically monotone relation
can be extended to a maximal cyclically monotone one, and a maximal cyclically
monotone relation interpreted as a subdierential @f uniquely denes f up to an
additive constant [82].16 Importantly, this means that any subdierential relation is
part of the subdierential relation of some closed convex function, and this allows us
to restrict attention to this class, which sometimes oers valuable structure.
2.3.7 Conjugate Functions
A useful tool when studying the subdierential relation of a convex function,
especially closed convex functions, is a function's conjugate. Intuitively, the conjugate
of a closed convex function is also a closed convex function where the subdierential
relationship is ipped. Conjugates will be used in Chapter 4 where I describe cost
functions, and Chapter 5 as a means of identifying the subdierential of a particular
convex function.
is dened as
fR : X !  R (Rockafellar function)
f(x) = supfhx   xn;x
ni +  + hx1   x0;x
0ig
where the supremum is taken over all nite sets pairs (xi;x
i) 2 R. If R is cyclically monotone then
fR is a closed convex function, and if also (x;x) 2 R then x 2 @fR(x).
15This is true when X is a Banach space, as I have assumed. A relation is maximal cyclically
monotone if no additional pairs can be added to it without violating the cyclic monotonicity condi-
tion. Equivalently, a relation is maximal cyclically monotone if it is not a subset of another cyclically
monotone relation. See [12] for a good survey of and introduction to monotonic functions.
16Recall that we are treating the subdierential as a subset of X  X.
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Formally, the conjugate of a convex function f : X !  R is dened as
f
 : X
 !  R (conjugate function)
f
(x
) = sup
x2X
hx;x
i   f(x)
Conjugates have many interesting properties. The conjugate of a proper convex
function is always a closed convex function. The biconjugate of f is the conjugate of
its conjugate and is written f; if f is a closed convex function then f(x) = f(x)
for all x 2 X.17 In the future I will write f(x)
X = f(x) when two functions agree on
a set X.
As an example, a closed convex function f : P !  R has a conjugate function f
that can be restricted to B, fjB : B !  R. We will see that if f describes the expected
score function of a scoring rule, then fjB describes a cost function. Alternatively, if
f : B !  R is a closed convex function describing a cost function, then its restricted
conjugate fjP : P !  R will describe the expected score function of a scoring rule.
These facts are elaborated on in Chapter 4.
What makes the conjugate so useful for the study of the subdierential of a closed
convex function is the conjugate-subgradient theorem, adapted here from [9].
Theorem 1 (Conjugate-Subgradient Theorem). Let X be a Banach space and X
17I am intentionally careful not to say the two functions are identical. The biconjugate may be
well-dened outside the domain of the original function since it maps not from the original space X
but X, the bidual of X. The bidual of the ca space is not itself, for example. When a space is
its own bidual it is called reexive and admits many special properties. Finite dimensional spaces
like Rn are always reexive and convex analysis in these spaces admits a great deal of additional
structure. In fact, Euclidean n-space is also its own continuous (and algebraic) dual space. This
is why we often see subgradients dened as a dot product between two n-dimensional vectors: the
dot product is the bilinear form between n-dimensional Euclidean space and its continuous dual
(itself). Structural dierences like this can make convex analysis in general Banach spaces dicult
to understand since we are likely to bring our Euclidean assumptions along with us to places they
no longer belong.
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its continuous dual space; also let f : X !  R be a proper and convex function. Then
the following three properties are equivalent:
1. x 2 @f(x)
2. f(x) + f(x) = hx;xi
If the function is also l.s.c. (closed) then the above properties are also equivalent to
3. x 2 @f(x)
The rst and third equivalences state that the conjugate of a closed convex func-
tion \ips" its subdierential relation. The second equivalence describes where the
conjugate function expression attains its supremum. That is, if x 2 @f(x), we have
that
f
(x
) = hx;x
i   f(x)
x 2 argmax
x2X
hx;x
i   f(x) (conjugate attainment)
This equivalence will be useful for understanding a convex function's supporting sub-
gradients, and how they relate to the subdierential. These supporting subgradients
are essential to our understanding of strict properness, and are described in the next
subsection.
2.3.8 Supporting Subgradients
A critical relationship for strict properness is that between points on a convex
function f and its supporting subgradients. These are subgradients that agree with
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the function when they are in the subdierential or, equivalently, subgradients for
which f is zero. It is precisely these supporting subgradients that we will identify
with scoring functions, and relations between points and unique supporting subgra-
dients will describe every strictly proper association between predictions and scoring
functions.
This subsection, unlike the others in this section, specically addresses convex
functions of the probability measures f : P ! R. These functions have supporting
subgradients wherever they are subdierentiable, and this is not generally the case.
Other functions always have supporting hyperplanes, but these are ane and not
linear functions. Working with them is dicult since they do not t in our standard
duality framework. Luckily, when we focus exclusively on the probability measures
we can stick with more familiar linear functions for our analysis.
The subdierential of (proper) convex functions f : P ! R actually has several
interesting properties we will use. First, it may contain elements from the continuous
dual space of the ca space, and this may mean functions outside of B. Thus we will
restrict our attention to the B subdierential. A notable special case where this is not
required is when our measurable space (
;F) has a nite set 
. In this case a convex
function of the probability measures is a function f : Rj
j ! R,18 and the continuous
dual space is also represented by Rj
j. Our scoring functions are vectors describing
a score for each outcome, there are j
j outcomes, and so the scoring functions are
identied with vectors in Rj
j. The bilinear form between the probability measures
18More precisely the function maps from the probability simplex of 
, not any vector in the
Euclidean plane.
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and bounded measurable functions in this case is the dot product.19
A second fact about the subdierential of a convex function f : P ! R, is that if
it contains b0 2 B at a point p0 2 P, then it also contains b0 +k for all k 2 R at that
point.20 We can check this using the subgradient inequality:
f(p)   f(p0)  hp   p0;b0 + ki (subgradient inequality)
f(p)   f(p0)  hp   p0;b0i + hp   p0;ki
f(p)   f(p0)  hp   p0;b0i + k   k
f(p)   f(p0)  hp   p0;b0i
the last line being true because we assumed b0 2 @f(p0). Intuitively, the expected
value of a constant function k is simply k, and using the separability of the bilinear
form shows that if one function is in the subdierential of such a function f, then
every translation of that function is, too. Further, if b0 is in the unique subdierential,
then all its translations are, too.
The above also tells us if f is (uniquely) B subdierentiable at a point p0, then it
has a (unique) supporting B subgradient at that point, too. This requires formally
dening a supporting subgradient. Letting P  P and B  B, we can dene this
mapping as
@
?
Bf : P  2
P ! 2
B (unique supporting B subgradients)
@
?
Bf(p;P) = fx
? j x
? 2 @Bf(p;P);x
?(p) = f(p)g
19The dot product equals the Lebesgue integral in this case.
20That is, it contains the function dened by adding b0 with the constant function k, which can
be represented by a real value.
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and as a shorthand I will let @?
Bf(p) = @?
Bf(p;p) be the not necessarily unique sup-
porting B subgradients of f at p. So letting b0 2 @f(p0) as before, then the function
b0   f(b0) is a supporting subgradient of f at p0, and this construction shows that
(unique) subdierentiability implies the existence of a (unique) supporting subgradi-
ent.
The next chapter demonstrates these unique supporting B subgradients describe
every scoring rule, and Chapter 4 shows they describe all of strict properness.
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The old-established way of measuring a person's belief is to propose a bet,
and see what are the lowest odds which he will accept. This method I regard
as fundamentally sound; but it suers from being insuciently general, and
from being necessarily inexact.
...
Suppost next that the subject is capable of doubt; then we could test his degree
of belief in dierent propositions by making him oers of the following kind.
Would you rather have world  in any event; or world  if p is true, and
world  if p is false?
...
This is, of course, a very schematic version of the situation in real life, but
it is, I think, easier to consider it in this form.
{ Frank P. Ramsey, 19261
...one essential criterion for satisfactory verication is that the verication
scheme should inuence the forecaster in no undesirable way. Unfortunately,
the criterion is dicult, if not impossible to satisfy, although some schemes
will be much worse than others in this respect.
{Glenn W. Brier, 1950
1All Ramsey's quotations are taken from his essay Truth and Probability [81].
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Strictly proper scoring rules are a popular means of acquiring and rewarding
accurate predictions of the future. Our study of these rules is motivated by a desire
to predict the likelihood of future events, events we assume can be represented by
a measurable space (
;F). We ask an expert for a prediction from P, and use a
scoring rule to associate it with a scoring function from B. If the rule is strictly
proper then this association is designed to incentivize self-interested experts to oer
the most accurate prediction possible, or, equivalently, this association is designed to
reward, in expectation, more accurate predictions more than less accurate ones.
Strict properness is the essential property for eliciting and valuing predictions.
If we ask experts for predictions and attempt to score them in a non-strictly proper
fashion then we arrive back at the problem Brier was trying to solve in 1950: our
\verication scheme" inuences our forecaster in undesirable ways. It may let the
expert be lazy and oer a less accurate prediction without penalty, or it may ac-
tively encourage the expert be inaccurate. Neither of these cases is desirable, and
from a narrative perspective we will remain exclusively interested in strict proper-
ness. Traditionally, however, a weaker property known simply as \properness" is
also characterized alongside strict properness, and this is mathematically so easy to
do that I will follow convention and my formal statements will describe proper and
strictly proper scoring rules.
In this chapter I characterize strictly proper scoring rules. I begin with a formal
denition in Section 3.1, then discuss how these rules can also be used to run a
prediction market in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 oers the formal characterization, and
Section 3.4 concludes by comparing my characterization to that oered in [43], which
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also characterized strictly proper scoring rules for measurable spaces. My result
stresses the relationship between predictions and scoring functions, and how it is this
relationship that a class of convex functions describes. Situating my discussion within
the realm of convex analysis oers many advantages, and one minor and arguable
disadvantage
3.1 Scoring Rules, Formally
Scoring rules have been dened and characterized many times, notably for discrete
spaces in [83] and for measurable spaces in [43]. The typical denition of a scoring
rule diers from the one I will oer, although the two are essentially the same barring
notational dierences. My denition will t much better in our narrative, however.
The classical denition appears at the end of this chapter when discussing Gneiting
and Raftery's characterization of strictly proper scoring rules. My own denition is:
Denition 1 ((Strictly Proper) Scoring Rule). A scoring rule is any function S :
P ! B.2 If S is a scoring rule with domain P and image or codomain B, it is called
(P=B )proper when
p(Sp)  p(Sp
0) (properness)
for all p;p0 2 P. The rule is strictly (P=B )proper when the inequality holds strictly
unless p0 = p.
We can relate this denition back to our motivating story. When using a scoring
2A scoring rule is an operator, and it will often be convenient to follow convention and write Sp
instead of S(p).
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rule we begin with a desire to predict the likelihood of future events, represented by
(
;F). An expert has some beliefs p 2 P about how likely these future events, and
we ask this expert for a prediction p0 2 P. Our scoring rule maps this prediction to
a scoring function, b = Sp0, and after we wait and observe the actual outcome ! 2 

the expert is scored b(!). Strict properness says the expert's expected score, p(Sp0),
is uniquely maximized when the expert reveals its beliefs. This is a strict incentive for
self-interested (and risk neutral) experts to accurately report what they think likely
to occur. Further, a strictly proper scoring rule rewards, in expectation, an expert
reporting what it believes to be the most accurate prediction of the future.
A strictly proper scoring rule S denes a one-to-one relation between P and B.
Each prediction (probability measure) can be associated with only one scoring func-
tion (bounded measurable function), and each scoring function can only be associated
with one prediction. This is best understood as thinking of a scoring rule as oer-
ing its expert a menu of scoring functions B. The expert picks a function from this
menu, and we then infer from its choice what its beliefs are. If one scoring function
was associated with two predictions then we would be unable to infer the expert's be-
lief. A scoring rule also must associate only one scoring function with each prediction
because it is a function of the predictions.
Thinking of scoring rules as oering a menu will be an especially useful intuition
in the next chapter on cost functions. For now, the key point is to realize that the
expert's prediction p0 is simply the language it uses to select a scoring function. A
scoring rule is strictly proper, then, when the menu of scoring functions it oers
separates the possible predictions, with each prediction expecting its own scoring
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function to score highest. Note that I did not say \with each scoring function being
maximized by a dierent prediction." This is a distinct property and it does not relate
to strict properness. Strict properness is about each prediction or belief \preferring"
a dierent function from the menu oered.
3.2 Prediction Markets and Scoring Rules
A prediction market is a popular mechanism for acquiring a consensus prediction
from a group of experts, not just one expert as we have been discussing. Prediction
markets using scoring rules were rst proposed in [48], and have been heavily studied
since. Predictions markets often use a scoring rule or a cost function, and in this
section I will describe them using scoring rules.
A prediction market that uses a scoring rule, or more concisely a scoring rule
market, lets one or more \traders" interact with a scoring rule a countable number of
times. It begins, like always, with a desire to predict the likelihood of future events,
represented by (
;F). The market starts or \opens" with an initial prediction p0,
then accepts traders' public and countable predictions as p1;p2;:::. Eventually the
market closes with a nal prediction p, either because traders stop oering predictions
or because the market stops accepting them, and afterwards we observe the actual
outcome ! 2 
 and score each trader the sum of the scores of their predictions minus
the sum of the scores of the immediately preceding predictions, as determined by our
scoring rule.
How traders are scored in a market and how we interpret these scores requires
elaboration. Let our scoring rule market be using a scoring rule S : P ! B, then the
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trader who made prediction pi receives a score of
(Spi   Spi 1)(!) (market's score for a prediction)
for that prediction. Prediction markets reward traders for improving over the last
prediction. If the scoring rule S is strictly proper then I will also describe the market
as strictly proper. A strictly proper market has the important property that if the last
prediction made disagrees with a trader's beliefs, then that trader has an incentive to
adjust the market. In particular, if the market closes with a prediction p that diers
from a trader's belief, then that trader had an opportunity to score higher than it did.
Thus, if trading stops organically in a market we are assured of a consensus among
the traders.
Our alternative motivation for strict properness was rewarding accurate predic-
tions, and a strictly proper market can be thought of as rewarding the improvement a
more accurate prediction makes upon a less accurate one. It also penalizes predictions
that are less accurate than the ones immediately preceding them. These markets are
especially clever because they reward the marginal information of a prediction. In
practice, they are also often considered cost eective because the total payout to
traders is only (Sp   Sp0)(!).
I said that if trading stops organically in a strictly proper market then it implies
a consensus among traders. It may be, however, that trading would never stop of
traders' own accord, or that the consensus reached is a poor one. How markets do
or do not reach consensus and aggregate information is discussed more in Chapter 6.
Still, with these classical prediction markets we think of accepting the last prediction
made as the best we will receive. Remember, though, our discussion of predictions
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markets here is just motivational and contextual. We need nor make no assumptions
about them or their use until Chapter 5 and beyond, where we will discuss particular
types of markets.
3.3 Characterizing Strictly Proper Scoring Rules
A scoring rule is a relation between P and B, two paired spaces. Chapter 2 dis-
cussed how some relations between such pairs could be studied using convex analysis,
and the following characterization of strict properness shows that strictly proper scor-
ing rules are represented by a subset of the structure of a particular class of convex
function.
Theorem 2 (Strictly Proper Scoring Rules and Convex Functions with Unique Sup-
porting Subgradients). Let P  P and B  B. A scoring rule S : P ! B is
strictly P proper if and only if there exists a convex function fS : P !  R such that
S  @?
BfS(P;P). The rule is P proper if and only if S  @?
BfS(P). (In plain English,
a scoring rule is strictly proper if and only if it is a subset of the unique supporting
subgradient relation of a convex function of the probability measures.)
Proof. Let S : P ! B be a P=B proper scoring rule (the assumption that S is onto
is without loss of generality), and let fS be the closed convex function dened as the
pointwise supremum of B, fS(p) = supb2B p(b). Letting (p0;b0) 2 S, properness says
hp0;b0i  hp0;bi; 8b 2 B (properness)
and this implies fS(p0) = p0(b0). We now verify b0 is a supporting subgradient of fS
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at p0 by checking the subgradient inequality:
fS(p)   fS(p0)  hp   p0;b0i (subgradient inequality)
sup
b2B
p(b)   hp0;b0i  hp;b0i   hp0;b0i
sup
b2B
p(b)  hp;b0i
which is always true, and so this convex function is such that S  @?
BfS(P), as desired.
When S is strictly P=B proper we have
hp0;b0i > hp0;bi; 8b 2 B (strict properness)
still implying fS(p0) = p0(b0). Following the above b0 is a supporting subgradient of
fS at p0, and we verify it is unique with respect to P by checking the strict subgradient
inequality on P (see Lemma 3):
fS(p)   fS(p0) > hp   p0;b0i;p 2 P (strict subgradient inequality)
sup
b2B
p(b)   hp0;b0i > hp;b0i   hp0;b0i
p(b) > hp;b0i;(p;b) 2 P
which follows from strict properness. These two arguments show that every proper
scoring rule implies the existence of a (closed) convex function with a corresponding
supporting B subgradient relation, and that every strictly proper scoring rule implies
the existence of a (closed) convex function with a corresponding unique supporting
subgradient relation.
Now let fS be a (proper) convex function fS : P ! R, and let S  @?
BfS(P)
be a non-empty one-to-one relation, and let the range of this relation be B. The
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subgradient inequality and the structure of this relation tell us
fS(p)   fS(p0)  hp   p0;b0i; 8(p0;b0) 2 S
which we substitute into using fS(p0) = p0(b0), to obtain
fS(p)  hp;b0i
and if (p;b) 2 S this gives
hp;bi  hp;b0i;8(p;b) 2 S;b0 2 B
which is properness. If S  @?
PfS(P;P) then the subgradient and following inequal-
ities are strict whenever b 6= b0, and we have strict properness. This concludes our
proof by showing that selecting any of the supporting subgradients determines a
proper scoring rule, and selecting any subset of the unique supporting subgradients
determines a strictly proper scoring rule.
In plain English, the above says that we can identify a strictly proper scoring rule
with a one-to-one subset of the unique supporting subgradient relation of a convex
function. It is important to notice that we do not identify a strictly proper scoring rule
with the unique supporting subgradient relation in its entirety, because it is possible
that the latter relation may associate one prediction with multiple scoring functions.
That is, there may be multiple unique supporting subgradients at a point. Since a
scoring rule is a function it can only map each point to one of these subgradients.
Cost functions, discussed in the next chapter, avoid this limitation.
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The proof also discusses the convex function fS dened as the pointwise supremum
of the range of a scoring rule S. This function is often called the expected score
function of S, since if an expert has beliefs p 2 P then their expected score for
making an accurate prediction is fS(p). The expected score function of a scoring rule
is uniquely dened, and there is a many-to-one association between scoring rules and
expected score functions. That is, multiple scoring rules, even multiple strictly proper
scoring rules, may share the same expected score function. Chapter 4 will elaborate
on expected score functions further.
Now that we understand there is a structural relationship between strictly proper
scoring rules and the unique supporting subgradient relation of a convex function,
a natural follow-up is better understanding when and where a convex function has
unique supporting subgradients. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is equivalent to a
convex function f : P !  R having unique subgradients.
Theorem 3 (Unique Subdierential Relations). Let X be a Banach space and X
its continuous dual space. Let Y  X and f : X !  R be a closed convex function;
the following are equivalent:
1. Y is a subset of the range of the unique subdierential relation of f
2. f is strictly convex on dom @Yf
3. the subgradient inequality, f(x) f(x0)  hx x0;x
0i, holds strictly whenever
x 6= x0 for all x 2 X and x
0 2 @Yf(x0)
4. the X subdierentials of f on Y are singleton sets
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Proof. I rst prove (1) implies (2). Assume, for a contradiction, that (2) is false
and (1) is true. Then there exists x;x0;x1 2 dom @Yf and an  2 (0;1) such that
x0 + (1   )x1 = x and
f(x0) + (1   )f(x1) = f(x) (convex equality)
Let x 2 Y be a subgradient of f at x. The conjugate-subgradient theorem says
f
(x
) = hx;x
i   f(x)
f
(x
) = hx0 + (1   )x1;x
i   f(x0)   (1   )f(x1)
hx;x
i   f(x) = 
 
hx0;x
i   f(x0)

+ (1   )
 
hx1;x
i   f(x1)

and since the conjugate-subgradient theorem says x 2 argmax
 x
h x;xi f( x) and the
above is a convex combination we have that both terms must be equal, and so we
conclude x0;x1 2 argmax
 x
h x;xi f( x), too, and thus x is in the Y  subdierential
of x0 and x1. This contradicts our assumption of (1) that Y is a subset of the range
of the unique subdierential relation of f, so (1) implies (2).
Now I show (2) implies (1). Assume, for a contradiction, that (1) is false and (2)
is true. Let x;x0;x1 2 dom @Yf such that x 2 @Yf(x0) \ @Yf(x1) and there exists
 2 (0;1) such that x = x0 + (1   )x1. Since (2) is true
f(x0) + (1   )f(x1) > f(x)
The two subgradient inequalities
f(x0)   f(x)  hx0   x;x
i
f(x1)   f(x)  hx1   x;x
i
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together with our assumptions imply
f(x0) + (1   )f(x1)  f(x)
a contradiction of (2). Since we assume (2) true, however, this shows (1) and (2) are
equivalent.
The last two equivalences following immediately from Lemma 3 and the conjugate-
subgradient theorem.
In particular, the above shows that a strictly convex f : P !  R has unique sup-
porting subgradients at every point, although these subgradients may not be bounded
measurable functions. Historically, characterizations of strict properness have focused
entirely on strict convexity, and this was possible because they also assume the prob-
ability measures of interest, P  P, were a convex set. In this case the above theorem
shows strict convexity is equivalent every subgradient being unique. The next section
of this chapter will discuss one of these characterizations.
This theorem on unique subdierentials only applies to closed convex functions,
and we need to recall that every scoring rule is a subset of the unique supporting
subgradient relation of a closed convex function, an example of which is its expected
score function. Because the subdierential of every convex function is a subset of
the subdierential of a closed convex function, we can focus on the closed convex
functions without loss of generality.
Lastly, before moving on, observe that although the prior theorem tells us the
convex function is uniquely subdierential on a portion of its domain, it does not tell
us how to nd the actual relation matching points from X and subgradients from
X. This is a real challenge in need of some active work, and I will not return to
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the problem until Chapter 5, when I need to better describe the subdierential of a
particular convex function. Doing so requires some special tricks that may be hard
to generalize.
3.4 Gneiting and Raftery's characterization
In [43] Gneiting and Raftery presented a characterization of scoring rules for arbi-
trary measurable spaces. They use a slightly dierent denition of a scoring rule, and
some unique concepts that are outside standard convex analysis. I will go through
this denition and these adjuncts, then present and compare their characterization
with my own.
Gneiting and Raftery start with an arbitrary measurable space (
;F) and dene
a scoring rule as any function S : P  
 !  R, such that the partial functions
S(p;) : 
 !  R are P quasiintegrable. This is the usual way to dene such scoring
rules, with an equivalent denition appearing in [83] for discrete spaces. It is simply
easier for my narrative to have a scoring rule map predictions to scoring functions.
From our perspective, we can interpret this as saying that Gneiting and Raftery
allow a broader class of scoring functions than the bounded measurable functions,
since they allow any P quasi-integrable function of 
. Quasi-integrability is like
regular integrability, which applies to measurable functions that have real-valued
Lebesgue integrals, except it allows the integral to have innite values.
Since these scoring functions are not part of the dual space of the probability
measures (ca space) they require two specialized concepts to handle. The authors
dene a \subtangent" of a convex function f : P !  R at a point p as function
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t : 
 !  R that is (1) p integrable, (2) P quasi-integrable and (3) satises the
subgradient inequality. They also describe a scoring rule as \regular" if the expected
score of any scoring function is real-valued unless it diers from the experts beliefs,
in which case the expected score can be negative innity.3
We can now state their characterization, which I present a little dierently than
they do for clarity.
Theorem 4 (Gneiting and Raftery). Let P  P be a convex set. A regular scoring
rule S : P
 !  R is P proper if and only if there exists a convex function f : P !  R
such that
S(p;!) = f(p)  
Z


t dp + t(!)
where t is a subtangent of f at p. The rule is strictly P proper when f is strictly
convex.
The above statement is obtuse. If we pretend that t is a bounded measurable
function and subgradient, then we can apply the conjugate-subgradient theorem,
though, which says f(x)+f(x) = hx;xi, and lets us interpret the above expression
as dening S(p;) : 
 ! R as t   f(t), which is a bounded measurable function and
a supporting subgradient of f. So in this case the statement becomes similar to my
own, and reveals some of its intuition.
While Gneiting and Raftery's characterization was a signicant accomplishment in
our development of scoring rules, my own characterization has the following benets:
3This can happen when a score of negative innity is associated with events a prediction assigns
zero likelihood to.
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1. It shows that strictly proper scoring rules are a one-to-one subset of a convex
function's unique supporting subgradients relation.
2. It does not use subtangents or require regularity conditions.
3. It allows P to be any subset of the probability measures, not just a convex one.
4. It will suggest a ready extension of strict properness to cost functions (see the
next chapter).
5. It ensures that any strictly proper scoring rule can be used in a prediction
market.
Of course, this last point may also be characterized a aw in my characterization.
Gneiting and Raftery do allow a more general class of scoring function than I do. This
generalization is, however, unlikely to be interesting. Practically it is hard to think of
how we would assign or enforce a score of negative innity, much less when we might
want to do so. Plus, we are usually interested in strictly proper scoring rules to use
in prediction markets, and scoring functions that assign scores of negative innity
cannot be used in that setting since we must take the dierence of scores, and the
dierence of negative innity and negative innity is undened.4
4The logarithmic scoring rule is a popular scoring rule in discrete settings, and using it in a market
requires restricting the domain of predictions it will accept. If allowed to accept any prediction it
will produce scores of negative innity. Any restriction that requires its scores always be real-valued
is also a scoring rule in my framework, since each scoring function is then a bounded measurable
function. When there are a nite number of outcomes any regular scoring rule, in the sense of
Gneiting and Raftery, can have its domain restricted to produce a scoring rule that always assigns
real-valued scores. Regular scoring rules for arbitrary measurable spaces, however, may be such that
any prediction can produce a score of negative innity. Restricting the domain of these scoring rules
will not let them be used in a market.
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That is not to say that my own characterization is perfect. It may still be possible
to generalize beyond P, possibly including some nitely additive measures, or go
beyond B and include other members of the dual space of the ca space. Or there may
be an alternative mathematical object that more succinctly and powerfully expresses
the structure of strictly proper scoring rules. Most likely, there might be a fascinating
notion of  strict properness that can be developed by studying the  subdierential
of a convex function. Noting that there is still a great deal to do, I think one major
advantage of my characterization is that it places our thinking about scoring rules
rmly in the realm of convex analysis, where we have many tools available to do it
with. We will use these tools again in the next chapter to dene and understand
strictly proper cost functions.
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The previous chapter discussed strictly proper scoring rules and reiterated that
strict properness is the essential property for acquiring and rewarding accurate pre-
dictions of the future. Strictly proper scoring rules have been the focus of a great deal
of work, including [43] which characterized them for arbitrary measurable spaces. Our
understanding of cost functions, another popular method for eliciting predictions, has
lagged behind our knowledge of scoring rules. Until now, cost functions for measur-
able spaces were not characterized, and there was no notion of a strictly proper cost
function.
A cost function, like a scoring rule, is a means of acquiring and rewarding predic-
tions about the likelihood of future events. These functions are especially interesting
because they can allow us to create prediction markets that emulate existing futures
markets where traders can buy and sell securities. Trading securities may have two
signicant advantages over using a scoring rule: (1) the interface is likely to be con-
sidered more familiar in many settings and (2) it lets traders focus on their area of
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expertise, instead of requiring their prediction specify the likelihood of every event.
As an example, we can consider running two prediction markets for the NCAA
tournament. One will use a scoring rule, and it requires traders submit predictions
specifying the likelihood of every possible event. There are more than a quintillion
of these events, and so traders using this scoring rule must submit more than a
quintillion numbers to specify their predictions.1 This market is unlikely to see much
participation.
In our second market we will act as a market maker and oer securities for each
event that pay $1 when that event occurs. We will quote prices for these securities,
and if a trader's expected value for a security diers from our quoted price then it will
have an incentive to buy or sell it. If, say, our security for Gonzaga beating Louisville
has a price of 30 cents, and a trader thinks the likelihood of this event is 80%, then
that trader will purchase this security and increase its price. This market is far easier
to interact with than the rst one, and it allows traders to focus on their areas of
expertise (like the chances Gonzaga beats Louisville).
Cost functions enable us to run this second kind of market with its simple and
natural interface. In these markets prices represent an implicit prediction, and the
price of a single security is one aspect or part of this representation. Traders no longer
need to deal with the entire prediction, only these parts. Oering this simplicity to
traders shifts some complexity from them to the market, however. When a trader
1It is possible that we could design a system that interprets succinct representations into full
predictions, and I will return to this idea in the conclusion. Currently, a signicant challenge of
working in discrete spaces is their complete lack of natural structure. In the next chapter we will
heavily exploit the structure of probability measures on the [0, 1] interval in our development of a
cost function for it.
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purchases shares in Gonzaga beating Louisville they are telling us this event is more
likely than we thought, and we will want to adjust the prices of other related events
{ like the chances Gonzaga wins the tournament { accordingly. Intuitively, we, as
market maker, are responsible for translating a trader's myopic adjustment into a set
of feasible prices that reect some reasonable prediction about the future. Instead of
traders dealing with quintillions of numbers, now the market has to.
This chapter focuses exclusively on characterizing strictly proper cost functions,
and Chapter 5 will discuss how they can emulate futures markets. It begins in Sec-
tion 4.1 with the development of scoring relations, the root objects in our study of
strict properness. Section 4.2 denes strictly proper cost functions, and Section 4.3
concludes with a brief discussion of their relation to scoring rules, scoring relations,
and expected score functions, that better reveals the structure of strict properness..
4.1 Scoring Relations
A scoring relation is a generalization of a scoring rule that allows many scoring
functions to be associated with each prediction. Scoring relations are truly the fun-
damental object in our study of strict properness, and happily it is straightforward
to generalize from scoring rules to them.
Denition 2 ((Strictly Proper) Scoring Relation). Any non-empty one-to-many re-
lation R  P  B is a scoring relation. Letting P be the domain and B the range of
R, such a relation is (P=B )proper when
p(b)  p(b
0) (strict properness)
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for all (p;b) 2 S and b0 2 B. The relation is strictly (P=B )proper when the inequal-
ity is strict whenever (p;b0) 62 R.
A scoring relation is a lot like a scoring rule (scoring rules are simply one-to-
one scoring relations) and its denition of strict properness is analogous. A scoring
relation describes an association between predictions and scoring functions, just like
a scoring rule, and we can also think of it as oering a menu of scoring functions. If
a scoring relation is strictly proper, then the clutch of scoring functions it associates
with a prediction has two properties: (1) an expert who thinks that prediction is most
likely prefers choosing one of these scoring functions over all others and (2) the expert
is indierent among the scoring functions in this set. Strict properness also requires
that (3) no two predictions are associated with the same (set) of scoring functions.
Thus, if we oer the range of a strictly proper scoring relation as a menu of scoring
functions we can still uniquely infer an expert's beliefs from their choice of scoring
function: only that prediction thinks that scoring function maximizes its expected
score.
As we saw in the previous chapter, strictly proper scoring rules represent subsets
of the relation between points and unique supporting subgradients (that are also
bounded measurable functions) of a convex function. Strictly proper scoring relations
have the same characterization.
Theorem 5 (Strictly Proper Scoring Relations and Convex Functions with Unique
Supporting Subgradients). A scoring relation R is strictly P=B proper if and only
if there exists a convex function fR : P ! R such that R = @?
BfR(P;P). The relation
is P=B proper if and only if R = @?
BfR(P).
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The proof is immediate from the characterization of strictly proper scoring rules.
Scoring relations also admit expected score functions, which we will now need to
formalize.
Denition 3 ((Strictly Proper) Expected Score Functions). A closed convex function
fR : P !  R is an expected score function for a scoring relation R when (p;b) 2 R
implies b 2 @?fR(p). If fR is an expected score function then it is called (strictly)
proper exactly when R is (strictly) proper.
Given a strictly P=B proper scoring relation R, the pointwise supremum of B is
an expected score function for R. This simple construction lets us consider only closed
functions as expected score functions without loss of generality (and see Chapter 2 for
a more general perspective on why restricting attention to this class is without loss).
The name \expected score function" is derived from the property that f(p) = p(b)
for all (p;b) 2 R, and we can interpret this as saying that the function's value at
a prediction p 2 P is the highest expected score an expert holding that belief can
obtain (when choosing a function from the scoring menu B).
There may be multiple expected score functions for a scoring relation, and we knew
this since scoring rules are scoring relations and they may have multiple expected score
functions. The requirement for a function fR to be an expected score function for
our scoring relation R is that its points and unique supporting subgradients contain
the association between predictions and scoring functions described by the relation.
Importantly, any expected score function of a scoring relation has the same value on
the domain of the scoring relation. Thus, if the domain of a scoring relation is all of
P, it will uniquely dene an expected score function.
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Strictly proper scoring relations are a way of capturing the complete structure
oered by the points and unique supporting subgradients of a convex function. Scor-
ing rules may not be able to accomplish this since they are one-to-one mappings,
and a convex function may have multiple unique supporting subgradients at a point.
Cost functions, described in the next section, can be thought of as extending strictly
proper scoring relations to capture the structure of a convex function's points and
their unique subgradients.
4.2 Strictly Proper Cost Functions
Our goal with a cost function is to let traders buy and sell securities like they do in
existing futures markets, and to use this trading behavior to infer a prediction. This
goal will not be fully realized until the next chapter, and it is far from our current
understanding. It can also be dicult to see how the mathematical denitions in
this and the previous section relate to this more practical goal. I ask the reader to
bear with me as we rst continue to abstract even farther away from futures markets
before returning to them.
One way to think of a cost function is as a language exposing a scoring menu.
Throughout this thesis I have described scoring rules, and now scoring relations, as
oering a menu of bounded measurable functions. Strictly proper scoring relations
actually describe all of (classical) strict properness in that they can describe every
scoring menu and how to infer a probability measure from them. Not all scoring
relations, however, immediately oer us a means of exposing this menu. Scoring rules
are useful because they provide a natural language, the language of predictions, as a
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means to access this menu.
One natural alternative idea to using a scoring rule is to let traders select a
scoring function directly from the menu. This is almost what a cost function does,
and is an excellent intuition for how they work. Of course, we could also design
other languages, possibly even ones that are many-to-one mappings into the scoring
functions. For example, we could have two scoring functions b0 and b1, and design a
silly new means of acquiring and rewarding accurate predictions that required traders
give us some object from an arbitrary set L that then mapped to one of these two
scoring functions. This is, of course, absurd, but it illustrates the point that our
systems for inferring predictions can be thought of as (1) a menu of scoring functions
and (2) a language that lets traders select a scoring function. Again, using scoring
rules as an example, their language for selecting a scoring function was the set of
predictions.
I will describe the language of cost function as securities. Mathematically these
securities are translations of scoring functions that the cost function exposes. For
example, when a cost function exposes a scoring menu B, a security will be any real-
valued translation of an element of B. So if b 2 B, then b + k for any real k is a
security. Intuitively the language of cost functions lets traders not only request a
scoring function directly (they can ask for b itself), but also allows them to ask for
them in the apparently (for now) mathematically circuitous fashion of specifying a
translation of the scoring function instead. This roundabout language is what will let
us emulate a futures market, and this context is described in the next chapter. For
now, we can think of a trader \purchasing" the security b+k at a \cost" of k to arrive
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back at the scoring function b. This thinking gives us the name \cost function:" the
function determines how much a trader must pay for a security.
A strictly proper cost function, then, must map securities to scoring functions.
To dene these functions we need a formal denition of B+, the securities generated
from the scoring menu B. We formally dene these translations as:
B
+ = fb
+jb
+ = b + k;b 2 B;k 2 Rg (translations of elements of B)
and it will be convenient to describe a cost function as strictly P=B+ proper even
though it exposes the scoring menu B, leading to the following denition of a strictly
proper cost function.2
Denition 4 (Strictly Proper Cost Function). Any function C : B ! B is a cost
function.
Letting R be a (strictly) P=B proper scoring relation, a cost function C : B+ ! B
may also be described as (strictly) P=B+ proper when C(b + k) = b, for all b 2 B,
k 2 R. I will also call such cost functions \cost functions for R."
Sometimes it will be useful to restrict the domain of C to a subset of B  B+,
and in these cases I will describe C as (strictly) P=B proper.
One subtle and very important thing that is easy to miss in this denition is that
simply exposing the scoring menu of a strictly P=B proper scoring relation R makes
the cost function strictly P=B+ proper in the most meaningful way: if a trader has
beliefs p 2 P then they will strictly prefer choosing securities b+ 2 B+ such that
2I am abusing the idea that k is a real number and a constant-valued function represented by a
real number, and will continue to do this for the immense convenience it oers. There should be no
confusion for the reader.
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(p;C(b+)) 2 R. The strict properness part of this denition only demands the menu
exposed be the same as some such scoring relation. It is the \cost function" part of
the denition that denes how the language of securities is mapped to the scoring
functions.
This denition follows closely on our discussion. A cost function exposes a scoring
menu B, and it does so by mapping translations of scoring functions, called \securi-
ties," back to the original functions. We can also derive this denition geometrically
from expected score functions. Letting fR be a strictly P=B proper expected score
function, and b 2 B;b 2 @?fR(p), the function b + k is also a subgradient of fR at p.
It is not a supporting subgradient unless k is zero, and we can think of a cost func-
tion as oering these subgradients as its language and associating them with their
corresponding supporting hyperplanes.
Yet another way of thinking about a cost function involves the conjugate of fR,
f
R. Applying the conjugate-subgradient theorem, we see that f
R maps translations
of supporting subgradients into the real values k that they are translated by. In other
words, if b 2 B;b 2 @?fR(p), then f
R(b+k) = k for all k 2 R. The classical denition
of a cost function ts this idea closely.
Denition 5 (Strictly Proper Classical Cost Function). Any function _ C : B ! R is
a classical cost function.
Letting R be a (strictly) P=B proper scoring relation, a classical cost function
_ C : B+ ! R may also be described as (strictly) P=B+ proper when _ C(b+k) = k, for
all b 2 B, k 2 R. I will also call such classical cost functions \classical cost functions
for R."
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Letting fR be an expected score function for R, this can be equivalently stated as
_ C(b + k)
B+
= f
R(b + k). That is, _ C agrees with the conjugate of fR on B+.
Essentially, I like to think of cost functions mapping translations of scoring func-
tions (securities) back to scoring functions, and the classical way of thinking of a cost
function actually had them map to a \cost" for each security. Translating between
these two denitions is trivial, and I will switch between the representations as is con-
venient. The next section elaborates on some properties that can make the classical
cost function representation easier to work.
4.3 Cost Functions in Duality
Scoring relations are the fundamental object of study when understanding strict
properness, and particular methods of acquiring and rewarding accurate predictions
simply oer dierent languages to access their menus of scoring functions. Scoring
rules use the language of predictions, and cost functions oer translations of the
scoring functions called \securities." Both of these languages are intuitive and natural,
the rst because we are, after all, attempting to acquire a prediction, and the second
since we can think of a market maker oering securities to trade, just like in a futures
market (a context we will soon return to).
Having now described scoring rules, scoring relations, expected score functions
and cost functions, it can all become too confusing how these objects relate to one
another, or what separates one from another, or how one might actually work with
these objects. Before formalizing some of these connections, let me oer a (relatively)
simple example.
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The function f(x;y) = x2+y2 is a strictly convex and continuous two-dimensional
function. This function is about the simplest we can hope to work with, since each
dimension represents an outcome. This function has a well-dened G^ ateaux dier-
ential everywhere, its gradient, and this implies it has a unique subgradient at every
point (see Chapter 2). For instance, at the point (.5, .5) it has the subgradient (1, 1).3
Since f is strictly convex, each of these subgradients are unique (see the discussion
in the previous chapter). Note that (1, 1) is not a supporting subgradient of f at (.5,
.5), and that there is no supporting subgradient at that point.
The line segment dened by x + y = 1;x > 0;y > 0 represents the probability
measures over two discrete outcomes, and so this set will be P. Restricting f to this
set we obtain fjP, which is no longer continuous or G^ ateaux dierentiable since it has
an empty interior. Further, it now has an innite number of subgradients at every
point. At (.5, .5) it still has the unique subgradient (1, 1), and it also has unique
subgradients (1;1) + k for any real-valued k. Because this function is restricted to
the probability measures it now has unique supporting subgradients everywhere, and
the unique supporting subgradient at (:5;:5) is (:5;:5). The function remains lower
semi-continuous, proper and strictly convex.
We can use fjP as an expected score function, and identifying points with the
supporting subgradients that are translations of the original function's f gradients
denes a strictly P proper scoring relation.4 This scoring relation is one-to-one by
construction, and so is actually a scoring rule. If an expert oers a prediction of
3The continuous dual space and, in fact, just the dual space of R2 is itself. The bilinear form is
the dot product.
4We know it is proper for all of P by our construction, and the G^ ateaux dierentiability of f.
We do not immediately know what scoring menu B this scoring rule exposes.
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(:5;:5) this scoring rule returns the scoring function (:5;:5), and if the rst outcome
occurs the expert is scored :5 and if the second outcome occurs the expert is scored
:5. If the expert oers the prediction (.75, .25), we compute their scoring function
by nding the gradient of f at (:75;:25), which is (1:5;:5), then translating that to
be a supporting subgradient of fjP, to receive (:875; :125). So an expert predicting
(:75;:25) receives a score of :875 if the rst outcome occurs, and  :125 if the second
outcome occurs. This is to be expected: predicting one outcome is more likely than
another will result in a higher score when that outcome occurs, and a lower score
when the other does.
In general it can be very hard to understand the relation between a convex func-
tion's points and supporting subgradients. For nite outcomes we are lucky to have
the above technique, where we can use a \nice" strictly convex function, take its gra-
dient, and then determine a supporting subgradient of the restricted function from
it.
Now we can think of using fjP to dene a cost function, which accepts secu-
rities, or subgradients of fjP, and returns scoring functions (supporting subgradi-
ents). So a trader might ask for the security (1:5;:5) and receive the scoring function
(:875; :125). This emulates the trader purchasing the security (1:5;:5) at a cost of
:625. We can compute this necessary translation using the conjugate of fjP, which
maps subgradients into the translations needed to make them supporting subgradi-
ents. So fj
P(1:5;:5) = :625.
There are still some gaps in our analysis. First, it is not clear what the domain of
the cost function should be, since we do not know what scoring menu we are exposing.
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Second, in general, computing the conjugate may often be dicult. In this case we
can address both these gaps by using some results about convex programs:
fj

P(x;y) = sup
p2P
hp;(x;y)i   fjP(p)
= sup
p2R2
p  (x;y)   fjP(p)
which is a convex program in two variables. Further, since fjP is strictly convex and P
is closed this convex program will always have a unique solution, which implies a cost
function derived from fjP is actually strictly P=B proper. This technique does not
tell us what scoring menu B  B is actually exposed (that would require identifying
all the supporting subgradients), but it does let us compute everything needed to run
a scoring rule or cost function derived from fjP. In the next chapter I will also rely on
our understanding of convex programs to describe a more complicated cost function.
Formally, the above example can be thought of as an instantiation of this next
theorem:
Theorem 6 (The Structure of Strict Properness). Letting R be a scoring relation
with domain P and range B, the following statements are equivalent:
1. R is a strictly P=B proper scoring relation.
2. There exists a l.s.c. convex function fR : P ! R that is a strictly P=B proper
scoring function for R. The convex conjugate of fR restricted to B is a classical
cost function for R.
3. R is a subset of the unique supporting subgradient relation of a convex function
fR : P !  R.
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4. There exists a continuous convex function _ CR : B ! R that is a strictly P=B+ 
proper classical cost function for R and whose convex conjugate restricted to P
is an expected score function for R.
The statements follows readily from my characterization of strictly proper scoring
rules and the conjugate-subgradient theorem, as well as l.s.c. convex functions on
Banach spaces being continuous.
Some prior work has investigated the connections between scoring rules and cost
functions, most notably [1], and also [3]. Both investigated the discrete case, and
their statements are not simple. Essentially, they showed that there could exist an
equivalence between strictly proper scoring rules and some cost functions, in the sense
that both could oer the same scoring functions to traders. They also showed that
\prices" in a cost function market can correspond exactly to predictions in a scoring
rule market, although this thinking will have to wait until we develop prices in the
next chapter. My treatment is more complete since it describes all of strict properness
through the structure of strictly proper scoring relations, which are analogous to the
structures between points and unique supporting subgradients of convex functions of
the probability measures. Everything else is derived from this fundamental structure.
This interest in association scoring rules and cost functions leads me to formalize the
following simple duality between them:
Theorem 7 (Scoring Rules and Cost Functions). For any strictly P=B proper scor-
ing rule, there exists a strictly P=B+ proper cost function with the same range (scor-
ing functions).
This fact is incredibly simple when presented from the perspective developed in
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this thesis, and I think it highlights the utility of our approach. It says that for
every scoring rule there is a cost function with the same set of scoring functions, and
thus the only dierence is the language used to select a scoring function. Remember,
though, that since not every scoring relation is a scoring rule, this duality is imperfect.
For every scoring rule there is a cost function, but there is not a scoring rule for every
cost function.
There are many advantages to focusing on strict properness directly. It is an
essential property for eliciting and rewarding accurate predictions, and so we would
like to understand what is a strictly proper scoring rule, what is a strictly proper cost
function, and what are strictly proper scoring relations. The greatest advantage of
this approach is understanding strictly proper mechanisms as presenting languages
that expose a scoring menu. The above theorem is a testament to the clarity of
understanding this oers us, in contrast to some convoluted historical results.5 The
next chapter further demonstrates the utility of this approach. I have also chosen
to dene strict properness in such a way that we can identify strictly proper scoring
relations with the points and unique supporting subgradients of convex functions of
the probability measures. This lets us readily leverage the tools of convex analysis, like
we saw in the above example. Prior work, by not conceptualizing scoring relations,
had a more dicult time applying these tools.
Now that we understand what a strictly proper cost function is, we will use them
in the next chapter to create prediction markets that emulate futures markets. These
cost functions have more structure than we are assuming here, and we will nd this
5I have written several of these convoluted historical results myself, and remain proud of them.
794: Cost Functions
structure to be incredibly useful and natural.
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Practical Cost Functions
This chapter is the culmination of our work in Chapter 2{4. So far we have been
focused exclusively on strict properness, the essential property for eliciting and re-
warding accurate predictions of the likelihood of future events. This chapter expands
this focus, showing how cost functions can closely emulate futures markets in Section
5.1, and then demonstrating the utility of all this work by creating a cost function
for bounded continuous random variables in Section 5.2.
5.1 Cost Functions as Futures Markets
In the previous chapter I described cost functions and strictly proper cost func-
tions. Strictly proper cost functions mapped securities into scoring functions, and
they did so in a way that mimicked buying and selling securities. Letting C be a
strictly P=B+ proper cost function, the security b + k being mapped to b can be
thought of as the cost function selling the security b + k at a price of k. A classical
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cost function oered another interpretation of this, simply mapping b + k to k and
describing its price directly.
This interpretation is especially nice because it provides traders with the familiar
interface of trading securities with a market. Not all strictly proper cost functions,
however, have all the nice properties we associate with a market maker. In particular,
a strictly proper cost function (1) may not reliably oer every security for trade, and
(2) it may not be able to quote meaningful prices. Consider, for example, a trivial
strictly proper cost function with a single scoring function b. Then that cost function
can sell the security once, and likely not twice, unless b + k = 2b. That is, the cost
function is not dened on 2b, and this means it cannot always trade this security.
This is likely to be considered a real decit in practice, and we can readily construct
non-trivial examples that demonstrate this lack.
The second challenge I mentioned is that strictly proper cost functions may not
always quote meaningful prices. By \meaningful," I mean that the market should
be able to quote a price for a security such that if a trader's expected value for
that security diers from the price, then that trader expects to prot by trading the
security. Either buying some amount of the security if its price is lower than the
trader's expectation, or selling some amount if the price is higher. Note that this
price is likely not the cost of a security, and that we are not considering securities
purchased in discrete units. Not every strictly proper cost function can quote a price
like this.
It turns out these two problems are related, and Section 5.1.2 describes how re-
quiring B+ be a vector space solves both. When a strictly proper cost function has a
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vector space for its domain it guarantees every security is reliably oered for trade,
and it can quote a meaningful price for each. These results are almost immediate
from the assumption. Two other desirable properties for a market maker to have are
that it cannot lose more than a bounded amount of money, and that it oers traders
no arbitrage. These problems are discussed in Section 5.1.3. Before either of those,
however, it is time we described cost function prediction markets. This will provide
the context needed for us to continue.
5.1.1 Cost Function Prediction Markets
So far we have discussed a great deal about cost functions, and in Chapter 3 I
described a scoring rules market, but we have not yet looked at prediction markets
that use cost functions, or cost function markets. This section will help us understand
exactly how these markets work, and what specialized notation we need when working
with them.
Let B  B and C : B+ ! B be a cost function. I have described cost functions as
oering securities, which are elements of B+ and mapping them to scoring functions
in B. This is an excellent intuition when working with a single trader, as it mimics a
market maker who charges the trader a price of k to purchase the security b + k, for
some scoring function b 2 B and real k.
When a cost function is used in a market, however, it is best to think of it as
mapping liabilities to scoring functions. Mathematically nothing changes. A liability
is any element of B+, and a scoring function is still an element of B. The reason for
this change is that the term \liability" will better capture our intuition about how
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cost functions emulate existing futures markets. The market can still be thought of
as oering securities, and in Section 5.1.2 we will see how, under a very reasonable
condition, every element of B+ is also a security. In general, however, this may not
be the case.
This is almost certainly confusing, so let's begin by adding some context. A cost
function C : B+ ! B prediction market is thought of as opening with an initial
liability ` 2 B+. Usually ` = 0, the constant zero function. Like a scoring rule
prediction market, this market then accepts a countable and public series of trades
or updates, and these updates are functions from B+ that we will call liabilities. So,
traders oer a countable and public series of liabilities `0;`1;:::.
Oering liabilities does not connect well with our idea of trading in a futures mar-
ket. Fortunately, we can interpret these oers as traders buying and selling securities.
When a trader requests a liability `i 2 B+, they receive the scoring function
C(`i)   C(`i 1) (cost function market score)
and we can think of this as the trader purchasing the security `i  `i 1. So securities
are now the dierences between two liabilities. When we think of traders purchasing
securities, the latest liability oered is the sum of these securities, and thus represents
the market maker's potential net payouts to the traders. Hence why I refer to them
as \liabilities."
Eventually the market closes with a nal liability ` 2 B+, and if our cost function
is a cost function for a strictly P=B proper scoring relation R, then we extract the
prediction p such that (p;C(B+) 2 R. Again, this is like a prediction market that
uses a scoring rule, where the last prediction made is extracted from the market. This
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implies the market maker's worst-case loss is
sup
`2B+;!2

 
C(`)   C(`0)

(!) (worst-case loss)
This description of a cost function is entirely mathematically correct, and, I think,
still very unsatisfying. It is odd that traders are oering liabilities, and it is especially
strange that securities are only dened implicitly as the dierence of these liabilities.
This can make for some very strange behavior. In particular, a \security" may or may
not be available depending on the market's current liability. Again, this is because
we consider a security as a dierence between two liabilities. So if the market has two
scoring functions, b0 and b1, if the market has liabilities b0 then the only meaningful
security that can be purchased is b1   b0, and if the market has liabilities b1 the only
meaningful security that can be purchased is b0 b1. I think of these markets as being
\unreliable," in that they do not consistently oer traders a set of securities to buy
and sell. This failure also does not let our cost function oer meaningful prices for
its securities. The next (sub)section addresses these oddities with a simple structural
assumption.
5.1.2 Prices and the Reliable Market Maker
It is desirable, in practice, to let traders reliably buy and sell securities when
interacting with a market maker. This means that, regardless of the market's current
state, a trader can buy or sell any of a set of securities.
We might attempt to create such a market by starting with a set of basis securities
X  B. The market could then let traders purchase bundles of these securities,
bundles that are elements of the vector space B+ that is generated using X as a basis.
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This market admits an interesting interpretation. Its liabilities and its securities are
elements of B+, and since B+ is a vector space any security can be purchased or sold
regardless of the market's current liabilities.1 In other words, this market reliably
oers a set of securities.
With our interest in strictly proper cost functions the above naturally suggests
attempting to use our scoring functions as a set of basis securities. This may not do
what is intended, however, since the vector space created from this basis may contain
elements that are not translations of the scoring functions. Consider a two outcome
state space. Then we might have two scoring functions (1, 0) and (0, 1). If we use
these scoring functions as a basis they will generate a vector space that contains (.5,
.5), which is not a translation of either scoring function. Our cost function has no
means of interpreting a request for this vector.
Instead, we can require that B+ simply be a vector space. This ensures that every
element of B+ can always be purchased as a security, since the sum of two elements in
B+ is also in B+. Thus if the market has liability `, we can take any element b+ 2 B+
and add it to ` to achieve ` + b+ 2 B+. So an expert can always move the market
from ` to ` + b+, eectively purchasing the security b+. Again, in this case the space
of liabilities and securities is the same, and the dierent words are only for intuitive
clarity. The market's liability is the sum of all securities purchased, and we can think
of traders buying and selling securities, with the set B+ dening these securities.
It is this thinking that lets us return to why we dened cost functions as mapping
1Liabilities and securities are both elements of B+ because the dierence of any two liabilities is
a security, and any such dierence is also an element of the vector space B+ by construction, so the
space of liabilities and securities coincides. Any security can always be purchased because B+ is a
vector space, and the sum of any two elements must then also be in the space.
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securities back to scoring functions. At rst there seemed to be no reason to let
translations of scoring functions be mapped into scoring functions. It would have been
much simpler if traders requested scoring functions directly. The scoring functions
alone, however, cannot describe a vector space, and without a vector space we cannot
reliably oer securities. Considering the same market as before, if a trader purchases
the security (1, 0), and another the security (0, 1), the market's liabilities are (1,
1). The next trader may then also want to purchase the security (1, 0), moving
the market's liabilities to (2, 1). These liabilities arise naturally through trading
securities, and they are not a scoring function. Thus we let cost functions map
translations of scoring functions back to scoring functions. We also can only let a
cost function map translations back to scoring functions because this mimics paying
a cost for each security. If the security mapped back to a scoring function were not a
simple translation then we could not create a cost for it that would perfectly emulate
the scoring function.
When a cost function is strictly P=B+ proper, and B+ is a vector space, then we
also obtain a natural notion of prices. This is easiest to see, as are many results on
cost functions, using the classical interpretation of a cost function. Let R be a strictly
P=B proper scoring relation, and fR an expected score function for it. The conjugate
of fR restricted to B is a classical cost function _ CR for R, and it is a continuous convex
function of the bounded measurable functions.
Now let b+ 2 B+. Since _ CR is strictly proper, its G^ ateaux variation at b+ agrees
with the probability measure R associates with C(b+) on B+. Let p be this probability
measure, this means the G^ ateaux variation of _ CR at b+, r _ CR(b+;)
B+
= p. Let's walk
875: Practical Cost Functions
through this equivalence. The variation of _ CR at ` 2 B+ in the direction of b+ 2 B+
is
r _ CR(`;b
+) = lim
!0
_ CR(` + b+)   _ CR(`)

(price / G^ ateaux variation)
then if an expert has beliefs p such that p(b+) 6= r _ CR(`;b+), the above expression
implies there exists  6= 0 such that
p(b
+) > _ CR(` + b
+)   _ CR(`)
demonstrating that if a trader's expected value for a security diers from the G^ ateaux
variation in the direction of that security, the trader expects to prot by trading it.
Thus, if the G^ ateaux variation at ` 2 B does not agree with the probability measure
R associates with C(`), a trader with beliefs p has a trade it expects to be protable,
and this implies the market is not strictly proper as I assumed.
Assuming B+ is a vector space is vital for this result because it means the security
b+ can actually be purchased. Without a vector space we can quote these prices
for the securities just ne, but they are not meaningful since we cannot guarantee
traders can act on them.
More formally, using the conjugate-subgradient theorem we can restate this argu-
ment as follows:
Theorem 8 (Strict Properness and the G^ ateaux Variation). Let f be a strictly
P=B proper expected score function, with B  B a convex set. Then the conjugate
of f restricted to B, fjB is a classical cost function _ C such that for all (p0;b0) 2 R,
r _ C(b0;)
B+
= p0.
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Recall the points of a classical cost function are bounded measurable functions (se-
curities) and its subgradients are probability measures (predictions). If a probability
measure is a subgradient of the classical cost function at a point, then it is the prob-
ability measure our implicit scoring relation associated with that point (a bounded
measurable functions). This is an easy consequence of the conjugate-subgradient the-
orem, and is a mathematical way of stating that the G^ ateaux variation agrees with
the probability measure we associate with each security. Finally, note the theorem
only requires B be convex, and if B+ is a vector space then this implies B is convex.
Note also that the G^ ateaux variation satises our notion of meaningful prices.
This implies that the prediction we associate with a liability is also how we determine
prices. The price of a security is its expected value with respect to this prediction.
Letting the domain of a cost function, B+ be a vector space adds a great deal of
structure to a cost function. It lets us reliably oer securities and quote meaningful
prices. This seem like highly desirable properties in practice, and the cost function
we will develop shortly will oer a vector space of securities for this reason.
5.1.3 Bounded Loss and Arbitrage
The last two properties I will consider before describing a particular cost function
for bounded continuous random variables are bounded loss and a lack of arbitrage.
Let's begin with bounded loss:
Denition 6 (Bounded Loss). A P=B proper scoring relation R has bounded loss
if B is bounded above. A cost function for R has bounded loss if and only if R does.
Note that only B must be bounded, and not the dierence describing the worst-
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case loss. This is because any particular scoring function is, itself, bounded, and so
our only concern is that the set of all scoring functions is unbounded above. We now
have the following simple result.
Theorem 9 (Boundedness and Bounded Loss). Let R be a strictly P=B proper scor-
ing relation, and fR : P !  R the pointwise supremum of the range of R. fR is an ex-
pected score function for R, and its conjugate restricted to B is a strictly P=B+ proper
classical cost function _ C. _ C has bounded worst-case loss if fR is bounded above.
Proof. If fR is bounded above then the expectation of every scoring function is
bounded above, by construction. If a scoring function were unbounded above, then
it would be unbounded above on P, too. (There must be a series of measurable sets
with increasing real values, and for every measurable set there exists a probability
measure that assigns all its mass to that set, so for any value of a scoring function
there exist probability measures whose expectation for that function is that value.)
Thus, if fR is bounded above, every scoring function is also bounded above and we
have bounded worst-case loss.
This theorem statement and proof are a nice demonstration of the utility of think-
ing about strict properness in terms of scoring relations or menus of scoring functions.
It lets us easily understand that the only possible payos a trader can get are de-
scribed by scoring functions, and that if these payouts are bounded above so is our
loss.
The second property, no arbitrage, is immediately satised by any strictly proper
cost function. We rst dene it as:
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Denition 7 (No Arbitrage). A strictly P=B+ proper cost function C allows no
arbitrage when
inf
!2

 
C(`1)   C(`0)

(!)  0; 8`0;`1 2 B
+ (no arbitrage)
In English, no arbitrage means that every trade has some possibility of being
weakly unprotable. And we have the following formal result:
Theorem 10 (Strictly Proper Cost Functions Permit No Arbitrage). A P=B+ proper
cost function C : B+ ! B permits no arbitrage.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that there exists liabilities `0 and `1 in B+ such
that
inf
!2

 
C(`1)   C(`0)

(!) > 0
Then every probability measure expects to prot by purchasing the security C(`1)  
C(`0), but by properness (and the above argument about prices) the probability mea-
sure associated with C(`0) does not expect to prot by purchasing any security when
the market has liabilities `0, so the existence of arbitrage opportunities contradicts
properness.
In fact, when our cost function is strictly proper we can strengthen the above
result so the no arbitrage inequality becomes strict. Some papers, like [1] and [31]
relax the no arbitrage property as it can be computationally dicult to enforce. These
possibilities are discussed further in the conclusion.
Now that we have discussed a market reliably oering securities, quoting prices,
having bounded worst-case loss and admitting no arbitrage, we can discuss an actual
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cost function for bounded continuous random variables. Cost functions for this space
with properties like bounded loss have proven elusive historically.
5.2 A Cost Function for Bounded Continuous Ran-
dom Variables
Cost functions with good properties for continuous random variables have been
discussed for some time, yet no one has yet produced a cost function with bounded
loss for this space. In [38] the authors showed markets for continuous random vari-
ables could not have bounded loss when satisfying some other economically motivated
properties. In [68] a continuous outcome space was discretized, which is a common
approach to the problem, and in [67] a cost function for continuous random vari-
ables with bounded loss was mistakenly claimed, a claim corrected in the author's
thesis [66]. Most work on cost functions has been for discrete spaces, like the best
characterization of cost functions for discrete spaces [1], and work especially focused
on making cost functions for large discrete spaces tractable [31, 53].
In the previous chapter, however, we saw that describing a cost function for a
measurable space is as simple as describing a scoring rule for one, and such scoring
rules have been known for some time [58] and were characterized in [43]. In fact, we
can begin with any strictly convex function of the probability measures on the [0, 1]
interval, like
S(p) =
Z
0;1
F
2
p d (expected score function)
where Fp is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) identied with the probability
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measure p 2 P. The conjugate of this function restricted to B is a classical cost
function for the interval
_ C(b) = sup
p2P
hp;bi  
Z
[0;1]
F
2
p d (classical cost function)
and since S is bounded above this classical cost function has bounded worst-case loss.
It is not so clear what other properties this market has, however. It is not even clear,
for instance, where the original expected score function is subdierentiable, or what
its subgradients are, and this means we do not understand what sets P  P and
B  B it is strictly P=B+ proper for.
In this section I will develop a more practical cost function for bounded continuous
random variables whose properties we can understand. On a broad, natural class of
securities this cost function can be solved for using a convex program with a nite
number of variables, too. While this cost function is imperfect, I think it represents
an important rst step in our understanding of cost functions for continuous outcome
spaces.
5.2.1 Unbiased Cost Functions
The classical cost function
_ C(b) = sup
p2P
hp;bi  
Z
[0;1]
F
2
p d (classical cost function)
also has an odd property we have not previously discussed. If the market opens with
the constant zero function, as we usually expect, then the probability measure the
market will initially assume assigns probability one to the event one occurring. That
is, it assigns the single point one a probability of one, and the price of securities like
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[0, .99] is zero! I will call markets like these biased, since despite uniform liabilities
they assume non-uniform beliefs. Unbiased markets may be considered more natural
to work with, and admit a nice computational interpretation, as we will see shortly.
Formally, we dene bias as:
Denition 8 (Unbiased Market). Let P be the set of probability measures, and B the
set of bounded measurable functions, on ([0;1];L). A scoring relation R  P  B is
unbiased when (p;b) 2 R implies that for any two measurable sets L0;L1 2 L where
b is constant-valued and b(L0) = b(L1), we have
1. if (L0) = (L1) = 0, then p(L0) = p(L1),
2. and if (L0);(L1) > 0, then p(L0)=(L0) = p(L1)=(L1).
A cost function is unbiased when it is the cost function for an unbiased scoring rela-
tion.
This formal denition of unbiasedness is a mouthful. It says that if the market's
liabilities are the same on two measurable sets with positive Lebesgue measure, then
the price of these sets is in proportion to their \size," as determined by Lebesgue
measure. For example, if the market's liabilities are 3 on [0, .1] and [.2, .6], being
unbiased implies the market assigns four times the probability to the interval [.2, .6]
since it is four times as large.
When two sets are Lebesgue-negligible, unbiasedness requires their price be the
same if their liabilities are the same. This has some interesting implications about the
prices of these Lebesgue-negligible sets, like that every Lebesgue-negligible set with a
positive price contains a countable number of point masses whose prices sum to the
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price of the set. This in turn means that no market that assumes prices consistent
with a singular continuous measure can be unbiased. The market we construct will
exclude these measures from consideration.
Before moving on, note that this denition of unbiasedness is particular to markets
for the [0, 1] interval. The idea of something being unbiased is always a matter of
perspective, and in an arbitrary measurable space it is not clear what perspective is
natural, or even if there is always a notion of uniformity. Our familiarity with the [0,
1] interval, Lebesgue measure, and identifying probability measures with CDFs are
all reasons why constructing a market for it may be much easier than constructing
cost functions in other measurable spaces.
5.2.2 A New Cost Function
The cost function I will soon describe requires some new notation. Instead of ac-
cepting securities from all of B, it only accepts securities that are composed of a nite
number of constant real-valued segments. I will call these \interval functions" and
denote the set of them by Binterval. These functions can be described as a collection
of tuples associating non-overlapping subintervals of [0, 1] with real numbers, like
([0;:1];5);((:1;:3); 3);([:3;:3];0):::.2 Crucially, this set of of securities is a vector
2Note that this class is not the set of piecewise-constant functions, since these have no requirement
that they consist of a nite number of segments. Further, it is also not the class of simple functions.
This latter class is any function (usually circumscribed to the bounded and measurable functions)
that only attains a nite number of values. The diculty with simple functions is that these values
can be obtained in unusual ways. For example, the Dirichlet function is simple because it only
attains the values zero or one, and it is one on rational numbers and zero on irrational numbers.
The practical market I will propose cannot handle this kind of erratic behavior. Unfortunately, my
conference paper [23] that this chapter draws heavily from has an error where it uses the simple
functions instead of these interval functions.
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space.
Correspondingly, I will let Pinterval be the set of \interval" probability mea-
sures. These are probability measures p that can also be described by tuples of
non-overlapping subintervals of [0, 1] with real numbers, and the real value associ-
ated with a subinterval species the measure p assigns uniformly to that interval. For
instance, Lebesgue measure would be
 
([0;1];1)

, since it is uniform on the entire in-
terval. Importantly, these measures admit only pure point and absolutely continuous
parts in Lebesgue decomposition, and they are a convex set.
Now I can dene my new cost function for the [0, 1] interval. Since it is useful to
have a name for it, I will call it a dynamic discretization market, since it eectively
allows traders to arbitrarily discretize the interval with their securities. I will dene
this market as the classical cost function:
_ C : Binterval ! R (dynamic discretization market)
_ C(b) = max
p2Pinterval
hp;bi  
0
@
X
!2ppp
p
2(!)  
Z


arctan(
dpcont
d
) d
1
A
where ppp is the pure point part of p, which is also treated as a countable set of points
in the interval in a minute abuse of notation,3 and pcont is the absolutely continuous
part of p. Again, measures in Pinterval have no singular continuous parts.
Intuitively, this market lets traders dene their own discretization of the interval.
Importantly, unlike an ex ante discretization, traders can dene this discretization
multiple times ex interim. This means traders can create the precise discretization
they like to best express their beliefs (as long as those beliefs are in Pinterval). An
3Recall that in Chapter 2 we saw this set was always a countable collection of point masses.
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ex ante discretization may not accomplish this. How valuable, exactly, this is, is
a matter for debate. Developing a framework for describing the value of oering a
broader set of predictions would be an interesting area for future work.
We are now, of course, interested in what properties this cost function has. Its
securities are a vector space, and it is strictly proper, but it's not clear if it exhibits
bounded loss, or what set P  P it is strictly proper for, or how we might readily
compute it. The next two subsubsections do precisely this.
Bounded Loss
For a market to have bounded loss its scoring functions must be bounded above.
In this case, bounded loss is equivalent to showing that there exists some k 2 R such
that
k > sup
b2Binterval;!2[0;1]
b(!)   sup
p2Pinterval
hp;bi  
0
@
X
!2ppp
p
2(!)  
Z


arctan(
dpcont
d
) d
1
A
which follows quickly since the negative arctan function is bounded below, the sum-
mation is bounded above, and so the entire term in large parentheses is bounded for
all probability measures and can be removed. This leaves the dierence:
k > sup
b2Binterval;!2[0;1]
b(!)   sup
p2Pinterval
hp;bi
which is always less than or equal to zero, since supp2Pintervalhp;bi = sup!2[0;1] b(!).
Thus the market has bounded loss, which we state formally:
Theorem 11 (The Dynamic Discretization Market has Bounded Loss). The dynamic
discretization market has bounded worst-case loss.
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Using the negative arctan function may have seemed like an odd choice. Here we
see that it is useful since it is bounded below. In the next subsubsection we will also
see how important it is that it is a negative strictly convex function.
Strictly Pinterval=Binterval Proper
This subsubsection is complicated, complicated enough to be confusing. Before
leaping into our narrative, it will help to describe what we will be doing:
1. Proving the conjugate of the dynamic discretization market is strictly convex
on Pinterval.
2. Showing the market is unbiased.
3. Demonstrating the market is strictly Pinterval=Binterval proper.
As a side eect, I will show that the market can be computed using a convex program
with a nite number of variables, one variable per every interval described by the
market's current liabilities.
First, we need to show the market's conjugate is strictly convex on Pinterval. This
result will be needed for the next two.
Lemma 4. The function
S : Pinterval ! R
S(p) =
X
!2ppp
p
2(!)  
Z


arctan(
dpcont
d
) d
is a strictly convex function of the interval probability measures.
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Proof. Let p0;p1 be two distinct probability measures in Pinterval. We need to show
that

0
@
X
!2(p0)pp
p
2
0(!)  
Z


arctan(
d(p0)cont
d
) d
1
A
+ (1   )
0
@
X
!2(p1)pp
p
2
1(!)  
Z


arctan(
d(p1)cont
d
) d
1
A
>
X
!2(p0+p1)pp
(p0 + (1   )p1)
2(!)
 
Z


arctan(
d(p0 + (1   )p1)cont
d
) d
and proceed by analyzing two cases. First, assume that (p0 + p1) has a pure point
part where p0 and p1 dier, then

X
!2(p0)pp
p
2
0(!) + (1   )
X
!2(p1)pp
p
2
1(!) >
X
!2(p0+p1)pp
(p0 + (1   )p1)
2(!)
since f(x) = x2 is strictly convex, so p2
0(!) + (1   )p2
1(!)  (p0 + (1   )p1)2(!)
for all ! 2 
 and the inequality holds strictly where the measures are distinct, and
thus the inequality holds for the sum, too (since the sum is nite and bounded).
Alternatively if (p0+p1) has an absolutely continuous part where p0 and p1 dier,
then
 
Z


arctan(
d(p0)cont
d
) d   (1   )
Z


arctan(
d(p1)cont
d
) d
>  
Z


arctan(
d(p0 + (1   )p1)cont
d
) d
because  arctan is a strictly convex function, allowing us to apply Lemma 1.
Since we assumed p0 6= p1 they must dier on their pure point or absolutely
continuous parts, so one of the last two inequalities above must hold strictly and
their summation proves the desired original inequality.
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A helpful way to think of this conjugate is as a \regularization" or \penalty"
function for our cost function. It prevents the cost function from assuming extremal
beliefs by penalizing them. The strict properness of this penalty function will be
crucial to the next two proofs.
Next on our list was showing the market is unbiased.
Theorem 12 (Unbiasedness of the Dynamic Discretization Market). The dynamic
discretization market is unbiased.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction in two cases. First assume that there
exists b 2 Binterval such that the corresponding probability measure pb is biased. One
possibility is that there exist two Lebesgue-negligible measurable sets L0 and L1 where
b is constant and equally valued on both sets, yet pb is such that that p(L0) 6= p(L1).
I will show we can improve on this supremum, since
hp;bi   p
2(L0)   p
2(L1) < hp;bi   2(p0 + (1   )p1)
2(L0 + L1)
for all  2 (0;1) by the strict convexity of f(x) = x2. Thus we can improve on
this probability measure by equalizing the probability assigned to the sets L0 and
L1, contradicting our assumption that the market would create such an unbiased
measure.
Alternatively, there are two Lebesgue-measurable sets L0 and L1 such that (L0)
and (L1) are both greater than zero, b is constant and equally valued on both sets,
yet pb is such that
p(L0)
(L0) 6=
p(L1)
(L1). Again, we can improve on this supremum, since
hp;bi  
Z
L0
arctan(
dp
d
) d  
Z
L1
arctan(
dp
d
) d < hp;bi   arctan(
p(L0 + L1)
(L0 + L1)
)
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for all  2 (0;1), following again by the strict convexity of the negative arctan
function.
So any unbiased probability measure can be improved upon, and thus we conclude
that the market cannot assume such a measure as the solution to its supremum
expression. Hence, the market is unbiased.
Unbiasedness is a natural property for a market to have, and it will also let us
solve the market using a convex program. The next proof is interesting because it
rst shows we can use a convex program to nd a solution for the market, then takes
some results from convex analysis in Euclidean spaces to prove the market is strictly
Pinterval=Binterval proper.
Theorem 13 (Strict Pinterval=Binterval properness of the Dynamic Discretization
Market). The dynamic discretization market is strictly Pinterval=Binterval proper.
Proof. We begin by showing we can solve the dynamic discretization market using a
convex program, which requires showing that the solution to the supremum
sup
p2P
hp;bi  
0
@
X
!2ppp
p
2(!)  
Z


arctan(
dpcont
d
) d
1
A
is always in Pinterval.
Every function in Binterval can be described as a nite subset of non-overlapping
subintervals I of [0, 1] associated with real values (I0;r0);(I1;r1);:::). Any possible
solution, then, is distinguished by how much probability it assigns to each interval
and how it does so. If an interval is degenerate, the only mass that can be assigned to
it is through a pure point part. If the interval has positive length, on the other hand,
mass can be assigned to it through a combination of pure point, singular continuous or
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absolutely continuous parts. The rst lowers the value of the supremum, the second
leaves it unchanged, and the last actually increases it.4
This thinking implies any mass assigned to a non-degenerate interval must be in
an absolutely continuous part, and now we need to see this absolutely continuous
part is uniform on each interval. Luckily, this follows immediately from the denition
of unbiasedness, which we just proved. This argument shows that if the supremum
attains a solution it does so in Pinterval.
We can now use this fact to solve for _ C using a convex program:
_ C(b) = max
p2(RjNj)
X
i2N
ripi  
 
X
i2M
p
2
i  
X
i2O
arctan
pi
(Li)
!
where N indexes all the pairings of intervals and reals dening b, and M indexes the
degenerate intervals and O indexes the non-degenerate intervals. This program can
alternatively be expressed as minimizing a strictly convex function minus a linear
function over a closed convex space, and this implies it always attains a solution.
Thus we conclude that the solutions to the practical security market are in Pinterval,
and the market attains such solutions for any b 2 Binterval.
We can now use this result to investigate the strict properness of our dynamic
discretization market. The market attaining a unique maximum in Pinterval at each
point in Binterval implies it is strictly ?=Binterval proper, where ? is some (still unknown
to us) subset of Pinterval. We will use another result about convex programs to identify
the space of beliefs.
Let  be a partition of the [0, 1] interval, and B the functions that are constant-
4These features are vital for my argument. I need the pure point part be penalized with a positive
strictly convex function, and the absolutely continuous part to be \rewarded" with another strictly
convex function.
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valued on each element of this partition, representable as functions b :  ! R. A
convex program with jj variables can solve for _ C over B, and can be written as
_ C(b) = max
p2()
X
2
b()p()  
0
@
X
2;()=0
p
2()  
X
2;()>0
arctan
p()
()
1
A
Importantly, any probability measure in () can be obtained as a solution to this
expression, because any Dirac measure is obtainable and the subdierential of a con-
vex function is a closed and convex set. This implies that any measure in Pinterval is
obtainable as a solution, and our cost function is strictly Pinterval=Binterval proper,
as desired.
I think the above proof is incredibly interesting. It begins by showing that a
convex program can solve for the classical cost function at any point, then using facts
about convex programs to prove properties of the function as a whole. It is truly a
fascinating technique that I have not seen elsewhere.
5.3 Practical Cost Functions in Review
The dynamic discretization market just discussed is a strictly Pinterval=Binterval proper
cost function for the [0, 1] interval. It has bounded loss and is unbiased. Being strictly
proper it also admits no arbitrage. Since Binterval is a vector space, it can be thought
of as reliably oering every security for trade, and it can quote meaningful prices,
too. Finally, at any point we can use a convex program to solve for both the classical
cost function and cost function version of the market, letting us extract a prediction
and obtain a cost readily.
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Before this, markets for [0, 1] that experienced bounded loss were unknown. Some
prior work, notably [2, 3] and the unpublished [36], has begun to approach my char-
acterization of strict properness, and could likely be developed into a similar result.
It seems the community has been getting ready for this moment, and that we are all
collectively on its threshold. This thesis is simply one of the rst past the post, and
I am sure there will soon be many more.
The idea of a market being biased or unbiased is new. Unbiased markets can occur
even in discrete spaces, and these markets were likely not noticed because in those
settings it is very natural to work with a probability distributions PDF over its CDF.
Working with a PDF avoids many of the issues of bias, and working with a CDF
makes developing unbiased markets far trickier. Not only do unbiased markets make
more intuitive sense, they also oer practical computational speedups by letting us
solve them using convex programs.
In [1] (the best paper characterizing classical cost functions for discrete spaces)
the authors also discuss how they can solve for their classical cost functions of interest
using a convex program. They go farther than I do in this analysis, describing it for
the entire class of classical cost functions on discrete spaces. They also suggest a
fascinating way of relaxing the convex program so that it is easier to compute. This
sacrices no arbitrage, although it maintains other desirable properties. For discrete
spaces this is a superb practical guide, and it suggests a great opportunity for further
work.
The dynamic discretization market, despite all its nice new properties, is still far
from ideal. It only oers securities from Binterval, and can only express beliefs from
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Pinterval. This may or may not be an issue in practice, depending on the complexity
of traders' beliefs. In settings where beliefs are especially complicated it may be
preferable to use a scoring rule over a cost function. The value of a cost function is
implicitly predicated on traders not holding complete beliefs, and when they are so
complex it suggests it is easier for traders to specify their beliefs directly than trade
securities. Matheson's scoring rule [58] is an extremely easy to compute and strictly
proper scoring rule for this setting.
Clearly there is still a great deal of work to do on developing cost functions, and
I will return to this discussion in the conclusion.
1056
Designing Informative and Simple
Prediction Markets
Chapters 3{5 have discussed strict properness. As we saw in Chapter 5, however,
strict properness is not the only property of interest for prediction markets. This
chapter investigates the design of markets that are both simple and informative.
These are markets where we learn the likelihood of our events of interest as if we knew
all the traders' private information, and we do so using as few securities as possible.
Running a market with fewer securities is computationally easier than running one
with many securities, and so removing superuous securities is a natural design goal.
This chapter's setting is distinct from the previous chapters'. I will assume only a
nite number of states of the world 
,1, and that traders are Bayesian agents with a
common prior and knowledge of how their private information is structured. Further,
1Implicitly interpreted as part of the measurable space (
;2
) since we are working in a discrete
setting.
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I will use the same mathematical abstraction as [65], which has traders predicting
the expected future prices of the securities. This prediction market does not at rst
resemble the scoring rule or cost function markets we have described so far, although
we can think of it as a cost function market where the market maker does not enforce
feasible prices. This setting oers the necessary structure to formalize our discussion
of information aggregation in prediction markets and let us use results from [65]
without a great deal of work translating them to another abstraction.
Semi-formally, in this chapter I consider there are some events of interest we are
interested in learning the likelihood of. We oer a bundle of securities to the traders,
and they begin exchanging information about their private information / signals by
oering public predictions in the market. The more securities available the more
expressive the traders can be, and the more likely they will reach a consensus that
reveals the likelihood of the events of interest as if we knew all the traders' private
information. Of course, having too many securities is undesirable, so our goal is to
nd the fewest securities we can oer such that traders' will most accurately reveal
what we would like to know.
As mentioned in the introduction, a good example of this design challenge is creat-
ing a market for corn futures. There are many variables that impact the future price
of corn. The amount of sunshine and rain, future demand for corn, the introduction
of new varieties of corn and growing techniques, etc.. Traders may have varying levels
of knowledge about each of these variables. Some may be experts at predicting the
weather (meteorologists), others are experts at understanding future demand (cereal
producers). To pool all their information, then, we must oer them enough securities
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so they can express this knowledge. At the same time, however, we do not want to
oer superuous securities, and there may be clever ways to oer one security instead
of two. Finding just the right, minimal set of securities to let the market best reveal
the future price of corn is our challenge.
The above informal example provides a helpful intuition, and I think the math-
ematical complexities also suggest a more precise and formal example that demon-
strates the tension between informativeness and simplicity. This example is derived
from [41].
Example 1. Consider a market oering a single security worth $1 if a particular
candidate wins the U.S. presidential election and $0 otherwise. The market has two
participants: a political analyst in Washington and an Iowa caucus-goer who is well-
informed on local politics. The analyst understands the importance of Iowa on the
campaign and knows whether a win or loss there will mean the candidate is elected.
The caucus-goer, on the other hand, knows whether the candidate will win or lose the
caucus, but not its broader eect.
This situation can be described by dening four states of the world, !1, !2, !3,
and !4: The analyst knows if the true state of the world is on the diagonal or not
Iowa
Wins Loses
General Election
Wins !1 !2
Loses !3 !4
(the eect of the caucus) and the caucus-goer knows which column the true state is
in (the results of the caucus). If they could reveal their private information they
would learn the true state of the world, !. But with a uniform prior over the state
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space, both think the likelihood of election is 1=2 and value the security at $0.50 no
matter what their private information is, since every signal contains a state where the
candidate wins the election and another where the candidate loses. Thus the market
closes without accomplishing anything useful, with the nal security price still being
$0.50.
This market is clearly very simple, and it is not informative. If, instead, it oered
one security for each state of the world, however, then the traders could perfectly
express their private beliefs and combine their knowledge to better predict the likely
results of the presidential race.
Semi-formally, I will call a market informative if it does two things:
1. It oers a set of securities so that, in perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as traders
continue trading the value of these securities converges to their expectation
conditional on all traders' private information / signals. Markets with this
property are said to aggregate their information.
2. The prices of these securities always reveals the likelihood of each event of
interest.
This rst property was studied by [65], who showed it was dependent on the securities
being separable, a technical condition we will review shortly. One problem with prices
being accurate alone, however, is they may not reveal what we need to know, hence
the second property. It may sound odd that a market can aggregate information ins
a useless manner. Trivially, we might only decide to oer securities related to the
weather when trying to predict the price of corn. The market may perfectly aggregate
all traders' knowledge about these securities and accurately determine their prices,
1096: Designing Informative and Simple Prediction Markets
but we can infer nothing from them about the future price of corn. More generally,
we are concerned that while prices may be correct, they can be consistent with many
possible interpretations of the likelihood of our events of interest. Informativeness
requires both that (1) prices always aggregate all traders' information and (2) we can
use these prices to uniquely infer a single interpretation of the likelihood of our events
of interest.
This chapter also focuses on simplicity, and a market is both simple and informa-
tive when
1. it is informative,
2. it oers as few securities as possible,
3. and these securities are associated with events, oering $1 if an event occurs
and $0 otherwise.
I already mentioned the rst two properties; the third is a naturalness condition on
the type of securities we may oer. These securities appear common in practice, and
I will show that with more exotic securities odd results are possible. We might, for
example, be able to use a single carefully and strangely designed security to represent
a lot of complex information, and it is unlikely real traders would be able to work
with such a security.2
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. A discussion of related work
appears in Section 6.1, followed by a formal description of our model in Section 6.2.
Section 6.3 discusses information aggregation in prediction markets, building on prior
work to show the importance of oering securities that are separable. Section 6.4
2We rarely see a single security acting as a summary statistic for an entire market.
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begins our discussion of designing simple and informative markets, and Section 6.5
concludes.
How we are able to design markets that are simple and informative depends on
our understanding of the structure of trader's knowledge. Returning to our corn
example, it depends on how well we understand what variables are relevant to future
corn prices. Our mathematical example also shows it requires understanding how
traders information is related. This leads to the following breakdown of Section 6.4
on design:
 In Section 6.4.2, I assume we know nothing of how traders' information is struc-
tured. In this setting determining the likelihood of an event requires as many
securities as there are outcomes in that event or its complement (minus one),
possibly a prohibitive number in practice. This section also discusses complete
markets, and how they are the only markets that always reveal the likelihood
of every event.
 Section 6.4.3 shows that with perfect knowledge of traders' signal structure a
single security can create an informative market. This security is likely too
strange to use in practice, however, and this market should not be considered
simple. This section motivates our restriction to only use securities associated
with an events, paying $1 if that event occurs and $0 otherwise.
 Finally, Section 6.4.4 considers designing simple and informative markets given
perfect knowledge of the trader's signal structure. In this case, designing a
simple and informative market is NP-hard.
These results are a little disheartening. Designing simple and informative markets
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is either trivial when we know nothing about how traders' knowledge is structured,
but requires a prohibitive number of securities. On the other hand, when we know
everything about how traders' knowledge is structured their design is NP-hard. Still,
I think this chapter is interesting as it introduces this natural problem of how we can
create markets that are informative and simple. Perhaps these results will inspire
future work to look harder at information aggregation occurring outside the market,
or develop a formal theory of partial aggregation that is more tractable, or provide
further motivation for developing markets that can handle very large outcome spaces,
like the work of [53] and [31].
This chapter references some material in an appendix that appears on Yiling
Chen's website3. I have decided not to include this material for the sake of a stream-
lined narrative.
6.1 Related Work
Information aggregation and the design of prediction markets have been discussed
in many other papers. A series of papers have shown that prediction markets are
empirically eective in settings like politics [10], business [86, 26], disease surveil-
lance [79], and entertainment [73]. Experiments with predictions markets have also
shown them eective [76, 77, 78], and substantial work has analyzed the theory of
how markets aggregate information, including at rational expectations [80, 6, 45],
competitive [87, 74], and game theory equilibria [65, 51, 18].
The early foundations for the study of information aggregation come from [8],
3http://yiling.seas.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/informativesecurities.pdf
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whose abstract results are rened and extended by [41, 62, 60] and [63]. These papers
show that a set of Bayesian agents regularly announcing their posterior probability
distributions over a set of outcomes will eventually converge in their beliefs. Critically,
these papers do not discuss whether this convergence is informative, only that the
agents reach some impassable consensus.
In a prediction market the above is analogous to traders agreeing on the price of
each security. As mentioned in the preface to this chapter, this agreement may not
reveal anything useful. Some prior work on prediction markets has investigated what
I call \informativeness," where traders reach a revealing consensus. In [32] informa-
tive Shapley-Shubik markets (see [84]) were characterized, assuming straightforward,
non-strategic traders. And [65] characterized information aggregation in prediction
markets with strategic, risk-neutral traders at perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This
latter paper demonstrated the importance of a market being suciently expressive
to let this aggregation occur, and the separability property it develops is essential to
my work. An extended discussion of this paper and its results appears in Section 6.3.
[51] generalized this model to risk-averse agents.
The work of [32], [65], and [51] focuses on understanding the aggregation of in-
formation relevant to the value of a given, xed security. My work diers because
it considers design: how we can simplify markets for large outcome spaces like the
9.2. quintillion outcomes of the NCAA tournament [88], the over 250 ways for states
to vote in the U.S. Presidential election, and the n! rankings for a competition with
n candidates, while keeping these markets informative. Oering a security for each
state would be theoretically informative and practically unmanageable. Prior work
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on simplifying markets, like [19], has not considered whether the result is informative.
6.2 Formal Model
In this section, I describe my model of traders' information and the market mecha-
nism. This model closely follows [65], but is generalized to handle a vector of securities
(often simply referred to as a set of securities) instead of a single security.
6.2.1 Modeling Traders' Information
We will consider n traders, 1; ;n, and a nite set 
 of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive states of the world. Traders share a common knowledge prior distribution
P0 over 
. Before the market opens Nature draws a state ! from 
 according
to P0 and traders learn some information about ! that, following [8], is based on
partitions of 
. A partition of a set 
 is a set of nonempty subsets of 
 such that every
element of 
 is contained in exactly one subset. For example, ffA;Bg;fCg;fDgg
and ffA;Dg;fB;Cgg are both partitions of fA;B;C;Dg. I assume that every trader
i receives i(!) as their private signal, where i(!) denotes the element of the
partition i that contains !. In other words, trader i learns that the true state of
the world lies in the set i(!).
I refer to the vector  = (1; ;n) as the traders' signal structure, which is
assumed to be common knowledge for all traders. The join of the signal structure,
denoted join(), is the coarsest common renement of , that is, the partition with
the smallest number of elements satisfying the property that for any !1 and !2 in the
same element of the partition, i(!1) = i(!2) for all i. For example, the join of the
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partitions ffA;Dg;fB;Cgg and ffA;C;Dg;fBgg is ffA;Dg;fBg;fCgg. The join
is unique. I use (!) to denote the element of the join containing !. Note that if
two states appear in the same element of the join, no trader can distinguish between
these states.
6.2.2 Market Scoring Rules
The market mechanism that we will consider is a market scoring rule [48, 49]. In
this chapter, I will describe a market scoring rule as a mechanism that allows traders
to sequentially report their probability distributions or expectations. While focusing
on market scoring rules may seem restrictive, market scoring rules are surprisingly
general. In particular, any market scoring rule that allows traders to report proba-
bility distributions over 
 has an equivalent implementation as a cost-function-based
market where the mechanism acts as an automated market maker who sets prices for
j
j Arrow-Debreu securities, one for each state and taking value 1 in that state and
0 otherwise, and is willing to buy and sell securities at the set prices [48, 25].
This result can easily be extended to general scoring rules by applying the re-
sults of [2, 3]. In particular, their results imply that any market scoring rule that
allows traders to report their expectations has an equivalent implementation as a
cost-function-based market that allows traders to trade securities with the market
maker. Thus, without loss of generality, my model and analysis are presented for
market scoring rules.
Before describing the market scoring rule mechanism, let's rst review the idea of
a strictly proper scoring rule. Scoring rules are most frequently used to evaluate and
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incentivize probabilistic forecasts [39, 43], but can also be used to elicit the mean or
other statistics of a random variable [54]. The scoring rules that we consider will be
used to elicit the mean of a vector of random variables [83]. Let X = (x1; ;xm) be a
vector of bounded real-valued random variables. A scoring rule s maps a forecast ~ y in
some convex region K  Rm (e.g., the probability simplex in the case of probabilistic
forecasts) and a realization of X to a score s(~ y;X(!)) in R.4 A scoring rule for eliciting
an expectation is said to be proper if a risk neutral forecaster who believes that the
true distribution over states 
 is P maximizes his expected score by reporting ~ y =
EP[X], that is, if EP[X] 2 argmax~ y2K
P
!2
 P(!)s(~ y;X(!)). (For random vectors X,
I use EP[X] to denote the expected value !2
P(!)X(!).) A scoring rule is strictly
proper if EP[X] is the unique maximizer.5
One common example of a strictly proper scoring rule is the Brier scoring rule [16],
which is based on Euclidean distance and can be written, for any b > 0, as s(~ y;X(!)) =
 b
Pm
j=1(yj   xj(!))2 =  bjj~ y   X(!)jj2.
Strictly proper scoring rules incentivize myopic traders to report truthfully, but
do not provide a mechanism for aggregating predictions from multiple traders. Han-
son [48, 49] introduced market scoring rules to address this problem. A market scoring
rule is a sequentially shared strictly proper scoring rule.6
4Technically, the region K should include the convex hull of the possible realizations of X, a set
equivalent to the possible expected values of X. A full discussion of this and other properties of
scoring rules is beyond the scope of this thesis, but interested readers can see [83].
5This discussion is mathematically redundant with my discussion earlier in the thesis. I think it
is valuable to contextualize the prior work into the setting of discrete probability theory, however.
Also note that earlier I did not discuss eliciting a statistic, only eliciting the complete belief. Eliciting
a statistic is a common goal for a scoring rule, and the earlier analysis can be easily extended to this
case.
6The descriptor \sequentially shared ..." is meaningless. It has been adopted as a kind of cant
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Formally, let X be a vector of random variables.7 The market operator species a
strictly proper scoring rule s and chooses an initial prediction ~ y0 for the expected value
of X; when there is a known common prior P0, it is most natural to set ~ y0 = EP0[X].
The market opens with initial prediction ~ y0, and traders take turns submitting predic-
tions. The order in which traders make predictions is common knowledge. Without
loss of generality, I assume that traders 1;2; ;n take turns, in order, submitting
predictions ~ y1;~ y2; ;~ yn, then the process repeats and the traders, in the same or-
der, submit predictions ~ yn+1;~ yn+2; ;~ y2n. Traders repeat this process an innite
number of times before the market closes and Nature reveals !. Each trader then
receives a score s(~ yt;X(!)) for each prediction made at some time t, but must pay
s(~ yt 1;X(!)), the score of the previous trader. The total payment to trader i (which
may be negative) is then
P1
t=0 s(~ ytn+i;X(!))   s(~ ytn+i 1;X(!)).
6.2.3 Modeling Traders' Behavior
Together, the traders, state space, signal structure, security vector, and market
scoring rule mechanism dene an extensive form game with incomplete information.
I consider Bayesian traders either acting in perfect Bayesian equilibrium or behav-
ing myopically in this game. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a subgame perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Loosely speaking, at a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, it
must be the case that each player's strategy is optimal (i.e., maximizes expected
to describe how prediction markets work. I think this is simply because the literature has done
such a poor job formalizing these mechanisms it has turned to magical insider language as its best
recourse.
7Typically market scoring rules are used for probabilistic forecasts in which case X would be a
vector of indicator random variables, but this need not be the case.
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utility) given the player's beliefs and the strategies of other players at any stage
of the game, and that players' beliefs are derived from strategies using Bayes' rule
whenever possible. See Gonz alex-D az and Mel endez-Jim enez [44] for a more formal
description.8
Perfect Bayesian equilibria can be dicult to compute and it is an open question
whether they always exist in prediction markets, although in some special cases they
do [18]. An alternative is to consider myopic Bayesian traders who simply maximize
their expected payo for the current round. Since strictly proper scoring rules my-
opically incentivize honest reports, these traders report their current posteriors each
time they make a prediction.
6.3 Information Aggregation
Separability is used to characterize the conditions under which securities aggregate
information about their own values. Building on ideas from DeMarzo and Skiadas [29,
30], [65] characterized separability for a single security. [65] showed that in every
perfect Bayesian equilibrium market prices will, in the limit, reect the value of the
security as if traders had revealed their private signals if and only if the security is
separable. If a security is not separable, then there always exist priors and equilibrium
strategies where no information aggregation occurs.
In this section, I generalize these prior denitions to multiple securities and ar-
bitrary signal structures. Ostrovsky assumed a restricted class of signal structures
without loss of generality, and my generalizations are uninteresting when only consid-
8Finding a good, formal description of PBE is very, very, very hard.
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ering aggregation. They will be necessary to discuss informativeness, however, as the
results of the next section demonstrate. I will then restate Ostrovsky's equilibrium
aggregation result in this setting. As previously discussed, perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium may or may not exist in prediction markets, and I also adapt and formalize
prior work on information aggregation to show separability is also the necessary and
sucient condition for myopic traders to always aggregate their information.
Informative markets require separable securities. If a market uses separable securi-
ties then both Bayesian traders acting myopically and in perfect Bayesian equilibrium
will, in the limit, value the security as if their private signals were revealed, and this
allows a market designer to directly infer the likelihood of his events of interest from
the securities' value. If a set of non-separable securities were used then the market
designer could be required instead to perform additional inference and know the prior
and traders' strategies.
As mentioned, I say a market aggregates information if, in the limit as time goes
to innity, the value of the securities approaches their value conditional on all the
traders' private signals. Since each trader i receives the signal i(!), their pooled
signal is
T
i i(!) = (!).
Denition 9 (Aggregation). Information is aggregated with respect to a set of se-
curities X, signal structure , and common prior P0, if the sequence of predictions
~ y0;~ y1;~ y2; converges in probability to the random vector EP0[Xj(!)].
A set of securities is separable if and only if the traders only agree on their value
when it reects their pooled information. That is, for any prior distribution there
must be at least one trader whose private information causes them to dissent from a
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consensus, unless that consensus is the traders' collective best estimate.
Denition 10 (Separability). A set of securities X is non-separable under partition
structure  if there exists a distribution P over 
 and vector ~ v such that P(!) > 0
on at least one state ! 2 
 in which EP[Xj(!)] 6= ~ v, and for every trader i and
state !;P(!) > 0,
EP[Xji(!)] =
P
!02i(!) P(!0)X(!0)
P
!02i(!) P(!0)
= ~ v: (6.1)
If a security is not non-separable then it is separable.
Here the vector ~ v represents a possible consensus, only agreed upon if there is no
alternative when the securities are separable.
Separability is a property of the entire set of securities, as Example 2 demonstrates.
Example 2. Let 
 = f!0
1; !
2; !3; !0
4; !
5; !6g. Two traders have partitions as
follows:
1 = ff!
0
1; !

2; !3g;f!
0
4; !

5; !6gg
2 = ff!
0
1; !

5g;f!3; !
0
4g;f!

2; !6gg
and there are two securities: x with value one when !
2 or !
5 occurs and zero other-
wise, and x0 with value one when !0
1 or !0
4 occurs and zero otherwise.
Both securities are individually non-separable with respect to . If the prior P
is uniform over !0
1, !
2, !
5, and !6, then EP[xji(!)] = 1=2 for i 2 f1;2g and all
! such that P(!) > 0. Similarly, if P is uniform over !0
1, !3, !0
4, and !
5, then
EP[x0ji(!)] = 1=2 for i 2 f1;2g and all ! such that P(!) > 0. The join of traders'
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partitions, however, consists of singletons. Hence, both EP[xj(!)] and EP[x0j(!)]
have value 0 or 1, not 1=2, for all !.
But taken together the set of securities is separable with respect to . Given
any prior distribution P and a state !, trader 2 either identies ! with certain,
which happens when P assigns 0 probability to the other state in its signal 2(!), or
assigns positive probability to both states in 2(!). In the former case, EP[Xj2(!)] =
EP[Xj(!)]. In the latter case, trader 2's expected value for the securities is positive
for both when ! 2 (!0
1;!
5), positive for only x0 when ! 2 (!3;!0
4), and positive
for only x when ! 2 (!0
2;!6). If the set of securities is non-separable there must
exist a distribution ~ P and a vector ~ v such that ~ v 6= E ~ P[Xj(~ !)] for some state ~ ! 2
f!jP(!) > 0g and E ~ P[Xj2(!)] = ~ v for any state ! 2 f!jP(!) > 0g. This is possible
only when ~ P assigns positive probability to the two states in 2(~ !) and 0 probability
for all other states because each signal of player 2 has a distinct expectation of the
securities. Given such a ~ P, however, trader 1 always uniquely identies the true
state and has the correct expectation of the securities. Hence, the set of securities is
separable with respect to .
6.3.1 Aggregation
Separability is a necessary and sucient property for aggregation in two natural
cases.
Theorem 14 (Equilibrium Aggregation, [65]). Consider a market with securities
X and traders with signal structure . Information is aggregated in every perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of this market if and only if the securities X are separable under
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.
Theorem 15 (Myopic Aggregation). Consider a market with securities X and myopic
traders with signal structure . Information is aggregated in nite rounds if and only
if the securities X are separable under .
Ostrovsky [65] proved a special case of Theorem 14 for markets with one security.
Theorem 14 stated above accommodates any nite set of securities and is proved using
a simple extension of Ostrovsky's proof. Specically, the proof shows that traders'
sequences of predictions at any perfect Bayesian equilibrium are bounded martingales
and must converge. Separability implies that if information is not aggregated in the
limit, there exists an agent who can make an arbitrarily large prot by deviating from
his equilibrium strategy, a contradiction to traders being in equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 15 makes use of prior work on convergence to common
knowledge (particularly [40]) and shows not only that myopic traders' sequences of
predictions are bounded martingales but also that they must converge to the same
random vector in a nite number of periods. Then, by separability, it is shown that
this consensus prediction must equal E[Xj(!)], implying aggregation. A full proof
appears in the appendix mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
If the securities are not separable then there exists a distribution P satisfying
(6.1) in the denition of separability. Letting this distribution be the prior, a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium is simply for traders to report the common consensus value,
not allowing any meaningful Bayesian updating and preventing aggregation from
occurring. Myopic traders are constrained to report this same value.
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6.4 Designing Securities
In this section I discuss the design of informative markets. While separability is
a sucient and necessary condition for aggregation in two natural settings, it only
implies the value of the securities reects all the traders' private information, not
that the market designer can use this value to infer that private information or the
likelihood of the events of interests. I dene informative securities as securities that
are both separable and allow for the likelihood of the events of interest to be inferred
directly from their value.
As I will show, complete markets are always informative, but deployed predic-
tion markets are rarely complete. These markets require too many securities to be
practical, and their securities present challenges for traders. A prediction market for
the U.S. presidential election, for example, may need one state per outcome in the
electoral college. This is over 250 states and requires traders to bid on securities like
\The President wins Ohio, not Florida, Illinois, not Indiana ..." Even if alternative
bidding methods were developed, traders would still be required to review the value
of each security for aggregation to be formally implied. This is impractical, and so I
consider good designs as those using a few natural securities. I rst discuss the design
requirements of markets that are always informative, and markets that are informa-
tive for a particular signal structure. The latter market allows a single security to
be informative on any set of events, but arguably appears \unnatural." To describe
the challenges of designing using only natural securities I then consider a constrained
design process instead, where the market designer is restricted to an arbitrary subset
of (possibly natural) securities.
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6.4.1 Informative Markets
Informally, I would like to say that a market's securities are informative on a set of
events with respect to a signal structure if the market organizer learns the likelihood
of the events as if it knew all the traders' private signals. Assuming the values of
the securities reect traders' pooled information, if the likelihood of the events is
unambiguously implied from these values then functionally all the private signals are
revealed. I call this latter property distinguishability.
Denition 11 (Distinguishability). Let  be a signal structure over states 
 and
Pjoin() be the set of all probability distributions over 
 that assign positive probability
only to a subset of states in one element of join() (i.e., a trader's possible posteriors
after aggregation). A set of securities X on 
 distinguishes a set of events E with
respect to  if and only if for any P;P 0 2 Pjoin();EP[X] = EP0[X] implies P(E) =
P 0(E);8E 2 E.
Equivalently a set of securities distinguishes a set of events if there exists a function
from the securities' values to the likelihood of the events. When a set of securities is
both separable and distinguishable I will describe it as informative.
Denition 12 (Informativeness). A set of securities X is informative on a set of
events E with respect to a signal structure  if and only if X both distinguishes E and
is separable with respect to .
Informativeness is a strong condition. Even if securities are not informative it
might be possible for a market designer to infer some information from the market,
or for the market to be described as partially informative. Generalizing our framework
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to account for partial aggregation would be an interesting line of future work.
6.4.2 Always Informative Markets
I rst address the problem of designing a set of securities that is informative on
a set of events with respect to any signal structure. I will call such securities always
informative. These securities may be of practical interest if the market designer is
unsure of the traders' signal structure; using a set of always informative securities
implies aggregation will occur no matter what the true signal structure is.
A market is said to be complete if by trading securities, agents can freely transfer
wealth across states [57]. Rigorously, consider the set of securities that contains a
constant payo security plus all of the securities oered by a market. The market
is complete if and only if this set includes j
j linearly independent securities. The
most common is a market with j
j Arrow-Debreu securities, each associated with a
dierent state of the world, taking value 1 on that state and 0 everywhere else. For
an overview of complete markets, see [33] or [57].
Complete markets are theoretically appealing because they allow traders to ex-
press any information about their beliefs. I formalize this well-known idea in our
framework in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A market over state space 
 with securities X is complete if and
only if for all distinct probability distributions P and P 0 over 
, EP[X] 6= EP0[X].
Proof. Let M be a matrix containing the payos of X, with one row for each outcome
and one column for each security. The element at row i and column j of M takes
value xj(!i).
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Consider a probability distribution P represented as a row vector so, PM =
EP[X]. The system of linear equations
P
0M = EP[X]
X
!2

P
0(!) = 1
has a unique solution P 0 = P if and only if the matrix M0, which is M augmented by
a column of 1s to represent the summation constraint, has rank j
j.
If the market is complete, M0 has this rank so any distinct probability distribution
has distinct expectation.
Now assume EP[X] 6= EP0[X];8P 6= P 0, and, for a contradiction, that the market
is not complete. Then the system of equations has at least two solutions, one of which
is the probability distribution P and a distinct solution Q, such that PM = QM =
EP[X]. Let U be the uniform distribution over 
. Then there exists c > 0 such
that (1   c)U + cQ is a probability distribution (since Q satises
P
!2
 Q(!) = 1).
Moreover, (1   c)U + cP is also a probability distribution and
 
(1   c)U + cP

M =
 
(1   c)U + cQ

M;
contradicting EP[X] 6= EP0[X];8P 6= P 0. Thus, the market must be complete.
This expressiveness is a necessary and sucient condition for the likelihood of
every event to be inferred, and suggests an alternative characterization of complete
markets as those markets that are always informative on every event.
Theorem 16. A market is always informative on every event E with respect to every
signal structure  if and only if it is complete.
Proof. Distinguishing every event E is equivalent to distinguishing each state of the
world ! 2 
; the latter are also events and so must be distinguished, and if each is
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distinguished then the likelihood of any event can be inferred. Proposition 1 shows
that completeness is a necessary and sucient condition for distinguishing each state
of the world.
It remains to show that complete markets are also separable with respect to any
signal structure . Assume, for a contradiction, there exists a signal structure  and
a complete market with securities X such that X is non-separable with respect to .
Since X is non-separable there must exist distinct probability distributions P and P 0
over 
 such that EP[X] = EP0[X]; but by Proposition 1, in a complete market this
equality only holds if P = P 0, a contradiction. So complete markets are separable
with respect to any signal structure and always distinguish every event, implying they
are always informative on every event.
Complete markets are often impractical, but rarely is every event of interest. Even
if a single event is of interest, however, as many securities as almost half the states in
the market may be required to create an always informative market. I let  E denote
the complement of E.
Theorem 17. Any market that is always informative on an event E must have at
least min(jEj;j  Ej)   1 linearly independent securities.
Proof. Let X be a set of securities, fewer than min(jEj;j  Ej)) 1 of which are linearly
independent, and assume, for a contradiction, that X is always informative on E.
Restricting attention to states in E, the argument from Proposition 1 implies this
market has too few securities to distinguish every probability distribution over E and
there exist probability distributions PE and P 0
E such that EPE[X] = EP0
E[X]. Let the
dierence between these distributions be the vector E = PE P 0
E, and dene vectors
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
+
E and 
 
E such that 
+
E(!) = max(0;E(!)) and 
 
E(!) = min(0;E(!)). Since
E is the dierence of two probability distributions with the same expected value,
X
!2E

+
E(!)
jj
+
Ejj1
X(!) =
X
!2E
 
 
E(!)
jj
 
Ejj1
X(!): (6.2)
That is,
+
E(!)
jj+
Ejj1 and
  
E(!)
jj 
Ejj1 are disjoint probability distributions over states in E with
the same expected value, and the same argument can be made, mutatis mutandi for
two such probability distributions over states in  E. Let these distributions over E be
QE and Q0
E, and the ones over  E be Q  E and Q0
 E. Although I have been referring to
these as distributions over E and  E I will also consider them to be distributions over 

that assign zero probability to all states not previously included in the distributions,
and I will use these names to stand for both these distributions and the states they
assign positive probability to to reduce notation.
Now suppose there are two traders with signal structure
1 = ffQE;Q  Eg;fQ
0
E;Q
0
 Egg
2 = ffQE;Q
0
 Eg;fQ
0
E;Q  Egg
and prior
P0 =
QE + Q0
E + Q  E + Q0
 E
4
:
Each trader's expectation conditional on any signal is the same since EQE[X] =
EQ0
E[X] and EQ  E[X] = EQ0
 E[X] and each signal contains one distribution over states in
E and another over states in  E. But the join of the signal structure is ffQEg;fQ0
Eg;fQ  Eg;fQ0
 Egg,
and if X is separable with respect to  the expectation conditional on any such ele-
ment must also, then, be the same. This implies EQE[X] = EQ  E[X], but by construc-
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tion QE(E) 6= Q  E(E), so if X is separable with respect to  it does not distinguish
E, contradicting our assumption that X is always informative on E.
This result demonstrates the need for a market designer to allow traders to express
information it nds uninteresting. It also suggests that, in practice, few markets are
acquiring all of their participants' information. This is unsurprising, but I think
better designs will extract more information, and that this result shows knowledge of
or assumptions about the traders' signal structure may be necessary to inform those
designs.
6.4.3 Fixed Signal Structures
If the join of the traders' signal structure is known and has singleton sets for its
elements, then there exists a single security that is informative on every event.
Theorem 18. For any signal structure  such that join() consists only of singleton
sets there exists a security x that is informative on every event E with respect to .
The proof uses a result from [65].
Theorem 19 ([65]). Let  be a signal structure such that join() consists of singleton
sets of states, and let x be a security that can be expressed as x(!) = if(i(!)) for
an arbitrary function f mapping signals to reals. Then x is separable under .
Proof of Theorem 18. To construct the security, rst assign a unique identier s0;s1;s2;:::
to every signal of every trader, and dene f(sj) = 10j for all j. Let S! denote the
set of indices of the identiers corresponding to the signals of each trader for state
!, i.e, corresponding to i(!) for each trader i. The security x(!) = j2S!f(sj) is
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separable by Theorem 19. Additionally, the sum j2Jf(sj) for any J  f0;1;2;:::g
is unique, and each state ! has a unique associated set of signals since I assumed the
join consists of singletons. This implies the value of the security for each element of
the join is unique, so the security also distinguishes every event.
The assumption that the join of traders' signal structure consists only of singleton
sets is not without loss of generality. If the signal structure is known, however, the
market designer can treat elements of the join as states of the world, identify the
correct element of the join by running the market with a single security, then apply
the prior to that element to learn the likelihood of each state as if he knew all the
traders' private signals. If the prior is unknown this distribution can also be solicited
from any single trader using a scoring rule.
6.4.4 Constrained Design
A single security acting as a summary statistic for an entire market is unlikely
to be considered natural by any criterion. Real markets, like those on Intrade, use
multiple securities. Instead of imposing our own denition of natural, in this section I
consider adding a design constraint that the market's securities must be picked from
a predened set. The market designer is then challenged to nd the fewest securities
from this set that are informative on the events of interest with respect to the given
signal structure. I call this the informative set optimization problem. If the set
of predened securities is empty or has no informative subset then the problem is
simply infeasible, so I assume there exists at least one such subset.
Demonstrating informative set is hard would not be very interesting if exotic
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and unnatural securities were required for the proof. One commonly used class of
securities are event securities which pay $1 if an event occurs and $0 otherwise. The
corresponding optimization problem is informative event set, a restriction of
informative set, and even solving this restricted version of the problem is np-
hard.
More formally, informative set takes as input a nite outcome space 
, a set
of events of interest E, each a subset of 
, and a set of possible securities X, each of
which maps 
 ! R. The challenge is nding a minimal set of securities from X that
is informative for the events of interest E. The informative event set problem
is the same, except the set of possible securities X is restricted to maps 
 ! f0;1g.
Now we can state the following results.
Theorem 20. informative event set is np-hard.
This immediately implies that the more general informative set problem is
also hard.
Corollary 1. informative set is np-hard.
The proof appears in the appendix and demonstrates a one-to-one correspondence
between set cover instances and a minimal informative set of securities for a single
fully informed trader.
The complexity of these problems suggests that while knowledge of the traders'
signal structure allows for better designs, a perfect design will be intractable to com-
pute or require additional assumptions about the relationship between traders' signal
structure and the set of possible securities. Practically we can only ever hope to oer
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better (but not perfect) designs that extract more information from traders than cur-
rent markets do. These results conrm we will always have to settle for some degree
of error in our designs even if the traders' signal structure could be perfectly observed.
6.5 Designing Markets in Review
The formal framework presented here is an early step in our understanding of how
to design prediction markets. In hindsight, it may be most interesting for what it does
not say, and what gaps it reveals in our understanding of these markets. After all, in
practice strict properness seems sucient for markets to be accurate in practice. This
suggests that either (1) a substantial amount of information aggregation and signalling
occurs outside the market, and/or (2) even when the markets are not completely
formally information, they are usually partially informative. That is, in practice,
even if we are not extracting all the traders information, it appears we are getting a
lot of it.
Two suggested areas for future work are extending the formal framework pre-
sented here to describe partial information aggregation, and empirically determining
whether markets only respond to outside signals or traders aggregate information
within the market itself. Reviewers for the conference version of this chapter also
agreed that extending it to consider partial information aggregation would be very
interesting. Empirically, this is likely what is occurring, and given the empirical suc-
cess of prediction markets I have also wondered if a random set of securities is, with
high probability, likely to aggregate a good deal of information.
Another possibility is that markets simply respond to outside signals. In a pres-
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idential election, for example, traders can review the predictions of Nate Silver, and
they might set the price in the market equal to the value he predicts. In these cases
markets are more about expressing one's condence in a belief, rather than inferring
and exchanging signals. An empirical study that could reveal whether outside signals
or internal signals or both were used in markets would be fascinating.
Both questions appear deeply natural and essential to our understanding of pre-
diction markets.
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Decision Making
The options God gives us are always conditional on our guessing whether a
certain proposition is true.
{ Frank P. Ramsey, Truth and Probability
This chapter, like the one preceding it, is a self-contained discussion of how pre-
dictions and techniques closely related to prediction markets can be used to assist
decision making. It also uses only the discrete theory, unlike Chapters 2{5, and again
like Chapter 6. Written recently, and being farther from the material presented else-
where in this thesis, this chapter stands on its own almost completely unchanged.
This version references an appendix, available on Yiling Chen's website.1 I have not
included the material from this appendix since I think it bogs down our narrative.
1http://yiling.seas.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/DM_full_version.pdf
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7.1 Introduction
Consider a company attempting to decide whether to invest in solar or wind
energy. To improve its chances of making the right decision it would like to acquire
some expert advice. The company needs, however, some method of incentivizing
experts to be accurate. That is, it needs some means of paying experts so that they
honestly reveal their private beliefs or information.
In this chapter I characterize two methods of accurately soliciting expert advice
for decision making. The rst elicits predictions from one or more experts about
the likely eects of each available action. If these predictions are accurate then the
company can use them to make an informed decision. The second simply asks a
single expert to recommend an action. If the expert's incentives are aligned with the
decision maker's then this action will prot them both. So with the rst method
our challenge is incentivizing accuracy, and in the second method it is aligning the
expert's most protable recommendation with the decision maker's most preferred
action.
The rst part of this Chapter (Sections 6.2{.4) focuses on eliciting predictions for
decision making. One popular method of eliciting accurate forecasts of the future is
a prediction market. In a prediction market, traders or experts produce a series of
forecasts about future outcomes of interest. For instance, traders may be asked to
predict whether it will rain or not on Friday next week, or which nominated lm will
win the best picture Oscar. These predictions are probability distributions over the
outcomes and are made publicly, allowing experts to review each other's forecasts
and update their own predictions accordingly. Eventually the market closes and the
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future becomes the present and is observed.
A fundamental property of well-designed prediction markets is that they pay or
score predictions for accuracy. If providing an accurate forecast maximizes an expert's
score for that prediction, I say the market is proper, and if an accurate forecast
uniquely maximizes the score the market is strictly proper. Strictly proper prediction
markets are theoretically eective at aggregating expert information and providing
an accurate forecast of the future under some general conditions [65, 24, 51].
Since strictly proper prediction markets are so useful for forecasting the future,
we would like to provide the same incentives to experts when eliciting predictions to
make a decision. Extending these incentives is not straightforward: the predictions
necessary for decision making are dierent than those made in a classical prediction
market, and making a decision changes the observed future. Put another way, in a
prediction market an expert predicts the future, but a decision maker is interested in
the many possible futures that can result from its choice. This implies the same tech-
niques that make a prediction market strictly proper do not apply for the elicitation
of predictions for decision making. The dierences between the classical prediction
and decision making settings are detailed in Section 2.
In Section 3 I introduce a model of eliciting predictions for decision making, and
in Section 4 I use this model to characterize strictly proper decision making, extend-
ing the incentives of strictly proper prediction markets to decision making with both
a single expert and many experts in a market (a decision market). Unfortunately,
creating this incentive requires the decision maker use a completely mixed strategy
to choose an action. Essentially, the decision maker must implement an unbiased
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estimator of the future, and this requires stochastically sampling from it. This lim-
itation suggests that eliciting predictions for decision making lets a decision maker
understand its choice, but requires the decision maker not always act on this under-
standing. If the decision maker is initially likely to take any action, however, then
eliciting predictions may increase the likelihood it makes the best available choice.
In Section 5 I discuss an alternative method of acquiring expert advice where
the decision maker simply asks a single expert to recommend an action. In this
setting I will explicitly model the decision maker's preferences, and our goal is for the
expert to accurately reveal the decision maker's most preferred action. I show that
we can incentivize an expert to accurately reveal this action if and only if the decision
maker's preferences admit a convex weak utility representation, and that this method
no longer requires the decision maker choose an action stochastically.
Related Work Decision markets were rst proposed by [47] without an analysis
of their incentives. [69] showed these proposed decision markets did not provide the
same incentive for accuracy as a strictly proper prediction market, and I elaborate on
this insight in Section 2. They also described a special case of expert recommendation
that I detail and generalize in Section 5.
Other work related to eliciting predictions for decision making has considered
external incentives in addition to the market's intrinsic incentives. [85] considered
a prediction market where experts can aect the future by taking some actions and
dened principal-aligned scoring rules that incentivized them to only take \helpful"
actions. These rules are spiritually similar to the methods I develop in Section 5,
but in this chapter's setting experts cannot take actions to aect the future except by
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inuencing the decision maker's action through their predictions or recommendations.
More recently, Boutilier[14] has discussed decision making with an expert who has
its own preferences over the decision maker's actions. Intuitively, if our experts are
solar energy lobbyists they may prefer we invest in solar energy even if they must
mislead our decision and receive a lower score for doing so. He (Boutilier) introduces
compensation rules that redress the expert's loss of utility for letting other actions
occur to make the expert indierent again. He also details some realistic complexities
of this setting, like the decision maker not precisely knowing the expert's utility
function. Dierent from [14], experts in this chapter's setting do not have preferences
over actions.
7.2 Prediction and Decision Markets
In this section I formally compare classical prediction elicitation and eliciting
predictions for decision making. This comparison illuminates the new incentive chal-
lenges that come with making a decision. I begin by describing the classical setting.
There are many methods of eliciting predictions about the future. One popular
method uses a scoring rule [16, 43] to evaluate a forecast, and similar rules will be the
focus of this chapter. Formally, let 
 be a nite, mutually exclusive and exhaustive
set of outcomes and (
) the probability simplex over 
. A forecast or prediction
is a probability distribution over 
 (an element of (
)), and a scoring rule is any
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function2
S : (
)  
 ! R (scoring rule)
that maps a forecast and observed outcome to the reals. Intuitively, a scoring rule
compares the forecast to the observed outcome and assigns a real-valued score. For
example, we might be curious if it will be sunny or cloudy tomorrow3. In this case

 = fSunny, Cloudyg and a forecast is a binary probability distribution like (1
3 :
Sunny; 2
3 : Cloudy). If tomorrow is sunny then this forecast's score would be S((1
3 :
Sunny; 2
3 : Cloudy);Sunny).
Predictions from a single expert and many experts in a market are scored dier-
ently. I describe working with a single expert rst. A single expert produces one
prediction p 2 (
), after which we observe the outcome ! 2 
 and score the expert
S(p;!). If the expert believes a forecast q is the true forecast, then its expected score
for a prediction p is
S(p;q) =
X
!2

q(!)S(p;!) (expected score)
where q(!) is the likelihood the belief q assigns to outcome !. Not every scoring
rule is useful. A desirable property is that a risk-neutral expert is incentivized to
accurately reveal its belief. A scoring rule that provides such incentive is proper and
satises
argmax
p2(
)
S(p;q)  fqg; 8q 2 (
): (properness)
2See Chapter 3 for why I dene scoring rules to be real-valued.
3I assume these outcomes are mutually exclusive (no sunny cloudy days or cloudy sunny days)
and exhaustive (it is either sunny or cloudy).
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That is, I treat the argmax function as returning a set of maximizing arguments to
the expression, and a scoring rule is proper when the expected score is maximized
by accurately reporting the belief q. Even a proper scoring rule may not be useful.
Always paying or scoring an expert $5 is proper, but it provides no real incentive to
be accurate. Instead, we are interested in strictly proper scoring rules where
argmax
p2(
)
S(p;q) = fqg; 8q 2 (
) (strict properness)
The expected score of a strictly proper scoring rule is uniquely maximized by ac-
curate reporting. (Strictly) Proper scoring rules have been characterized previously
in [43], [59] and [83] with convex functions. I will use the following results in later
sections of this chapter.
Theorem 21 ([43]). A scoring rule is (strictly) proper if and only if
S(p;!) = g(p)   g
?
p  p + g
?
p(!)
where g : (
) ! R is a (strictly) convex function and g?
p is a subgradient of g at the
point p.4
Corollary 2 ([43]). Any proper scoring rule
S(p;!) = g(p)   g
?
p  p + g
?
p(!)
satises
X
!2

p(!)S(p;!) = g(p); 8p 2 (
)
4A subgradient of a convex function g : Rn ! R at a point p 2 Rn is a vector g?
p such that
g(p)   g(q)  g?
p  (p   q) for all p;q 2 Rn.
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As mentioned, many experts participating in a market are scored dierently from
a single expert. A prediction market 5 operated using a market scoring rule mech-
anism [48, 49] opens with an initial forecast p0 and lets experts make a series of
forecasts p1;p2;:::. These forecasts are public so experts can review prior predictions
and update their own accordingly. Eventually the market closes and an outcome
! 2 
 is revealed. Instead of being scored for accuracy, however, each forecast in
a market is scored for how much it improves the accuracy of the preceding forecast;
the expert who produces forecast pi is scored or paid S(pi;!)   S(pi 1;!) for the
forecast.6 An expert may make multiple forecasts in the market and its total score is
the sum of the scores for its forecasts.
This method of scoring is useful since it only rewards experts for improving the
accuracy of the prior prediction. Further, we can interpret the last prediction made
in the market as a current market or consensus expert belief. After all, if an expert
disagrees with the current prediction they have an incentive to change it. If the
scoring rule S is proper then this method of scoring is also proper for experts since
argmax
p2(
)
S(p;q)   S(p
0;q) = argmax
p2(
)
S(p;q); 8p;q;p
0 2 (
)
Intuitively, the score of the previous forecast is xed and so does not aect the
optimization. If the scoring rule S is strictly proper then this method is strictly
proper, too. I describe markets using (strictly) proper scoring rules as (strictly)
proper markets.
5Prediction markets can also be operated using continuous double auctions [34, 11], automated
market makers [68, 71], and other wagering mechanisms [78, 72, 56]. In this chapter, we are interested
in prediction markets that use scoring rules.
6It is known that market scoring rules can be equivalently implemented as automated market
makers [21, 25]. I restrict my discussion to the former for technical tractability.
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Note that even in a (strictly) proper market it may be that an expert still expects
to prot by misrepresenting its belief. An expert in a proper prediction market
maximizes its score for a forecast by being as accurate as possible, and it does not
follow that it maximizes its total score by being accurate if it can make more than
one prediction in the market. In fact, an expert may nd misleading other experts
with false predictions to be worthwhile [18], since by leading other experts astray
the expert can create an opportunity for a large correction. If experts are acting
myopically however, then we always expect them to accurately report their beliefs in
a strictly proper prediction market.
Forecasts for decision making are dierent from those in the classical prediction
setting just detailed. When making a decision we have a set of actions A and outcomes

. I assume both sets are nite, mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Instead of
predicting the unique future, when making a decision, experts are asked to predict
the possible futures resulting from a decision maker's choices. This prediction can be
represented by a jAjj
j action-outcome matrix like the one in Figure 7.1, with each
row representing a probability distribution over possible outcomes if the associated
action is taken. The matrix in Figure 7.1 contains all the information relevant to
Outcomes 

Prot Loss
Actions A
Solar 2
3
1
3
Wind 2
5
3
5
Figure 7.1: An example action-outcome matrix showing an expert's prediction of
two possible futures: one resulting from investing in solar energy and the other from
investing in wind.
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making a decision. In this case, if the decision maker believes the prediction is
accurate it will prefer investing in solar energy. These forecasts are elicited in a
decision market just like in a classical prediction setting, except after elicitation the
decision maker selects an action based on the nal market prediction. Only the
outcome of this action is then observed. One intuitive way to think of a decision
market is as a collection of predictions markets with one prediction market per action.
Instead of observing the outcome of each market, however, we only observe it in one.
We have not discussed how these forecasts are scored. We'd like to design a means
of scoring that oers the same incentives for accuracy as strictly proper prediction
markets; that is, we want to incentivize experts to accurately reveal their beliefs. [47],
when introducing the idea of decision markets, suggested that forecasts in a decision
market could be treated like forecasts in a set of strictly proper prediction markets,
one for each action, and the markets for unchosen actions would simply be voided and
unscored. This is a natural proposal, but these markets do not incentivize accuracy,
as the following example describes.
Let our decision maker still be deciding whether to invest in solar or wind energy.
For simplicity I'll assume the outcome space of interest is simply how likely each is
to return a prot, 
 = fProt, Lossg. We'll be running a market, and we let the
prior prediction and an expert's belief be as in Figure 7.2. In this example, I further
assume that this expert is the last expert in the market and its prediction will be
used by the decision maker to select an action.
We can adopt Hanson's proposed scoring scheme using the strictly proper quadratic
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Prior prediction
Prot Loss
Solar 2
3
1
3
Wind 2
5
3
5
Expert belief
Prot Loss
1
3
2
3
2
5
3
5
Figure 7.2: A hypothetical prior prediction (left) and expert belief (right). The expert
can improve the market's prediction for what will occur if solar energy is invested in
and agrees with the current prediction for wind energy.
scoring rule
S(p;!) = 2p(!)  
X
!2

p
2(!) (quadratic score)
and assume the decision maker chooses the action most likely to be protable. Unfor-
tunately, if our expert reports accurately then its expected score is zero: the decision
maker will invest in wind energy and the expert did not improve that prediction.
Alternatively, the expert can lie and claim wind energy has no chance of becoming
protable. The decision maker will then invest in solar and the expert will expect to
score
1
3
 
2=3   (1=3)
2   (2=3)
2
+
2
3
 
4=3   (1=3)
2   (2=3)
2
 
1
3
 
4=3   (1=3)
2   (2=3)
2
 
2
3
 
2=3   (1=3)
2   (2=3)
2
= 2=9 > 0
Thus, misreporting in this decision market is preferred to reporting accurately, and
we cannot claim such a market incentivizes accuracy. The intuition of this example
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was rst noted by [69] for working with a single expert. When an expert is not the last
trader in a market, an additional complication is that the expert's prediction is not
the nal prediction that is used by the decision maker to select an action, although
it may aect future predictions.
Experts' ability to aect which of several possible futures is observed is the salient
distinguishing feature of a decision market. Eliciting predictions for decision mak-
ing has the potential to improve our decisions, but without the right incentives are
unlikely to be useful. In the next two sections I characterize strictly proper decision
making that provides the same incentives as strictly proper prediction markets to
experts. Section 7.3 starts by formalizing the decision making and scoring process.
7.3 Eliciting Predictions for Strictly Proper Deci-
sion Making
The key distinction between decision making and the classical prediction setting
is that in the latter there is one possible future and in the former experts inuence
which of multiple possible futures is observed. To adapt the incentives of a strictly
proper prediction market to decision making, then, requires accounting both for how
the decision maker chooses an action and how accurate an expert's forecast is. In
this section I rst formalize my model of eliciting predictions for decision making
and selecting an action, then describe how experts are scored and what it means for
decision making to be strictly proper. We will see that this denition is dierent if
we are working with a single expert or many experts in a decision market.
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7.3.1 Eliciting Predictions and Decision Making
Until now I have been informal with describing how a decision maker uses the
predictions it acquires to make a decision. In this subsection I formalize this process.
I begin by describing what a forecast for decision making is, how these forecasts are
acquired in the single expert and market settings, and then conclude with how a
decision maker uses these forecasts to select an action.
Let A be a nite set of possible actions that a decision maker can take and 
 a nite
set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes of interest to the decision maker. In
our running energy investment example A = fSolar, Windg and 
 = fProt, Lossg.
Experts are risk-neutral, rational agents and have private beliefs representable
by an jAj  j
j action-outcome matrix associating actions with distributions over
the outcomes.7 Examples of these matrices appear in Figures 1 and 2. Each row of
an expert's action-outcome matrix is a probability distribution over outcomes and
represents the expert's subjective belief on likely outcomes when the row's action
is taken. I denote the set of action-outcome matrices as P. Experts are asked to
produce forecasts or predictions, which are also action-outcome matrices in P, but
may not be the same as their beliefs.
I consider eliciting predictions from both a single expert and many experts in a
market. When working with a single expert, that expert makes a single prediction
P 2 P. The decision maker then applies a decision rule to this forecast to construct
a decision strategy|a probability distribution over the available actions.
7Some prior work considers a setting where experts can incur cost to improve their beliefs and
studies how to induce an appropriate degree of learning as well as accurate predictions [64]. I do not
consider cost of obtaining additional information and assume that experts are endowed with their
beliefs.
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Denition 13 (Decision Rule). A decision rule is any function
R : P ! (A);
mapping predictions in P to decision strategies from (A). Let R(P;a) be the prob-
ability the decision strategy R(P) assigns to taking action a, and say a decision rule
has full support if R(P;a) > 0 for all P 2 P and a 2 A.
Once the decision maker has its strategy it selects an action according to it and
then an outcome ! 2 
 is observed. Intuitively, this outcome is the result of the
action taken.
Multiple experts in a decision market are treated dierently. A decision market
opens with an initial prediction P0 and lets experts make a series of public predictions
P1;P2;:::. This is similar to how prediction markets operate, but with matrix fore-
casts instead of vectors. Eventually the market closes with a nal prediction P and
the decision maker applies its decision rule to this prediction to construct its decision
strategy. I make no assumption on market dynamics or how this nal prediction is
formed.
I further assume that experts know the decision rule used by the decision maker
prior to making their predictions. In Section 7.4, I will show that this assumption
can be relaxed and my results hold as long as experts know that the decision maker
will use a decision rule with full support.
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7.3.2 Scoring Predictions
In classical prediction elicitation, forecasts are scored using a scoring rule, a func-
tion
S : (
)  
 ! R: (scoring rule)
In eliciting predictions for decision making, a decision maker uses the following gen-
eralization of a scoring rule instead.
Denition 14 (Decision Scoring Rule). A decision scoring rule is a function
S : (A)  A  P  
 ! R (decision scoring rule)
mapping a decision strategy, an action taken, a forecast and an observed outcome to
a real number.
A decision scoring rule lets us account for how the decision maker selects its action
as well as how accurate the expert's forecast is. In the next section, we'll see that
this generalization is essential for strictly proper decision making. Throughout the
chapter, I assume that experts know the decision scoring rule used prior to making
their predictions.
When working with a single expert, the decision maker pays the expert who
provides forecast P a score S(R(P);a;P;!), when action a, drawn according to the
decision strategy R(P), is taken and outcome ! is observed. The expected score of
an expert who believes Q and predicts P is
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;P;!): (expected score)
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Unpacking the above, each term is the likelihood an action and an outcome jointly
occur, R(P;a)Q(a;!), times the value to the expert for that outcome occurring
S(R(P);a;P;!).
In a decision market, like in a prediction market, experts receive a net score that
is the dierence of their and the previous predictions' scores. The net score for
prediction Pi is S(R(P);a;Pi;!) S(R(P);a;Pi 1;!), when the nal prediction is P,
the decision maker takes action a according to decision strategy R(P), and outcome
! is observed. The expected net score of an expert in a decision market who believes
Q and predicts Pi, with nal prediction P, is
X
a2A;!2

R(P)Q(a;!)
 
S(R(P);a;Pi;!)   S(R(P);a;Pi 1;!)

(expected net score)
Note that, unlike the single expert setting, there is a separation between the prediction
the decision maker creates a decision strategy from P, and an expert's prediction Pi.
7.3.3 Incentives and Strict Properness
In this subsection I dene strictly proper decision making. Unlike the classical
prediction setting, I will use three denitions of strict properness. One for working
with a single expert, one for running a market, and one that works for both settings.
Also unlike a market, strict properness is not just a function of the scoring rule or
even the decision scoring rule. Instead, an expert's incentives will depend on both
the decision rule and the decision scoring rule used. As a result I will describe (R;S)
pairs as either strictly proper for an expert, for a market, or simply as strictly proper
if they work for both. This is a whirlwind of specialized terms, but by going through
each one, their necessity should become clear. Also, shortly after introducing pairs
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that are strictly proper for a market, we will see that we can safely forget about them
to focus on the other two. Each version of strict properness, however, brings the
same expert incentives as strict properness for the classical prediction setting to the
relevant decision making setting.
To begin, I say a decision rule and a decision scoring rule pair is strictly proper for
an expert when a single expert uniquely maximizes its expected score for a prediction
by revealing its beliefs. Thus, exactly as with a strictly proper scoring rule, truthful
revelation is strictly optimal for a single expert facing such a pair.
Denition 15 (Strictly Proper for an Expert). A decision rule and decision scoring
rule pair (R;S) is strictly proper for an expert when
fQg = argmax
P2P
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;P;!); 8Q 2 P
Strict properness for a market is dened very dierently, and in the next we'll see
these dierences are meaningful.
Denition 16 (Strictly Proper for a Market). A decision rule and decision scoring
rule pair (R;S) is strictly proper for a market when
X
a2A;!2

R(P)Q(a;!)
 
S(R(P);a;Q;!)   S(R(P);a;Pi 1;!)


X
a2A;!2

R(P
0)Q(a;!)
 
S(R(P
0);a;Pi;!)   S(R(P
0);a;Pi 1;!)

for all Q;Pi 1;Pi;P;P 0 2 P, with the inequality strict if Pi 6= Q.
Understanding this denition and how it is dierent from the prior strict proper-
ness for an expert is useful. The expected score of an expert in a market is most
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notably dierent because the decision rule may not be applied to the forecast being
scored. Instead it is applied to the nal forecast made, and for strict properness I
require an expert always expects to strictly maximize its net score by revealing its
beliefs no matter what the decision strategy is.
Intuitively, it is possible that an expect can change the nal prediction to aect
the decision strategy. Since I make no assumptions on the market dynamics and how
the nal prediction is formed, when an expert changes its prediction from Q to Pi,
the nal prediction may change from P to P 0. What I am ruling out with the above
denition is that an expert might have an incentive to change the nal prediction by
predicting against its belief.
I note that the focus of this chapter is not on analyzing whether and when a
decision market aggregates all private information and produces a consensus predic-
tion with rational participants. Instead, I aim to understand when a decision market
provides incentives for any myopic expert to predict its belief if the expert only cares
about its expected payo of the current prediction, a property that strictly proper
prediction markets have but Hanson's decision markets lack. While strict proper-
ness for a market does not allow one to immediately conclude that the nal market
prediction aggregates all information of rational participants in a decision market,
such incentive is necessary for information aggregation | without it, as shown by
the example in Section 7.2, the last participant of the market may manipulate the
market prediction | and hence is fundamental to understand. In Section 7.6, I will
discuss the implication of strict properness for a market on information aggregation
in decision markets with forward-looking rational agents.
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Carrying around two denitions of strict properness is cumbersome. We'd like to
combine them into one, and we can almost accomplish this with the following.
Denition 17 (Strictly Proper Pair). A decision rule and decision scoring rule pair
(R;S) is strictly proper when a prediction's expected score is independent of the deci-
sion strategy
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;Pi;!)
=
X
a2A;!2

R(P
0;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P
0);a;Pi;!); 8Q;Pi;P;P
0 2 P (7.1)
and uniquely maximized when an expert predicts its belief
fQg = argmax
Pi2P
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;Pi;!); 8Q;P;Pi 2 P: (7.2)
Intuitively, this notion of strict properness makes decision making resemble the
classical prediction setting. Like in that setting I require that future predictions
cannot aect the score of prior predictions, and I demand an expert uniquely maximize
its score for a prediction by revealing its beliefs. Also, this denition nearly combines
the previous two, and every strictly proper pair (R;S) is strictly proper for both an
expert and a market, as the following proposition formalizes.
Proposition 2. Every strictly proper pair (R;S) is strictly proper for both an expert
and a market.
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Proof. Let (R;S) be a strictly proper pair. For any P 6= Q, We have
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;P;!)
<
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;Q;!)
=
X
a2A;!2

R(Q;a)Q(a;!)S(R(Q);a;Q;!)
The inequality following from Equation 7.2 and the equality from Equation 7.1. This
implies (R;S) is strictly proper for an expert.
Strict properness for a market requires
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)
 
S(R(P);a;Q;!)   S(R(P);a;Pi 1;!)


X
a2A;!2

R(P
0;a)Q(a;!)
 
S(R(P
0);a;Pi;!)   S(R(P
0);a;Pi 1;!);
for all Q;P;P 0;Pi 1;Pi 2 P, with the inequality strict if P 6= Q.
From the denition of strictly proper pairs, we have
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)
 
S(R(P);a;Q;!)   S(R(P);a;Pi 1;!)

  R(P
0;a)Q(a;!)
 
S(R(P
0);a;Pi;!)   S(R(P
0);a;Pi 1;!)

=
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;Q;!)   R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;Pi;!)  0
for all Q;P;P 0;Pi 1;Pi 2 P. The equality follows from Equation 7.1 and the inequal-
ity from Equation 7.2, and this inequality is strict if Pi 6= Q. Thus (R;S) is strictly
proper for a market, too.
In fact, we can go further and say this denition of strict properness denes most
of strictly proper decision making. For any pair that is strictly proper for a market
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there is a strictly proper pair that uses the same decision rule and a decision scoring
rule that provides experts the same expected net scores as before.
Proposition 3. For every pair (R;  S) that is strictly proper for a market, there exists
a strictly proper pair (R;S) such that every prediction has the same expected net score
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)
  S(R(P);a;Pi;!)    S(R(P);a;Pi 1;!)

=
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)
 
S(R(P);a;Pi;!)   S(R(P);a;Pi 1;!)

for all P;Q;Pi 1;Pi 2 P.
The proof appears in the appendix.
For all practical purposes, then, we no longer need to consider pairs that are
strictly proper for a market. A similar proposition cannot be shown for pairs that
are strictly proper for an expert. In the next section I show that strictly proper pairs
always have decision rules with full support, but some pairs that are strictly proper
for an expert do not. These pairs do, however, create decision strategies with full
support for almost all predictions. Hence this distinction is unlikely to be important
in practice. I thus say strictly proper pairs describe most of strictly proper decision
making.
7.4 Strictly Proper Decision Making
In this section I characterize strictly proper decision making with both many
experts in a decision market and a single expert. I show that any decision rule
with full support is part of a strictly proper pair, and it is easy to construct such
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pairs using a strictly proper scoring rule. Unfortunately, a fundamental limitation of
this approach to decision making is that it requires the decision maker always use a
completely mixed strategy to select an action when running a market, and most of
the time when working with a single expert. This suggests that eliciting predictions
for decision making can improve the likelihood a decision maker takes a preferred
action, but cannot guarantee it does so.
7.4.1 Strictly Proper Decision Markets
In this subsection I characterize strictly proper decision markets. Following our
discussion in the previous section, instead of working with pairs that are strictly
proper for a market, I restrict my attention in this subsection to pairs that are simply
strictly proper. I start by showing that if and only if a decision rule has full support
is it part of a strictly proper pair, and provide an easy means of constructing such
a pair given a strictly proper scoring rule. I conclude this section with the detailed
characterization of these pairs.
I begin by showing a decision rule must have full support to be part of a strictly
proper pair.
Theorem 22 (Full Support is Necessary for a Strictly Proper Pair). If a pair (R;S)
is strictly proper then R has full support.
Proof. Assume, for a contradiction, that R is a decision rule without full support and
S is a decision scoring rule such that (R;S) is strictly proper. Let P  be a prediction
such that R(P ;a0) = 0 for some action a0, which must exist by my assumption that R
does not have full support, and let Q and Q0 be two action-outcome matrices diering
1557: Decision Making
only on action a0. Then we have
X
a2A;!2

R(P
;a)Q(a;!)
 
S(R(P
);a;Pi;!)   S(R(P
);a;Pi 1;!)

=
X
a2A;!2

R(P
;a)Q
0(a;!)
 
S(R(P
);a;Pi;!)   S(R(P
);a;Pi 1;!)

for all Pi;Pi 1 2 P. This implies the same prediction maximizes the expected score
of an expert who believes Q and an expert who believes Q0, yet since this prediction
cannot be both Q and Q0 the pair (R;S) violates Equation (7.2) and so must not be
strictly proper, contradicting our assumption.
Simply put, experts have no incentive to be accurate on actions that are never
tested, so a decision rule without full support cannot be strictly proper. This intuition
is the same one mentioned by Othman and Sandholm [69], who showed that any
deterministic decision rule cannot be part of a pair that is strictly proper for an
expert.
On the other hand, we can constructively demonstrate that any decision rule with
full support is part of a strictly proper pair. Given a decision rule R with full support
and any strictly proper scoring rule  S, we can create a decision scoring rule
S(R(P);a;Pi;!) =
1
R(P;a)
 S(Pi(a);!); (7.3)
and the pair (R;S) is strictly proper since the expected score for a prediction Pi given
beliefs Q and decision strategy R(P) is then
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)
  1
R(P;a)
 S(Pi(a);!)

=
X
a2A;!2

Q(a;!) S(Pi(a);!)
the same expected score as if an expert were participating in jAj independent and
strictly proper prediction markets, one for each action. Intuitively, dividing the scor-
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ing rule's score by the likelihood that the decision maker takes an action unbiases how
the score is sampled. The following complete characterization shows that all strictly
proper pairs are constructed using a similar intuition.
Some additional notation is needed before stating the theorem. I use a colon be-
tween two matrices to denote their Frobenius inner product, A : B =
P
i;j A(i;j)B(i;j),
and let G?
P be a subgradient of the convex function G : P ! R at P. This subgradient
is also a matrix with the same dimensions as matrices in P.
Theorem 23 (Strictly Proper Pair Characterization). A pair (R;S) is strictly proper
if and only if R has full support and there exists a subdierentiable strictly convex
function G such that
S(R(P);a;Pi;!) = G(Pi)   G
?
Pi : Pi +
G?
P(a;!)
R(P;a)
(7.4)
Proof. I begin by showing that given a decision rule R with full support and a strictly
convex G, dening a decision scoring rule S as in Equation 7.4 makes (R;S) a strictly
proper pair.
An expert's expected score for predicting P with beliefs Q and decision policy
R(P) is
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;Pi;!)
=
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)
 
G(Pi)   G
?
Pi : Pi +
G?
Pi(a;!)
R(P;a)

=
X
a2A;!2

fR(P;a)Q(a;!)
 
G(Pi)   G
?
Pi : Pi

g + Q : G
?
Pi
= G(Pi)   G
?
Pi : Pi + Q : G
?
Pi (since
P
a2A;!2
 R(P;a)Q(a;!) = 1)
= G(Pi) + (Q   Pi) : G
?
Pi
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which is independent of the decision strategy, and the expert's expected score for
accurately predicting Q is then
G(Q) + (Q   Q) : G
?
Q = G(Q)
and applying the subgradient inequality we have
G(Q) > G(Pi) + (Q   Pi) : g
?
Pi; 8Pi 6= Q 2 P
implying (R;S) is a strictly proper pair.
Now I show that given a strictly proper pair (R;S) it is necessary that R have full
support and there exists a strictly convex G such that S is as dened in Equation 7.4.
Since Theorem 22 proved the necessity of R having full support, we only need prove
the latter condition.
As a shorthand, I dene an expected score function
V (R(P);Q;Pi) =
X
a2A;!2

R(P;a)Q(a;!)S(R(P);a;Pi;!)
and recall from Denition 17 that
V (R(P);Q;Pi) = V (R(P
0);Q;Pi);8P;P
0;Pi;Q 2 P
allowing us to write simply V (Q;Pi); our strictly convex function G will be G(Pi) =
V (Pi;Pi), which is convex (and I will verify is strictly convex shortly), and we'll use
G
?
Pi(a;!) = R(P)S(R(P);a;P;!)
for any P 2 P as our subgradient at Pi. We verify it is a subgradient by checking the
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subgradient inequality:
G(Pi) + (Q   Pi) : G
?
Pi
= V (Pi;Pi) +
X
a2A;!2

(Q(a;!)   Pi(a;!))R(P;a)S(R(P);a;Pi;!)
= V (Pi;Pi) + V (Q;Pi)   V (Pi;Pi)
= V (Q;Pi)
< V (Q;Q)
for all Pi 6= Q 2 P. The strict inequality following since (R;S) is a strictly proper
pair and this strict inequality implies G is strictly convex [50].
Before concluding, I note that since (R;S) is a strictly proper pair
R(P;a)S(R(P);a;Pi;!) = R(P
0)S(R(P)
0;a;Pi;!); 8P;P
0;Pi 2 P;a 2 A;! 2 

(otherwise there exist beliefs Q such that V (R(P);Q;Pi) 6= V (R(P 0);Q;Pi)), and I
use this fact to verify that G with subgradients as given is, in fact, equal to S
G(Pi)   G
?
Pi : Pi +
G?
P(a;!)
R(P;a)
= V (Pi;Pi)  
X
a2A;!2

fR(P;a)Pi(a;!)S(R(P);a;Pi;!)g +
R(P;a)S(R(P);a;Pi;!)
R(P;a)
= V (Pi;Pi)   V (Pi;Pi) + S(R(P);a;Pi;!)
= S(R(P);a;P;!)
So from any strictly proper pair we can construct a strictly convex G satisfying
Equation 7.4.
Theorem 23 shows that while a decision maker can take a preferred action with
probability arbitrarily close to one, it must commit to a completely mixed decision
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strategy. In short, the decision maker must implement an unbiased estimator of the
future, and this requires stochastically sampling the actions. Note, however, that
it is sucient for experts to believe they will be scored in a strictly proper fashion,
and the decision maker does not have to ex ante design its decision rule. Instead,
it can simply review the nal prediction, construct any decision strategy with full
support, and then score the experts using an appropriate decision scoring rule to
create a strictly proper decision market. This insight is spiritually analogous to the
observation made by [14] on using compensations rules for prediction elicitation when
an expert has preferences over actions. [14] noted that the expert does not need to
know the decision rule to be strictly incentivized to predict its belief.
A fun analogy to the decision maker in a strictly proper decision market is to an
overwhelmed teaching assistant grading a midterm. The teaching assistant does not
have the time to grade every question and instead must pick one from each test. If
some questions are more likely to be graded than others then students will spend
more time on those and neglect the rest, biasing their scores. Only by (1) possibly
grading any question and (2) weighting that question's score by the inverse likelihood
that the question is graded will the teaching assistant create an unbiased estimator,
where the student's expected grade is the same as if every question were reviewed.
This encourages students to pay equal attention to each question and not \game the
system."
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7.4.2 Strictly Proper Decision Making with a Single Expert
Working with a single expert is dierent than running a decision market since the
expert knows the decision maker will apply the decision rule to its prediction. In a
decision market, on the other hand, the decision rule is applied to the nal prediction.
This distinction allows pairs that are strictly proper for an expert to use decision rules
that do not have full support, although we can formally demonstrate that it is rare
for these rules to create decision strategies that are not completely mixed.
Theorem 24. For any pair (R;S) that is strictly proper for an expert, dene a set
P0  P as the forecasts that R maps to decision strategies that are not completely
mixed. The set P0 is nowhere dense in P with its natural Euclidean topology.8
Intuitively, this means that for any forecast that the decision rule maps to a not
completely mixed decision strategy, there is another arbitrarily close forecast that
does map to a completely mixed strategy. I think it is unlikely this ability to avoid
some actions will be useful in practice.
I conclude this subsection with a complete characterization of strictly proper for
an expert pairs. The statement and its proof are similar to those of Theorem 23.
Theorem 25 (Strictly Proper for an Expert Characterization). A pair (R;S) is
strictly proper for an expert if and only if there exists a subdierentiable strictly
convex function G and subgradients such that G?
P(a) = ~ 0 whenever R(P;a) = 0 and
S(R(P);a;P;!) = G(P)   G
?
P : P +
G?
P(a;!)
R(P;a)
; 8R(P;a) > 0: (7.5)
8A set is nowhere dense in a topological space if the interior of its closure, with respect to the
topological space, is empty.
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This concludes our discussion of strictly proper decision making, where a deci-
sion maker solicits a complete mapping from actions to outcomes. In the next sec-
tion I discuss an alternative where, instead of this mapping, a decision strategy or
recommendation is directly solicited. This alternative allows the decision maker to
deterministically take a preferred action, instead of doing so with high probability.
7.5 Recommendations for Decision Making
The previous section demonstrated that strictly proper decision making (almost
always) requires the decision maker use a completely mixed strategy to select an ac-
tion. Put another way, even if the decision maker learns some actions are undesirable
it must risk taking them. This is certainly not ideal and possibly non-credible for the
decision maker.
In this section I describe an alternative method of using expert advice to make
a decision. Instead of asking experts to predict the likely outcome of each action, I
instead simply ask a single expert to recommend an action. This allows the decision
maker to always take its most preferred action.
When deciding to invest in wind or solar energy in our running example, the
decision maker can run a strictly proper decision market and ask experts to predict
the likely outcome of each investment. This can increase the decision maker's chances
of making the right investment, but with some positive chance it must take the
\wrong" or less preferred action simply to test the experts' accuracy. A simple and
useful alternative is to oer a single expert a percentage of the realized prot, and ask
them to suggest an action. This expert is no longer interested in making an accurate
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prediction; instead its incentives are perfectly aligned with the decision maker's to
produce a \good" or preferred outcome. This alignment of expert's and decision
maker's incentives will let the decision maker deterministically act on the expert's
recommendation. Formalizing this model of decision making is the topic of this
section. I stress that if the expert recommends a single action, the decision maker can
deterministically take it, in contrast to the previous result. This is a great benet of
asking for a recommendation. In fact, we'll see that an expert can always recommend
a single action since a decision maker will have one action it (weakly) prefers more
than the others.
This approach, like eliciting predictions for decision making, also has its limita-
tions. It only lets us solicit a recommendation from a single expert, and eliciting an
accurate recommendation is possible if and only if the decision maker's preferences
admit a subdierentiable convex weak utility representation. Still, I think it is an
especially interesting option since it uses ideas from scoring rules without asking for
a prediction. Instead { intuitively { a scoring rule is used to rank the actions so the
expert is incentivized to choose the one the decision maker prefers most|aligning the
expert's and the decision maker's preferences.
7.5.1 A Model for Recommendations
When working with expert recommendations I consider a single expert reporting
a decision strategy  2 (A) and a prediction p 2 (
) of what is likely to occur if
that strategy is adopted. The decision maker then draws an action according to the
strategy, observes the outcome !, and scores the expert using a scoring rule S(p;!).
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Our goal is not to elicit any decision strategy, however, but a decision strategy that,
if followed, results in the most preferred possible distribution p.
Formalizing this statement requires specifying the decision maker's preferences. I
let the decision maker's preferences be a binary relation  on (
), the probability
distributions or lotteries over 
. The decision maker weakly prefers p1 to p0 if and
only if p0  p1 and strictly prefers p1 to p0 if and only if p0  p1. These ordinal
preferences admit a weak utility representation [75, 5] if there exists a function u :
(
) ! R such that if p0  p1 then u(p0) < u(p1) for all p0;p1 2 (
). Further,
I say these preferences admit a (strictly) convex weak utility representation if there
exists a (strictly) convex function u that is also a weak utility representation. I note
that an expected value maximizing decision maker always has preferences that admit
a convex weak utility representation. I continue to assume the expert is a risk-neutral
expected value maximizer. While this assumption may not always hold, it is arguably
reasonable for settings where the reward that the expert can receive is relatively small.
The decision maker's goal is to elicit the decision strategy that if followed results
in its most preferred distribution. If the expert has belief Q, then the decision maker
wants to nd a decision strategy  2 (A) { a column vector { such that
Q
T  
  Q
T  ; 8 2 (A) (preferred strategies)
where QT is the transpose of Q and hence QT  is the lottery over outcomes created
by selecting decision strategy . I let 
Q denote the set of such preferred strategies
 and
Q = argmax
2(A)
sup
p2(
)
X
a2A;!2

(a)Q(a;!)S(p;!)
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denote the set of decision strategies that maximize the expert's expected score. I say
a scoring rule is a recommendation rule for preferences  if it always incentivizes the
expert to reveal a strategy in 
Q.
Denition 18 (Recommendation Rule). A scoring rule S is a recommendation rule
for preferences  over (
) when Q  
Q for all Q 2 P.
Intuitively, a recommendation rule translates the decision maker's preferences into
a payo function (scoring rule) for the expert that incentivizes it to reveal the decision
maker's most preferred strategy.
To recap, in our recommendation setting there is a decision maker and a single
expert. The decision maker shows the expert a scoring rule, and the expert reports
a decision strategy and makes a prediction about the outcome of this strategy. The
decision maker acts according to the strategy, observes the outcome, and pays the
expert based on its prediction and the observed outcome using the scoring rule. If the
scoring rule is a recommendation rule then the expert has an incentive to reveal the
strategy the decision maker would most prefer taking if it had the same information
the expert did. I note that the expert does not need to know the decision maker's
preferences.
7.5.2 Characterizing Recommendation Rules
In this subsection I describe the preferences for which we can construct a rec-
ommendation rule where an expert maximizes its expected score by reporting the
decision maker's most preferred decision strategy. That is, I describe the preferences
for which we can strictly incentivize the expert to reveal strategies in 
Q. It turns out
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this is precisely the set of of preferences admitting a subdierentiable convex weak
utility representation.
I rst show that if we know a subdierentiable convex function9 that is a weak
utility representation of the decision maker's preferences, we can use it to construct
a recommendation rule.
Proposition 4 (Recommendation Rule Construction). If a sub dierentiable con-
vex function G : Rj
j ! R is a weak utility representation of the decision maker's
preferences , then the scoring rule
S(p;!) = G(p)   G
?
p  p + G
?
p(!)
is a recommendation rule for its preferences.
Proof. G is a weak utility representation of  means that p0  p1 implies G(p0) <
G(p1). By Theorem 21 and Corollary 2, the scoring rule
S(p;!) = G(p)   G
?
p  p + G
?
p(!)
is proper (in the classical sense) with expected score function
G(p) =
X
!2

p(!)S(p;!):
An expert with belief Q maximizes its expected score by solving
max
2(A);p2(
)
X
!2

(Q
T  )(!)S(p;!)
9A convex function G : Rn ! R is subdierentiable everywhere in its relative interior. I am
requiring, for notational simplicity, it also be subdierentiable at its relative boundary.
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and since S is proper, given any 
X
!2

(Q
T  )(!)S(Q
T  ;!) 
X
!2

(Q
T  )(!)S(p;!)
for all Q and p. By our construction,
X
!2

(Q
T  
)(!)S(Q
T  
;!) 
X
!2

(Q
T  )(!)S(p;!)
for some  2 
Q, with the inequality strict if  62 
Q, since
Q
T  
  Q
T  ; 8 62 

Q
and
G(Q
T  
) > G(Q
T  ); 8 62 

Q
which then, by Corollary 2, gives the desired inequality. Thus, S is a recommendation
rule.
Proposition 4 indicates that the decision maker's preferences admitting a subdif-
ferentiable convex utility representation is a sucient condition for the existence of
a recommendation rule for the preferences. In fact, it is also a necessary condition.
Theorem 26 gives the complete characterization.
Theorem 26 (Recommendation Rule Characterization). If the decision maker is
considering at least two actions, there exists a recommendation rule S for its prefer-
ences  if and only if these preferences admit a subdierentiable convex weak utility
representation.
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Proof. Proposition 4 proves that if the decision maker's preferences admit a subdif-
ferentiable convex weak utility representation there exists a recommendation rule for
them. Here I only prove the necessity of this condition.
Assume, for a contradiction, that the preferences  do not admit a subdieren-
tiable convex weak utility representation but there is a recommendation rule S for
them. Let there be an expert with belief Q such that Q(a) = q1 and Q(a0) = q2 for
all a0 6= a. Assume the expert recommends a single action, then its expected score
function given that action is
V (q) = sup
p2(
)
X
!2

q(!)S(p;!)
which is a subdierentiable convex function of the lotteries. Since I assumed that
 does not admit a subdierentiable convex weak utility representation, this implies
that there exists q1 and q2 such that
V (q1)  V (q2); and
q1  q2:
That is, the expert expects a (weakly) higher score by recommending a less preferred
action a. Further, the expert expects to score (weakly) higher by recommending
action a than any convex combination of actions because
V (q1)  V (q1) + (1   )V (q2)  V (q1 + (1   )q2);
where the second inequality is due to the convexity of V . Thus, the decision strategy
of taking action a with probability 1 is an element in Q but not in 
Q. This
contradicts our assumption that S is a recommendation rule for preferences .
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It is interesting that a scoring rule is used to \rank" lotteries in a way that matches
the decision maker's preferences over lotteries. This lets us incentivize an expert to
reveal the decision maker's most preferred decision strategy. Furthermore, because
the decision maker's preferences must admit a convex weak utility representation, it is
without loss of generality to restrict the expert to reporting a single action instead of
a decision strategy. To see this, let u be the convex function representing the decision
maker's preferences, and whenever p1  p2, we have u(p1) < u(p2). By convexity of u,
we know that u(p1 +(1 )p2) < u(p2), which implies p1 +(1 )p2  p2. Thus,
any mixed decision strategy (which will create a convex combination of lotteries)
is always (weakly) less preferred to the best single action (which leads to the most
favorable lottery). The expert can simply recommend a single action for the decision
maker to deterministically take.
7.5.3 Quasi-Strict Properness and Strictly Proper Recom-
mendation Rules
Recommendation rules incentivize an expert to reveal the decision maker's best
decision strategy, but not necessarily to accurately reveal their prediction on likely
outcomes if that decision strategy is followed. In [69], scoring rules that the authors
called quasi-strictly proper incentivized an expert to reveal both for a special case of
decision making. In their paper, a decision maker has a nite set of actions and only
two outcomes, \good" and \bad." The decision maker solicits an action-outcome
matrix from a single expert, then applies a deterministic decision rule to select an
action (i.e. no mixed decision strategy is allowed). The authors focus on the natural
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special case of their model where the decision rule selects the action most likely to
result in the \good" outcome, and show they can create a quasi-strictly proper rule
with two nice properties: (1) the action that the expert believes will most likely
result in the \good" action is always chosen by the decision maker, (2) the expert
accurately reports the likely results of this action. These rules are \quasi-strictly"
instead of \strictly" proper since the rest of the action-outcome matrix may not be
accurate.
In this setting, we no longer request an entire action-outcome matrix when an
expert makes a recommendation, and so we can simply describe recommendation
rules as strictly proper when they incentivize the expert to accurately reveal its belief
about the strategy's outcome.
Denition 19 (Strictly Proper Recommendation Rule). A scoring rule S is a strictly
proper recommendation rule for preferences  if it is a recommendation rule for ,
that is, Q  
Q for all Q 2 P, and for all  2 Q,
argmax
p2(
)
X
a2A;!2


(a)Q(a;!)S(p;!) = fQ
T  
g
for all Q 2 P.
In practice, strictly proper recommendation rules may be interesting as they allow
the decision maker to understand and plan for the likely aects of its decision. These
rules can be partially characterized immediately as a corollary of my recommendation
rule characterization.
Corollary 3 (Strictly Proper Recommendation Rule Characterization). If prefer-
ences  admit a subdierentiable and strictly convex weak utility representation, then
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there exists a strictly proper recommendation rule for .
The proof is immediate from the rst part of Theorem 26, since a strictly convex
function implies that the expert uniquely maximizes its expected score when the
prediction p is equal to the resultant lottery QT  . Note, however, this result is
not tight, and we leave open the possibility that other types of preferences may have
strictly proper recommendation rules.
7.6 Decision Making in Review
This chapter studied the elicitions of predictions and recommendations for deci-
sion making. It showed that when eliciting predictions for decision making, strict
properness generally required the decision maker risk taking an action at random.
This is best interpreted as telling us that a decision maker can improve the likeli-
hood it takes a preferred or \best" action by running a decision market, even though
it cannot guarantee it takes such an action. Thus, decision markets are useful, if
imperfect.
When working with a single expert, on the other hand, we can acquire a rec-
ommended decision strategy and simply take that action. This suggests a trade-o
between working with multiple experts, who may combine their knowledge in brilliant
ways, and working with a single expert, where there is no risk of taking an action our
consultant thinks will be a poor one.
Several avenues of future work are suggested by this chapter. First, the prior
chapters of this thesis consider strict properness very generally (Chapters 2{4) and
also the challenge of designing securities where information is aggregated. This chap-
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ter ducks both challenges. It is not clear that strictly proper decision markets will
aggregate information, and the extension from a discrete setting to a more general
one is likely interesting.
Second, also in Chapter 4 the duality between scoring rules and cost functions
was expressed. When making a decision, however, it is not clear what a cost function
market would look like. Decision markets are a generalization of prediction markets,
and a cost function for making decisions may also illustrate interesting properties of
cost functions.
Finally, my discussion of using a single expert to make recommendations is inter-
esting since our goal is no longer to elicit a prediction, nor even a statistic. This is far
from the classical setting where we are trying to elicit a belief, and other techniques
may be useful when we are asking for a recommendation. Further, our understanding
of strict properness and prediction markets does not provide any method for working
with multiple experts when asking for a recommendation. If this could be done it
would be of great interest, not only because it would suggest a new means of aggre-
gating information, but also because it would pool multiple experts' information and
let a decision maker deterministically take an action. That is likely to be valuable
in practice. I also left two immediate mathematical questions open: (1) character-
izing the necessary conditions for the existence of strictly proper recommendation
rules, and (2) understanding when preferences have a strictly convex weak utility
representation.
In the near future it may be that prediction markets are presented through a gen-
eralization that accommodates decision making. In fact, I no longer think decision
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making is necessarily the most natural lens through which to approach the mathe-
matical discussion in this chapter. We might alternatively think of it as a discussion
of how to run a prediction market when the future is imperfectly observed. That is,
instead of the classical setting where we observe the outcome perfectly, we might con-
sider some noise, or that the true state of the world is beyond us and we only receive
some signal about it. This is essentially what is happening here, with the added
challenge that we both (1) chose what observation of the true state of the world to
make and (2) have preferences about the signal received from doing so.
In short, I think there is a great deal of exciting future work that can begin from
this humble chapter, and I hope it will have a substantial impact on the developing
eld.
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Conclusion
This thesis covered a great deal of material, from the discussion of fundamental
strict properness in Chapters 3 and 4, the development of a cost function for bounded
continuous random variables in Chapter 5, the design of simple and informative mar-
kets in Chapter 6, and lastly the use of predictions for decision making in Chapter
7. In this conclusion I will review the results of these chapters and add a great deal
about possible extensions. I hope these extensions clarify the current work and are
interesting to future researchers.
8.1 Strict Properness
This thesis oers a new perspective on strict properness, a perspective where the
fundamental object of study is the scoring relation or menu of scoring functions.
Both scoring rules and cost functions can be derived from these relations, and are
best thought of as oering dierent languages to access the scoring functions. Scoring
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rules use the language of predictions, and cost functions mimic futures markets where
traders can buy and sell securities.
Strictly proper scoring relations can be identied with subsets of the points and
unique supporting B subgradients of convex functions of the probability measures.
Functions of the probability measures are incredibly special because they always have
these supporting subgradients wherever they are subdierentiable. We also have to
be careful to use the B subgradients since the continuous dual space of the ca space
is not well understood, and may contain other objects. This thinking led to a simpler,
more geometric characterization of strict properness than that oered by [43]. One
interesting distinction in their favor, though, is that they allowed some unbounded
functions to be scoring functions, and I will return to this as an opportunity for future
work.
This fundamental understanding of strict properness let us dene strictly proper
cost functions, and clarify their relationship to strictly proper scoring rules. Connec-
tions between cost functions and scoring rules had been made previously [2, 1], but
none as simply or completely as we were able to oer.
Strict properness is the essential property for eliciting and rewarding accurate
predictions of the future, but as we saw in Chapter 5 it is not the only one. Not every
strictly proper cost function reliably oers securities, or is able to quote meaningful
prices. If the space of securities admits a basis, however, then they do. Chapter 5 also
developed a cost function for bounded continuous random variables called a dynamic
discretization market since it eectively let traders decide on ex interim discretizations
of the continuous outcome space. This market was strictly proper, had bounded loss
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and was unbiased, a new property that is both natural and implied the market could
be computed using a convex program. Prior work on developing reasonable cost
functions for continuous outcome spaces suggested they all had bounded loss [? ] or
were mistaken [67]. Some more recent work like [2] is closer to my own, and could
plausibly be developed to obtain a cost function with bounded loss for a continuous
outcome space, although I believe this would be a substantial amount of work.
There is a considerable amount of work left undone and extensions suggested by
these developments. In particular:
Understanding the Subdierential
It is dicult to understand the subdierential of convex functions for non-Euclidean
spaces. This relation is at the heart of strict properness, and it is possible that progress
could be made considering only functions of the probability measures. We saw this
diculty in Chapter 5, where we had use results from convex programs to obtain
an existence result about the subdierential of the dynamic discretization market.
In particular, we need fast ways of understanding this relation so we can map from
securities to scoring functions, predictions to scoring functions, and scoring functions
to predictions.
The Existence of Convex Functions
Our characterization of strict properness requires a particular type of convex func-
tion exist, and it is not always clear if convex functions like it exist or not for arbitrary
measurable spaces. Work here may reveal some universal techniques for constructing
such functions. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear what domains, other than discrete
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and continuous Euclidean space, it is interesting to apply the techniques of this thesis
to. In these cases the desired convex functions certainly exist.
Extending Scoring Relations
I required scoring relations associate predictions with the bounded measurable
functions. This was an elegant way to identify them with standard convex analy-
sis concepts, but many generalizations are possible. The idea of strict properness
readily supports using measurable functions, as opposed to the bounded measurable
functions, for instance, although these would present many challenges and likely for
little gain. More interesting would be extending scoring relations to handle statistics
(also discussed below) or objects other than predictions. This may be very dicult,
or even impossible in some cases, yet is likely to have improve our understanding of
strict properness.
Generalizing Strict Properness
I have been saying strict properness is the essential property for eliciting and
rewarding accurate predictions, and it is, but maybe  strict properness is the essen-
tially property for eliciting and rewarding  accurate predictions. There are many
possible generalizations of strict properness that might provide predictions accurate
enough for our purposes. Mathematically, these might connect in a fascinating way
to the notion of the  subdierential. These relaxations of strict properness might
also have practical computational advantages.
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Liquidity Sensitivity
As mentioned, strictly proper cost function are liquidity insensitive|they do not
respond to market depth. This is an immediate consequence of strict properness and
the way it translates securities to scoring functions. Both the security b and b + k
translate to the same scoring function, and thus the market assumes the same prices
for both. With two outcomes, that means if one thousand and one securities for the
rst are sold, and one thousand for the second, the market has the same prices as if
just one security for the rst outcome were sold. Even though one out of a thousand
securities seems insignicant, it has as much impact as if it were the rst sold. I
cannot immediately think of a solution to this, although there has been some work
on liquidity sensitive markets [71, 70, 55].
Hybridizing Scoring Rules and Cost Functions
Understanding scoring relations oers us the possibility of hybridizing both scoring
rules and cost functions, obtaining the benets of both. For example, we might let
traders oer predictions or trade securities, and let the market handle translations
between these languages. This may even lead to scoring rules that do not require
an entire probability measure but, more like the work in Chapter 6, can let traders
specify only part of a probability measure, with the market supplying the rest in a
clever way.
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8.1.1 Valuing the Class of Elicitable Predictions
In Chapter 5 we saw a cost function that let us elicit predictions from the class
Pinterval. It is not clear how valuable this class of predictions is, or how much more
valuable it is versus oering a market that discretizes the interval ex ante. For in-
stance, when eliciting a prediction for the outcome of a continuous random variable
on [0, 1], how should we value a market that elicits predictions from Pinterval versus
one that asks for predictions of how likely the result is to be in [0, .5] or (.5, 1].
Intuitively, greater prediction precision seems better, and it would be nice to make a
formal claim or argument that it actually is better.
Statistic Elicitation
One problem recently formalized is the accurate elicitation of statistics instead of
entire probability measures [54]. This is a more general problem than acquiring a
probability measures, and one that could likely benet from this thesis' perspective
on strict properness.
Understanding Other Markets
There is a great deal of work on prediction markets other than those described
here: dynamic pari-mutuel markets [72], markets that set prices based on trader
behavior [15, 28], and call markets [35, 20, 4, 42] are some examples. Understanding
whether or not these markets are strictly proper, and what incentive challenges they
face, could be fascinating.
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8.1.2 Relaxing No Arbitrage
Some other markets [1, 31] suggest relaxing the no arbitrage property to improve
how quickly the market can be computed. Computing a market quickly is a serious
issue, and creating a framework for strict properness that incorporates relaxations
like this would like be interesting.
8.2 Simple and Informative Markets
Chapter 6 discussed the design of simple and informative markets with Bayesian
traders. Unfortunately, it showed that designing these markets was trivial and un-
helpful if we knew nothing about traders' information structure, and it was NP-hard
if we knew everything. Chapter 6 also allowed no opportunity for work in between.
This chapter likely suggests more questions than it answers, including these two:
Empirically Understanding Internal vs. External Aggregation in Markets
We lack a good understanding of whether markets aggregate information inter-
nally, because traders are reviewing past trades and price updates, or simply respond-
ing to external signals. The observed eectiveness of simple markets seems to suggest
a great deal of the latter. It may also be interesting to attempt to understand the sig-
nal structures traders have in practice, or at least how they interpret the information
they are presented with, and how they think others are interpreting this information.
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Notions of Partial Aggregation
As mentioned, Chapter 6's idea of informativeness is all-or-nothing. It may be
useful and interesting to develop an idea of partial aggregation, where some if not
all of traders' information appears in the market. Reviewers of Chapter 6 regularly
suggested this extension.
I believe there is a great deal of empirical work required rst before we can usefully
return to aggregation in prediction markets. Theoretical work like [65] is fascinating
and uses neat mathematical techniques, but it may be too far from the reality of the
situation to be interesting other than as a mathematical investigation. Learning that
markets mostly respond to outside sources would have dramatic implications for our
eld, drastically changing how we approach it. Even if only some information came
from outside, this would be fascinating. Investigating the use of external sources in
markets is likely the most important problem in the eld today.
8.3 Expert Advice and Decision Making
Chapter 7 described how we could use techniques related to scoring predictions
to make decisions. It began by describing decision markets, where a decision maker
elicits predictions about the likely results of each of a set of possible actions. The
decision maker can then review these predictions to help it decide on a course of
action, although it must also risk taking any action with some chance. Intuitively,
the market must implement an unbiased estimator of the future. This means that a
decision market can improve the likelihood a decision maker takes a preferred action,
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although the market cannot guarantee it will.
In the second part of Chapter 5 an alternative model where a single expert made
a recommendation was considered. In this setting the prediction is secondary to the
recommendation, and I showed that we could elicit what the expert believed to be
the best available action and deterministically take it. The technique used, however,
does not generalize to work with multiple experts, and so there is at trade-o between
leveraging the expertise of many experts or deterministically taking the action a single
expert believes optimal.
There are two particularly interesting possible extensions for this work:
Decision Markets in Practice
Running a decision market would be fascinating, both to see how well it would
work, and whether a decision maker would actually be willing to risk taking any action
ex post. Perhaps also, in practice, strict properness is not necessary because traders
are altruistic, and we can safely deterministically take an action in many cases.
Alternatives to Recommendation Rules
The recommendation rules described in the second part of Chapter 5 let a single
expert recommend an action to the decision maker. These rules cannot be immedi-
ately extended to handle multiple experts. What is left open as a possibility, however,
is that there are alternatives to decision markets and recommendation rules that do
let multiple experts pool their information and recommend an action. Such a method
would be of considerable interest.
1828: Conclusion
8.4 In Conclusion
Thank you for reading; I hope some parts of this thesis resonated and excite you
about the many possibilities here for future work.
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